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
FRANCE IN DANGER

This book was first published in France in October, 1913, which makes the warnings and the forecast contained in it all the more remarkable.

FRANCE IN DANGER

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CONTENTS

	PAGE
AN UNEXPECTED PREFACE	ix

Some consequences of the Agadir *coup*—Benefits of the national awakening—What we ought to know—The warning of Alsace-Lorraine—An article in the *Alldeutsche Blaetter*.

THE WORK OF THE PAN-GERMANS: WHAT THEY ARE.

I. THE PAN-GERMAN SPIRIT	I
----------------------------------	---

The pride of the conqueror—A nation transformed—William II and the Crown Prince—Contempt for France—"Deutschland über alles!"—Germany is not satisfied—A unanimous nation.

II. A FORMIDABLE ORGANIZATION	12
---------------------------------------	----

The Pan-German League and its branches—Methods of propaganda and action—The diffusion of Pan-German societies throughout Germany—Different formulas for the same idea—Eloquent figures.

III. THE PAN-GERMAN PRESS	20
-----------------------------------	----

An unequal conflict—Newspapers and journalists in Germany—Pan-German papers in Alsace-Lorraine and Paris—Scouts of imperialism—Maximilian Harden.

WHAT THEY CAN DO.

I. PAN-GERMANISM IN MOROCCO	31
-------------------------------------	----

Origins of the visit to Tangier—Herr von Bülow's ineffectual remonstrance—A vigorous campaign—Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter collaborates with the President of the Pan-German League—The Agadir *coup*.

	PAGE
II. WILLIAM II "ON THE MOVE"	39
<p>Before and after the foundation of the League—The Kaiser changes his tone—A wonderful coincidence of facts and dates—The Emperor and the League at variance—The "Black Week"—Armaments against France—William II still "on the move."</p>	
III. DEMOCRATIC PROPAGANDA	49
<p>A fallacy to be exploded—Pan-German ideas among the masses—Undisguised threats—If needs must, a revolution!—Teutomanic Liberals and Imperialist Socialists—If William II is dethroned.</p>	
IV. SHARPENING THE SWORD	61
<p>Pan-German campaign for increased armaments—Ineffectual resistance on the part of the Government—The "Keim Law"—Insolence and provocation from the victors—Permanent mobilization—Fresh naval and military schemes—One million two hundred thousand men!</p>	
V. THE GERMANIC "BLOC"	72
<p>Pan-Germanism in Austria—Its avowed objects and methods of action—A typical example—Feeling the way—The heir-apparent hesitates—A precarious truce—The great race-conflict.</p>	

WHAT THEY WANT TO DO.

I. ARGUMENTS FOR "INTELLECTUALS"	89
<p>Two methods—Privileges of the German tongue—A successful book—Big and little nations—Aristotle and Nietzsche—Concentration of "culture"—What the professors say—A new formula, and a new right.</p>	
II. WHAT A GERMAN VICTORY WOULD COST US	99
<p>Remember the map with the green border!—One of Herr Class's phrases suppressed by Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter—The programme of conquest and annexation—The account to be settled—To get at England—Are Frenchmen warned?</p>	
III. MONSTROUS THEORIES	108
<p>After the conquest—How the "reconquered brothers" will be treated—Compulsory expropriation and wholesale expulsion—The precedents of Alsace-Lorraine and Poland—The barbarian invasion.</p>	

CONTENTS

vii

PAGE

IV. "HEMMING US IN"	117
An allegorical picture—Pan-Germanism in Belgium—In Holland—In the Grand-Duchy of Luxemburg—In Switzerland—Latin solidarity—The consummation of a great work.	
V. WAR "INEVITABLE"	132
Logical deductions—Bellicose Germany—From Luther to von Bernhardi—What the "settlement of accounts" will be like—No compromise!—Two serious grounds of quarrel—Alsace-Lorraine and the Foreign Legion—Incidents and pretexts.	
VI. WAR "NECESSARY"	147
To test and strengthen the military virtues of the German army—To secure the peace of the world—To save Germany from an economic and financial crisis—France in danger!	
INDEX	159

AN UNEXPECTED PREFACE

A NEW phase of contemporary history dates from the Agadir *coup*. The appearance of the diminutive German gunboat in the waters of a little Moroccan port was to produce consequences never dimly contemplated even by those who intended that this premeditated and deliberate move should have a startling and ominous significance.

They had calculated that it would lead to negotiations, bargainings, possible complications, useful arrangements, and a final settlement, bringing with it unspecified but certain profit.

What they had not foreseen, however, was the essential and immeasurable effect of a violent nervous shock operating suddenly upon so impressionable a nation as France.

The shock of the Agadir *coup* brought France with one bound to her feet. Those who observed her from without seemed no less surprised than those who thought they understood her well because it had fallen to their lot to govern her.

From that moment a change came over the country ; the order of interests in the public mind was suddenly reversed : questions of internal politics, which had satisfied the popular appetite since the defeat of 1870, were now relegated to the second rank, and national sentiment demanded that the first place should be

given to measures dealing with the standing menace from without and the necessity of confronting it with honour.

We all know how, at the presidential election in January, 1913, some shortsighted politicians came to grief for not having appreciated this sudden and no less profound transformation of French mentality.

If they alone had had to be considered no doubt the flame would have been rapidly extinguished, for it had a disconcerting effect on eyes accustomed to the dark places of back-stairs intrigue.

But a series of events, some of them of considerable magnitude, such as the Balkan War, others merely trivial but significant, such as the incidents of Arracourt, Lunéville, and Nancy, the campaign against the Foreign Legion in the German Press, the brutalities of Germanization in Alsace-Lorraine, etc., kept public opinion keen, vigilant, and resolute.¹

Moreover, the increase of her army by Germany,

¹ "On April 13th certain Germans who had come from Metz to Nancy for the Sunday were annoyed by students in a beer-hall; what began as a political demonstration degenerated into a scuffle and other and inoffensive Germans were roughly treated. No representative of the authority of the Prefect or the police could be found for some hours to restore order; this sudden revelation of anarchy in a frontier town of such importance scandalized French opinion, and gave Herr von Jagow, the German Under-Secretary of State, an opportunity for inveighing against French Chauvinism. The German Embassy formally complained to the French Foreign Minister; the latter instituted an inquiry, as the result of which the Prefect of Nancy and the police officers who were responsible were reduced in *status*. . . .

"On April 22nd a German biplane crossed the frontier and descended at Arracourt, some miles from Lunéville. The officers navigating it alleged that they had been lost in a fog, and had crossed into France unawares; they were recognized to have acted in good faith and they were allowed to depart, as with the airship Zeppelin IV (which had landed at Lunéville on April 3rd), though its behaviour had given rise to very grave suspicion. The courtesy shown by France in the matter was regarded by the sensational Press as excessive and as contrasting unfavourably with the hostility and mistrust exhibited

without apparent reason in a piping time of peace, compelling France, as it inevitably must, to take corresponding counter-measures, aroused a most gratifying proof of patriotic fervour among the younger generations of Frenchmen. After the cruel and troublous years during which a morbid and colourless humanitarianism seemed to triumph, all the virile virtues of a race of soldiers reappeared and asserted themselves splendidly in the new blood. Never had the warning and appeal of those slain in 1870 been heard and understood with more tenderness and resolution than by the three-year volunteer recruits of the spring of 1913.

These, then, are some of the consequences of that stroke of the pen with which Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the German Empire, ordered the Commander of the gunboat *Panther* to anchor in the harbour of a little Moroccan port.

* * * * *

Now, have we learned all the moral lessons which the Agadir affair should have taught us, an affair which was finally settled only by a painful material sacrifice on our part?

Have we endeavoured sufficiently to unravel its origin, determine its causes, and foresee its consequences?

That we resent an insult keenly shows that we are not without courage, that we forthwith improvise an ener-

towards French officers in Germany. The French ambassador at Berlin, M. Jules Cambon, was directed to call the attention of the German Government to the frequency of these aerial visits, and the inconveniences that might result. Herr von Jagow acknowledged the complaint, and the only permanent effect of the incidents was an increased haste in Germany to pass the new military Bills, and in France a more active agitation on each side for and against the three years' term of service."—*Annual Register*, 1913, p. 284. [Translator's note.]

getic defence shows us to have determination and pride ; but of what lasting value are these noble atavistic impulses unless we follow them up by applying cold reason to discover whence comes this menace, its meaning, its scope and aim ?

How fragile this boasted " national awakening " would be, were it based merely on sentiment and were it not enlightened by an accurate knowledge of a real permanent peril, the development of which leads to our inevitable downfall.

Now that our falling birth-rate gives us cause for such grave anxiety for the future of our country, and now that we are faced by the problem of the continual augmentation of effective troops, the hour has come for us to think upon that axiom of popular wisdom : " forewarned is forearmed."

But are we sufficiently forewarned ? ¹

* * * * *

I must confess that it was only quite by chance that I began to suspect that we were not, and to feel any anxiety on the matter.

¹ Early in the year 1913, while the new German military law, which had received the unanimous sanction of the Imperial Federal Council, was before the Reichstag for its inevitable ratification, M. Seignobos, a professor at the Sorbonne, wrote in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* to prove that the huge increase in the German army was accounted for by the platonic love cherished by William II for his army. The German people had, it appears, undertaken an expenditure of one billion and handed over 200,000 more men to the tender mercies of the drill-sergeant in order that the Kaiser might not be deprived of the pleasure of holding fine military reviews!

It is surely a matter of the gravest concern that any man of education occupying an important post in France should write—even in a German paper—such disconcerting inanities.

If a Sorbonne professor who, we are willing to believe, wrote in good faith (otherwise he ought to be punished as a traitor); if an instructor of French youth is really so ill-informed of what is going on over our Eastern borders, what can we think of the ignorance of the great mass of the French people!

The treaty of November 4th, 1911, which put an end to the Moroccan conflict, was concluded by M. Jules Cambon and Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter with mutual congratulations. It was taken for granted that once the storm cloud had passed the sky would remain clear for a very long time. But, in the early spring of 1912, an incident took place which, though of far less importance, was to have as serious an effect upon the economic relations of the two countries as the Agadir incident had upon their political and diplomatic relations.

I refer to the Grafenstaden affair which induced the German Emperor to formulate the threat of annexing Alsace-Lorraine to the kingdom of Prussia so as to crush its resistance to the work of Germanization.

In itself the incident was trivial: it was a question of obtaining from the Alsatian Mechanical Construction Company the dismissal of the manager of the factory at Grafenstaden, an Alsatian named Heyler, accused of "Alsatian nationalism."

The accusation was brought by one Heinrich Kempf, a German printer, a member of the Pan-German League who had set up a printing press and a little local paper, the *Ilkirch-Grafenstadener Anzeiger*, at the factory gates in the little locality of Ilkirch-Grafenstaden, near Strassburg. The factory is an extremely important one, employing two thousand workmen, recruited mainly if not exclusively from the native element. The principal manufacture at Grafenstaden is machinery and locomotives, and these rival the similar engineering workshops at Hanover and Cassel. Are we to believe that the Pan-Germans took exception to the good feeling existing between the Alsatian manager and his two thousand fellow-countrymen, or that the German engineers thought it advisable to get rid of a rivalry

which M. Heyler's skill and energy made more dangerous every year? The fact remains that the puerile accusations of the contemptible little local paper, taken up by the vast Pan-German Press, gave the German Government a pretext for once again, and under particularly insulting circumstances, bringing its heavy hand down upon the conquered province. The Alsatian Mechanical Construction Company was officially notified that it would receive no further orders from the German railways as long as M. Heyler remained at the head of the works at Grafenstaden. Without these orders the works could not be carried on. There was no alternative, M. Heyler had to go.

Incidents such as these, which provoked a sharp campaign of reprisals in France against cheap goods "made in Germany," and had their effect on Franco-German relations, induced me to undertake a rather extensive tour of exploration in Alsace-Lorraine. The inquiry which I instituted among the majority of the representative men of the annexed provinces, made me the recipient of a good number of confidential communications inspired by intense patriotism.¹

One, among others, which recurred frequently struck me forcibly.

¹ An article which I wrote on my return brought about the parliamentary intervention of M. Joseph Denais, a Paris deputy, and the decree of expulsion which had been issued under the Combes Ministry by the Prefect of Meurthe and Moselle against an Alsatian deputy, Abbé Delsor, was at last revoked by M. Steeg, Minister of the Interior. This was a very belated reparation for an odious deed which had done more than German insolence and brutality for the Germanizing of Alsace-Lorraine.

Besides this, a series of articles supported by a consultation of deputies from our Eastern departments induced M. Millerand, the War Minister, to issue regulations dealing with the visits of German officers to the frontier zone.

I am anxious to state that these modest but useful results have been pursued at the suggestion of the same patriots from Alsace-Lorraine who encouraged me to write this work.

Why, I was asked, will Frenchmen persist in making the mistake of treating as of little importance, or even as a joke, the various manifestations of Pan-Germanism in Germany, its congresses, speeches, manifestoes, and programmes?

The real truth is that, allowing for some exaggerations and extravagancies, *the Pan-Germans have always succeeded in the end in getting what they asked from the people, the Parliament, and the Imperial Government*; the real truth is that these people at whom we jeer in France as ridiculous and harmless cranks, have contrived on almost every occasion to impose their will upon the Empire.

How many proofs could be given! They demanded Germany's intervention on behalf of the Low Germans in South Africa long before William II sent his famous telegram to Kruger. They created the phrase "Greater Germany" before the world-policy of the Empire was proclaimed in 1896. They protested against the neglect of colonies, and thereby instigated the occupation of Kiau-chau and the whole colonial movement since 1898. They laid down Germany's right to the succession of Turkey, and determined William II's voyage to the East. They were the first to undertake great campaigns in favour of increasing the navy and the army, and in favour of anti-Polish laws. Finally, it was they who prepared and perpetrated the Agadir *coup*.

For after a period of somewhat uneasy incubation and restless organization, Pan-Germanism has entered upon the path of practical, methodical, and fruitful realizations. To-day it is a reasoned, defined doctrine, with a programme which unwinds like the links of a chain—a chain in which many nations will one day find themselves bound to the verge of strangulation.

But France remains in ignorance.

Thus speak those who belong to the intellectual élite of Alsace-Lorraine, the men in whom the intellect, soul and spirit of our race, are incarnate.

* * * * *

I must candidly confess that I was in no way fitted for the study of these matters, but I have always remembered Théophile Gautier's touching definition of patriotism evoked by the early reverses of 1870 : " Mother is being beaten. Help ! " I was warned, both by farsighted Alsatians and by Frenchmen who, as the saying is, have bought their experience, that a danger, unheeded by her, was threatening my country. The least I could do was to go to her help—that is to say, to collect all possible information from the original sources, to weigh the evidence and to endeavour, with the help of those who had given me the work, to give it its full value as an object-lesson and as a sincere and loyal warning.

Have I fulfilled my purpose? My readers may have expected to find at the beginning of this book a preface signed by some name beloved of the public.

Believe me, it is with no thought of presumption that I have dispensed with eminent patronage which I might have had for the asking.

But I have had the good luck, which I thoroughly appreciate, of being able to produce the testimony of the powerful organization which is the main object of my inquiry, I mean the Pan-German League itself.

This preface, anyway, can hardly be suspected of partiality, and that is why I wish for no other.

If I may, I will now quote the terms in which the

Alldeutsche Blaetter, the official organ of the Pan-German League, commented upon an article of mine in March, 1913, wherein I sketched the plan of this work which I have now produced :

“ M. Vergnet’s main object is to show the French the fatal error under which they labour. Influenced by an ill-informed or unreliable German or Alsatian Press, these unsuspecting folk attribute little importance to Pan-German activity, whereas it is known to dominate imperial policy.

“ M. Vergnet proves this statement in detail. It is surprising what accurate information he has, both upon external and internal politics. On the whole his informants have served him well, and he has shown remarkable facility in grasping the sequence of facts.”

After a few insignificant criticisms, the *Alldeutsche Blaetter* continues : “ M. Vergnet has collected such an overwhelming mass of evidence that he cannot but convince his readers that the Pan-German movement has for long been one of the most important elements of the national life of Germany.” The article goes on to say that Herr Bassermann, the leader of the National Liberals, speaking in the Reichstag, had recently enlarged upon the same theme.

“ M. Vergnet has treated in detail, and with a thorough knowledge of his case, the whole history of the Moroccan conflict, from the spring of 1904, when Herr Class published his pamphlet *Have we lost Morocco?* to the convention respecting the Congo. He points out the importance of the fact that, in 1911, the head of the Foreign Office, Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, entered into direct relations with the President of the Pan-German League, Herr Class, and he adds : ‘ We must bear in mind the two outstanding points, the start and

finish of the movement: at the outset of the Pan-German campaign the Government scorned the League's demands; at the end, we find the Minister for Foreign Affairs collaborating with its President.' "

The article concludes with these words:

" M. Vergnet has pointed out most accurately the object and importance of Count von Reventlow's book, *William II and the Byzantines*.¹ On the whole, we repeat, we must admit that he shows a knowledge of fact and of the workings of cause and effect quite exceptional in a Frenchman; a few contradictions and errors of judgment we must attribute to the ardent patriotism of an enemy who, by his labours, is doing his best to rouse and warn France. In spite of a few inaccuracies and distortions of fact, M. Vergnet gives us, in a true and striking summary, a very creditable history of the Pan-German League."

I would apologize for paying any attention to these fulsome praises were I not convinced that the reader would feel as I do, what cynical defiance and bravado lie behind the words. They serve to accentuate the truth which I am trying to reveal. That they dare to confess their strength and their designs in such a tone of calm assurance shows that the Pan-Germans feel that they can rely on the zealous and efficient support of Germany as well, alas! as on the blindness and proverbial frivolity of France.

Do I need any further preface than this explicit and significant article in the *Alldeutsche Blaetter*?

* * * * *

I will add a few words only, for I am convinced that

¹ The exaggeration of monarchical power is known in Germany as *Byzantinismus*. [Translator's note.]

in a work of this kind it is best to dispense with elaborations of literary style. It would certainly fail in its purpose unless it sought to accomplish it by a logical precision of facts and figures, and with a stern simplicity of expression which is a guarantee of sincerity.

A statement of unvarnished fact such as this will, I know, not commend itself to people of a delicate literary palate, and these form a numerous class in a country like ours, where so many of us have asked nothing better of life than to taste the sweets of intellectual enjoyment. How are we, who have been brought up to revel in the things of the spirit, to learn to steel ourselves in the future against the charms of art and beauty?

But the Barbarians are at our gates. France is in danger! Can we stand aside and see her perish?

Ye artificers and custodians of French civilization, of French taste, French culture, and that wondrous moral patrimony which our ancestors have bequeathed to us, are ye willing to surrender it to Pan-Germanism triumphant with the land that nurtured you, its cities and hamlets, its harvests and its streams? It is no mere question of snatching the beautiful living body of our country from the hands of a foe who would a second time barbarously mutilate it on a bed of Procrustes. Our all is in peril, and first of all the very blessings which idealists hold most dear; the glowing hearth of the virtues, struggles and sacrifice, of the heroisms which have fed the flame of our country's prestige, that past of glory where France, spite of misfortune and laceration, has won the right to appear at the bar of destiny before the future garbed in riches and honour—all, in a word, which is our purest pride and has made our very selves, nay, even the soft and gentle air in which the airman springing up in the light of the sky of France can

breathe the perfume of the violets of Athens, and the laurels of Rome.

Thus the duty of the present hour, which dominates all other duties, and applies to all of us—and still more perhaps to the intellectual than to the peasant—must be to estimate the extent of the danger that is threatening our country.

It is in order to perform this duty that I have written this book.



FRANCE IN DANGER

THE WORK OF THE PAN-GERMANS

WHAT THEY ARE

I

THE PAN-GERMAN SPIRIT

The pride of the conqueror—A nation transformed—William II and the Crown Prince—Contempt for France—"Deutschland über Alles!"—Germany is not satisfied—A unanimous people.

BEFORE attempting to describe Pan-Germanism to Frenchmen we must explain the state of mind from which it arises; for there is no movement, or to speak more accurately, no doctrine in France with which it can be compared.

We are a people that has tasted defeat; in our moments of greatest daring we dream that a day of inherent justice will dawn. Our boldest claim is limited to the recollection that between France and Germany there lies that ancient boundary line, that ineffaceable frontier—the Rhine.

But what man among us, however warmly he cherishes these hopes and convictions, would suggest an appeal to violence without delay? There are many Frenchmen who believe that a war between France and Germany is inevitable before long, and they insist that the country shall be prepared to meet it; they also desire that this

terrible account shall be closed by the necessary reparation which will form the basis of a lasting peace. Unless I am much mistaken this is a fairly accurate description of a French patriot's frame of mind, in the present state of Franco-German relations.

Pan-Germanism is quite another thing. It betokens the conqueror's pride. The date 1870, inscribed on the Imperial Standard, marks the entrance of a new people into the council of nations. Men like Arndt, Arnim, Kœrner, Fichte, Schlegel, who inspired and revived German patriotism in 1813, would be horrified to-day at the pedestal of vanity reared by the German Colossus. That congeries of peoples which submitted passively for centuries to the yoke of the foreign conqueror, and which laughed at the misfortunes of the Prussian king after Jena, and thronged to see Napoleon and his "kind Frenchmen" pass, has nevertheless been consolidated into the most formidable of nations by a strong infusion of the active virtues of imperialist pride. The miracle has been wrought by victory, for victory is still a propitious goddess though we no longer build temples in her honour. For not only has she made Germany, and cemented the bonds, which will never break, of the Germanic *bloc*, she has also dowered the German empire with a force which will ensure its lasting might : military pride. Now they claim to be "*a master nation.*" The *Magdeburg Gazette* for April 10th, 1913, warned us that the world could not hope for peace "*as long as there were French patriots left who could dispute with us the premier place in Europe.*" Hark how ceaselessly William II paraphrases Bismarck's defiance : "We Germans fear God and nothing else on earth." With extracts from the speeches of William I's grandson we could make the most astonishing anthology of self-

sufficiency ever uttered by any potentate to the amazement of posterity.¹

“ We have a great future and I lead you to days of glory. . . .

“ We are the salt of the earth. . . .

“ We to-day, with our great united German fatherland, can undertake on a large scale what the Great Elector could only indicate. . . .

“ The German nation alone has been called to defend, cultivate, and develop great ideas. . . .

“ The German Empire has become a world empire. . . .

“ Nothing can be decided without Germany and the German Emperor. . . .

“ Our German nation shall be the rock of granite on which the Almighty shall finish his work of civilizing the world. Then the words of the poet shall be fulfilled, that German character shall save the world. . . .

“ Let them all come, we are ready! . . .

“ Our powder dry, our sword sharpened : let us not turn from our path, but let us strengthen our hands and banish pessimism. Hurrah for the German nation in arms! ”

The Emperor who speaks thus hopes to win from posterity the glorious title of “ William the Peacemaker.” He it was who said on one occasion : “ I believe that, in Germany, I, and my Chancellor alone desire peace ! ”

But is it surprising that the war fever which rages throughout Germany should occasionally infect her rulers ?

The Crown Prince, who, now that he is over thirty

¹ These sentences are extracts from a collection of speeches made by M. Jules Arren, *Guillaume II : ce qu'il dit, et ce qu'il pense* (William II : what he says and what he thinks).

can no longer be considered an irresponsible child, amuses himself by adding to the flow of Pan-German literature. In May, 1913, the publication of a book, *Germany in Arms*, made a tremendous stir; the future emperor was one of the contributors, and wrote for it a sort of hymn of the sword: "It is only by relying on our good German sword that we can hope to conquer that place in the sun which rightly belongs to us, and which no one will yield to us voluntarily. . . . Till the world comes to an end, the ultimate decision will rest with the sword.

" . . . If the whole German nation is resolved to risk cheerfully its life and its all, even in our hour of greatest peril we shall triumph over the world, were it full of devils." So says Emmanuel Geibel, one of the poets who has sung the new German Empire:

If we have nothing left
We still shall have a sword
Which, with a furious mighty blow,
Will repel the assault of the enemy.
Thus the battle shall be the judgment,
Dispensing life and death.
If misery cannot break iron,
Iron shall break misery.

This resounding manifesto was greeted with joyful acclamation throughout Germany, a few Socialists and Radicals alone holding aloof.

The *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, an Agrarian organ, wrote: "Bravo! Everyone who has a drop of German blood in his veins, or a vestige of military ardour in his heart, will applaud the manly words of our 'heir apparent.'"

The *Post*, a Conservative paper, had: "The Crown Prince has spoken as befits a future emperor, and we

trust that the moral and intellectual aptitudes of our heir-apparent will reach complete maturity without any external influence being allowed to impede their development. We need have no apprehension on this score, for we know how deeply noble convictions are ingrained in the Crown Prince."¹

The Military League, met in general assembly, sent a telegram of congratulation to the Crown Prince, who instantly telegraphed his thanks in reply.

A month after the publication of *Germany in Arms*, the Crown Prince ordered the suspension of a play at Breslau. It was written by Gerhart Hauptmann, and entitled "1813," but this appeal to the renascence of German patriotism was not considered either sufficiently Chauvinist or sufficiently militarist.

On this occasion the *Vossische Zeitung*, a Radical paper, uttered a truly pathetic lament: "We cannot help regretting that the Pan-Germans are trying to annex the young Prince Imperial and attach him to their party!"

This young man, whom the "Pan-Germans are trying to attach to their party," put himself deliberately at their head when, from the imperial tribune in the Reichstag, he openly applauded the attacks against England and Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's prudent policy.

On April 25th, 1913, during the vote on the war

¹ Eighteen years before, on March 26th, 1895, Bismarck's eightieth birthday, William II handed him a sword with these words:

"I have come to bring my present to your Excellency. I could think of no better gift than a sword, the arm of the Germans, a symbol of that weapon which your Excellency helped my grandfather to forge, to sharpen, and to wield, the symbol of that mighty period of construction cemented by blood and steel, a weapon which never fails, which in the hand of kings and princes helps if necessary to maintain the unity of the fatherland within, as it has helped in time past to secure it without."

budget, the Socialist Liebknecht had to be called to order, and raised an appalling tumult by denouncing the Crown Prince as the leader of "the bellicose camarilla" which was threatening the peace of the world.¹

M. René Pinon, whose moderation as a writer is well known, has made some very just observations upon the tremendous outbreak of pride which has turned every head in Germany.²

"If by Chauvinism we mean that a nation judges its own actions with exaggerated leniency, and misrepresents all others, the term certainly applies to the German people to-day. We Frenchmen like to make out the worst of ourselves, and *French Chauvinism is nowadays a myth*; but the pride of Louis XIV in all his glory was as nothing compared with that which emanates from German newspapers and inflates the nostrils of German professors. Pride is a dangerous councillor for a nation; for it leads it to underestimate the worth and deserts of other nations."

M. Pinon quotes in amazement the following statement made by a responsible paper, the *Kölnische Zeitung*: "For the last hundred years there has been no progress in any branch of French industry"!

Even more striking examples might be given of the contempt in which we are held by the Germans, who are infatuated with their own importance. Turn to the Pan-German Catechism, which, after a denunciation of the Slavonic peril, asks the following question:

"Are not our adversaries on the West our most dan-

¹ This is merely a detail, but it has a value of its own. The Crown Prince sent a horse to the Horse Show at Brussels in 1913 which was shown by Lieutenant von Rolck with no success, and was called *Nancy*!

² *France et Allemagne*, by René Pinon (p. 246).

gerous enemies? ” and gives this answer : “ They were so in former days, but they are so no longer. They have not the courage to attack us single-handed, because they know that forty million French have no chance against sixty million Germans. They are, therefore, obliged to have allies.”

No doubt this is why the most authoritative Pan-German writers no longer hesitate to threaten France. When, at the time of the Agadir incident, Herr Class, the President of the Pan-German League, issued a fulminating manifesto, it was not launched against France but against England.

In the same way France no longer counts for Herr Paul Rohrbach, a high official of the Colonial office, whose work, *German Thought in the World* (*Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt*), has had a prodigious success. England alone is worth a last effort on Germany's part. Besides, England has only been able to resist the German giant because the Anglo-Saxon branch has drawn its sap from the mighty Germanic oak, and still more because she has always put a high premium on that essentially German doctrine—world-imperialism. We hate our rivals, though we respect them. Germany gives England credit for what she is. As for France : “ Her destiny, for reasons which, in spite of all proffered explanations, remain among the enigmas presiding over the birth and death of peoples, seems to be that she must disappear from the list of great nations.”

Still more expressive are the words of Dr. Rommel, in a popular work entitled with cruel irony, *In the Country of Revenge* : “ France has given way all along the line, everything in her is going to rack and ruin, and now we can talk of her without fear and without anger, but with the respectful pity due to a great nation in the

days of her decline. The oil is running low in the lamp of France. . . . Her power of expansion and of resistance, the mainspring of a *great nation*, seem to be crushed."

In the Pan-German Catechism, to which we have just referred, Pan-Germans describe themselves as "warm-hearted Germans who never forget to think of the future development of the German people, just as a father provides for the future of his children, and is not engrossed merely with the present."¹

The whole world is included in this plan for the future, for the map of the world is completely altered for the benefit of "Greater Germany." In fact, the Pan-German Catechism is accompanied by a truly terrific Pan-German atlas.² It summarizes their whole doctrine. Germany will soon exercise a world dominion. For a long time the Teutonic race has been content to provide other peoples with emigrants as a "civilizing fertilizer," *Kulturdünger*. Now it means to consecrate its hegemony and give it the outward and visible signs of undisputed power. "Warm-hearted Germans" are getting impatient. . . .³

¹ *Alldeutscher Katechismus*, by Heinrich Calmbach, Verlag der Vermögensverwaltung des Alldeutschen Verbandes, Mainz.

² See particularly the maps and atlas by Paul Langhaus, published at Gotha (Justus Perthes).

³ Let me quote a passage from a book to which I shall frequently have occasion to refer during the course of this work, *Wenn ich der Kaiser wäre* (If I were the Emperor), by Daniel Frymann: "The military forces of France are considerable; some competent military authorities think they are even superior to ours. I am not of this opinion because we are justified in believing that many things which we possess in reality the French army only possesses on paper. Add to this, the social disorganization of the whole nation which cannot be remedied by warlike enthusiasm, and also the want of a leader recognized by the army in the event of a war.

"I am therefore of opinion that we shall get the better of France, even if the struggle is a hard one; I even believe that if necessary we could do more than that. Yet we must recognize that the

Every Pan-German paper and publication adopts this tone.

Every German citizen is brought up from his school-days with this idea, that Germany must exercise world dominion, or rather that she must rejuvenate and remodel the world. "Germany's mission in history," says a school manual (*The School and the Fatherland*), quoted by M. Georges Grosjean, "is to rejuvenate the exhausted members of Europe by a diffusion of Germanic blood." Since this is the case, how can she admit that France, feeble, decadent, and corrupt as she is, can withstand her? What is so peculiarly dangerous about German insolence, the boundless conceit and megalomania of this nation in arms, is its sincerity; German power, German science, German industry, everything German is the best, and must dominate, triumph, and command: "Deutschland! Deutschland über alles in der Welt!"

* * * * *

National infatuation of so marked and widespread a character, a conquering nation's lively faith in its brilliant destiny of universal primacy, would never confine itself to theory. We shall see what concrete form is taken nowadays by its aspirations for dominion. The chief rôle of the leaders of the Pan-German movement was to direct German patriotism along the paths of instinct. The romantic idealists of 1813 had assigned to Germanism triumphant the task of establishing the reign of human fraternity and of founding *perpetual peace*, as Kant said, upon respect for rights. This example of patriotic sacrifice which France has given to the world for more than forty years is unparalleled in history and deserves the greatest admiration. But," concludes Daniel Frymann, "the most admirable national sentiment cannot replace things which only exist on paper, nor compensate for a difference of twenty million inhabitants."

generous chimera has been rudely shattered by the Pan-Germans, and Heine would no longer have sped his barbed shaft: "Land for the French, the seas for the English, the kingdom of air for the Germans." Germany, nowadays, hopes earnestly that she will one day rule the seas, for she has fully grasped the import of William II's appeal and made it her own: "Our future is on the sea!" Meanwhile she wants more land.

Herr von Caprivi contradicts this. But, since 1892 the Pan-German League has worked upon public opinion and a complete change is evident in the trend of ideas in this respect.

It is laid down as clearly as one could wish in Herr Daniel Frymann's solid work, *If I were the Emperor*:

"Since Bismarck retired there has been a complete change of public opinion. It is no longer the fashion to say '*Germany is satisfied.*' Our historical development and our economic needs show that we are once more opening our mouth wide for new territory, and this situation compels German policy to follow paths unforeseen by Bismarck. . . ."

"If there is one State more than another which requires territorial expansion, it is the German Empire; for its population is increasing rapidly, its industry needs fresh outlets, its whole economic existence requires new territory for the supply of raw materials for which it now depends to an intolerable degree upon other nations (cotton, for example). . . ."

This is no doubt what Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg means, when he asserts that Germany is determined "to carve out her way in the world." But a Chancellor cannot express himself as freely as a mere publicist, even when the latter exposes the covetousness of the Pan-German League.

In the following chapters we have drawn up a statement of these demands, which represent the well-nigh unanimous wish of the German people to-day. But before we do this it will be as well to set forth what organization is at the disposal of Pan-Germans, and to what extent they can achieve what they desire.

Thus in time we shall discover how dangerous they are.

II

A FORMIDABLE ORGANIZATION

The Pan-German League and its branches—Methods of propaganda and action—The diffusion of Pan-German societies throughout Germany—Different formulas for the same idea—Eloquent figures.

THE life and soul of the Pan-German movement is naturally the Pan-German League (*Alldeutscher Verband*), for it is numerically the strongest of all the associations whose avowed object is the propagation of the imperialist ideal, and gives the lead and the word of command to all the others which it has founded.

Its foundation dates officially from 1891, from the reaction of the Bismarckian ideal against the imperial policy of the "new era," which the dismissal of the Chancellor inaugurated. Bismarck in disgrace was an honorary member from the first, and certainly inspired the early campaigns waged against the pacific policy of Caprivi, that is, against William II's personal policy.

But in reality the League was *in process of potential formation*, if we can use such an expression, from the morrow of the victorious war of 1870. By a delicate irony its virtual promoter seems to have been William II himself, in the days when, as Crown Prince, he professed ideas which he repudiated as Emperor. It is said that he liked to encourage the early doctrinaires of Pan-Germanism. A certain pamphlet, entitled *A Universal*

German Empire, which was disseminated broadcast throughout the Empire, was popularly supposed to have been drawn up in the immediate circle of the Prince Imperial. It contained these words :

“ Our aim must be the development of German power with all that it involves. The grouping of all its members into one political whole has always been the object of the efforts of a virile nation.

“ It must be well done ; we must confine our efforts within just limits ; we must go forward gradually till the moment arrives when we can unmask our batteries without danger ; then Europe will find herself faced by a situation whose smallest details have been prepared, and against which she will be powerless.”

The propagandist leaflets of the Pan-German League twenty years later, could not be more definite.

In 1875, Dr. Hasse, a personal friend of the Crown Prince, joined, on his advice, a little society known as the *Colonial Union*, which preached in vain Germany's need of economic expansion in Africa and Asia. This feeble association was to form the skeleton of the powerful Pan-German League, of which Dr. Hasse became the President.

The constitution of the League, under its first title *Allgemeiner deutscher Verband*, was brought about in the spring of 1891 by the signing of the Anglo-German agreement relating to East Africa, which, in exchange for concessions granted to England, gave Germany the little island of Heligoland. Violent opposition was roused throughout the Empire on that occasion by the highly pacific utterances of the Emperor, for the little island in the Baltic had been bought by Germany's withdrawal before England in the domain of colonial competition. The moment seemed propitious. A few

months after launching its first appeal the League had ten thousand members. The appeal proclaimed the necessity "of strengthening the consciousness of the German people, of fostering both within and without its frontiers the love of all German races." A whole programme of propaganda was at once laid down. The constitution provided notably for a wide diffusion of patriotic prints and pictures: "The League, imbued with a sense of the high educative value of art in the home, has decided to publish artistic pictures inspired by profound patriotic feeling." Annual prizes of 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 marks were offered to encourage the publication of a work of imperialist propaganda to be distributed gratis every year in the schools.

The real starting-point of the League dates from 1894. Dr. Hasse, the deputy for Leipzig and the old friend of William II, was then at its head, and it changed its title, the better to emphasize its object, to the Pan-German League (*Alldeutscher Verband*); at the same time a weekly paper was issued called *Alldeutsche Blaetter*.

The League then claimed "to implant in the masses of the German nation the conviction that German development by no means reached its highest point after the events of 1870 and 1871.

"The German Empire has become a world empire, but we have not yet derived from this fact all its consequences. Above the interests of the State, should be the interests of the Nation; even more sacred than love for the Fatherland should be love for the Mother country." "Love for the Mother country" is to be shown at home by assimilating with energy all refractory elements, Poles, Danes, Alsatians, and abroad by more and more extensive and "active dealings" with

the Germans of Austria, Switzerland, and elsewhere, with the Flemish, etc.

I hope to show how this programme has been developed and its realization pursued with truly remarkable method and tenacity of purpose.

At the present moment we do not know the number of the League's adherents, as this is kept a profound secret. We only know that Germany is divided into four territorial groups, which are again divided into two hundred and ten local sections. About thirty deputies in the Reichstag are Pan-Germans.

The League is directed by six persons, the President Class, a lawyer from Mainz, Generals von Liebert and Keim, Commander von Stoessel, *Superintendent* Klingemann (a pastor), and Itzenplitz, the armament manufacturer. They are assisted by an executive committee of about twenty persons, among whom are a number of professors, General von Wrochen, Dr. Reismann-Grone, the proprietor of the *Rheinisch-Wesphaelische Zeitung*, the Pan-German editor from Munich, I. F. Lehmann, and Langhaus, the cartographer, who publishes Pan-German atlases. Finally, there is a consultative committee of about a hundred members.

The Pan-German League, while it remains in principle outside all questions of party and denomination, has encouraged the formation, under its auspices and in close contact with it, of various societies on a narrower basis. Thus the *Deutschbund* (German Society), founded in 1890, undertakes to foster friendly feeling among its members "by emphasizing the culture of the race," which means that it is anti-Semitic. This is likewise the special object of the *Hammerbund* (called after the hammer, the emblem of the Germanic god Thor), founded in 1902. The *Odin Society*, in Munich, which

bears the name of another god of Germanic mythology. is particularly anti-Catholic. These societies are so diverse that all the friends of Greater Germany can join whichever one corresponds to their especial preference.

There are other societies with a distinctive object. The *Deutsche Kanzlei, Hilfsstelle für vaterlaendische Arbeit* gives information upon national questions and puts itself at the disposal of all patriotic societies and enterprises. The *Vaterlaendischer Schriften-Verband* furthers the publication of patriotic works. The object of the *Allgemeiner Deutscher Sprachverein* is to cultivate correct speech, and to extirpate from the German vocabulary all words derived from foreign sources. It has 31,000 members divided among 324 local sections.

The Veterans' Societies (*Kriegerverein*) are older than the Pan-German movement, but their federation (*Deutscher Kriegerbund*) is in close touch with the League.

We must also make special mention of the powerful and active *Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft*, the Colonial Association, with its ever-increasing work and influence.

When the question arose of increasing the German fleet, the Pan-German League headed the movement, and the better to cope with the situation created a special society, the *Deutscher Flottenverein*, which has 3,387 branches and 334,000 members, an annual expenditure of 565,000 marks, and a reserve of one million.¹ The success of this organization for increased naval armaments was so great, that it was thought advisable to start a similar association for the army. This was the object of the *Deutscher Wehrverein* (Society for

¹ The *Deutscher Flottenverein* even has branches in France. There has been one in Paris since 1902.

German Defence) which was founded in 1912, and has 278,000 members and more than 450 branches.

Each portion of territory that is "threatened" by a non-German population is under the protection of a special society. Since 1894 the *Deutscher Ostmarken-Verein* has undertaken to oppose the Poles in East Prussia. This society, which is usually known as the Hakatist Society, after the initials of its three founders, von Hansemann, Kennemann, von Tiedemann, has 54,000 members divided among 450 branches, an annual income of 170,000 marks, and a capital of 870,000 marks. By the side of this vast association there are smaller societies which deal with questions of detail such as the *Deutscher Stipendien-Verein der Provinz Posen*, which assists German students in Posen.

The borders of Denmark are watched over by the *Deutscher Verein für das nordliche Schleswig*, a society of 13,000 members, founded in 1891.

Since 1881, the *Verein für das Deutschtum in Ausland* has dealt with emigrants, kept them in touch with the Mother country, started German schools, etc. It has 50,000 members, 340 branches, and has already spent more than 4,000,000 marks on maintaining German education abroad. Other specialized associations, which it would take too long to enumerate, are all working for the same end.

Many of these societies have different branches for men and women, and there are also branches for young people, who are united in virtue of the most varied pretexts under the ægis of Pan-Germanism. For example, there is the *Deutsche Jugendwehr* for young folk at the seaside, the *Deutsch-nationaler Handlungs-Gehilfen-Verband* for young tradespeople, the *Jung-Deutschland*

Bund for physical preparation for military service, the *Verein Deutscher Studenten* for all Pan-German students.

The Pan-German League is, I repeat, merely the centre round which revolve an infinite number of associations of similar tendencies. By these means the Pan-German movement has spread its meshes over the whole Empire, and to-day there are few Germans who can claim to have held themselves absolutely aloof from this organization. Whether consciously or not they have been obliged to submit to the influence of its untiring propaganda, to the irresistible current of public opinion, and have perforce adopted its tendencies. At the present moment we can safely say that, with the exception of the adherents of Socialism—and not all of them even—the whole of Germany is Pan-German in sympathy, which means that she is possessed by a clear and reasoned ideal of expansion, conquest, and universal domination.

In the *Temps* of June 18th, 1912, the Berlin correspondent of this paper, M. Pierre Comert, makes a study of "German Chauvinism," and after pointing out the strength and power of public opinion created by the Pan-German League and its propagandist associations, writes :

"More skilful than official circles, these great organizations have known how to win the favour of the public ; it is always on their side whenever they come into conflict with accepted authorities. The Government is no doubt strong enough to-day to say them nay, and in spite of the uproar of the populace it can go its own way, saying, as did Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg at the sitting of November 9th, 1911 : ' We neither look for your praise, nor fear your blame.' But how much longer will its credit be good enough for it to stand out against public opinion with impunity ?

“ The gravity of the present situation is obvious. The German Government is all for peace ; public opinion is all for war. I do not hesitate to say that it would be far less dangerous if the Government wanted war and the public wanted peace.

“ If the Government cannot contrive to recover control of opinion, we fear that public opinion will inevitably crush the decisions of the Government. One of the highest personages of the Empire said to me the other day, with profound melancholy, ‘ The next war will be declared by the Press ’ ; perhaps it would have been more accurate to say that it would be the work of those influences which are supreme over both the Press and public opinion in Germany.”

These influences, to call them by their right name, are nothing more nor less than the Pan-German League and all its network of affiliated societies, that formidable manifold organization, that imperial freemasonry of which we know only the external manifestations, ridiculous and outrageous as they sometimes are. Nevertheless, their terrible work is being slowly and surely accomplished, they are gaining ground and making irresistible progress.

III

THE PAN-GERMAN PRESS

An unequal conflict—Newspapers and journalists in Germany—
Pan-German papers in Alsace-Lorraine and Paris—Scouts of
imperialism—Maximilian Harden

“THE next war will be declared by the Press.” These words alone, reported by the Berlin correspondent of the *Temps*,¹ would justify us in contradicting categorically those who persistently repeat in France that the Pan-German Press is a negligible quantity in the Empire. In Germany itself there are many Radicals and Socialists who would like to think so. Herr Théodore Wolff, who used to be the Paris correspondent and is now the editor of the Radical *Berliner Tageblatt*, is quite mistaken if he thinks he can divert our attention by statements so obviously devoid of truth as the following: “The Pan-Germans only control some obscure papers, and their exaggerations are instantly pointed out and contradicted by a score of responsible papers.”² It is quite true that the *Berliner Tageblatt* and the *Berliner Morgen Post* are always lecturing the Pan-German papers on common sense and moderation; but these sober words reach few ears, whereas an immense population batters on the gallophobe lies and warlike incitements of the *Taegliche Rundschau*, the

¹ The *Berliner Lokal Anzeiger* also reports them and attributes them to a high German official.

² *L'Énigme allemande*, by Georges Bourdon, p. 144.

Kreuz Zeitung, the *Reichsbote*, the *Berliner Lokal Anzeiger*, and the *Preussische Zeitung*, which bears as its device: "Forward for King and Country."¹

To give some idea of the active strength of the movement, it will be quite sufficient to mention a few of the most influential of the innumerable Pan-German publications.

I have already referred to the *Taegliche Rundschau* and the *Kreuz Zeitung*, which, together with the *Berliner Post* (the special organ of the great armament works), are the most important as well as the most violent Pan-German organs. The *Deutsche Tageszeitung* deserves special mention on account of the reputation of its military editor, Count von Reventlow. He and General Litzmann, a member of the *Wehrverein* and military editor of the *Taegliche Rundschau*, seem to vie with one another as to who can express in most violent language the German hatred for the hereditary enemy, *Erbfeind*.²

At present the pride of place seems due to the *Taegliche*

¹ We may remember moreover that a well-known military writer, Commandant Moraht, contributes to the *Berliner Tageblatt*, which is not exactly a pacifist organ, in spite of its cavilling attitude towards German super-patriotism.

We might also recall the fact that in June, 1913, the *Berliner Tageblatt* suppressed a sentence in Herr Wilhelm Ostwald's article on the question of armaments, because it was considered too favourable to France. Herr Ostwald had stated, as a matter of fact, that the passing of the three years' service law in France had been the result of the new German military laws! And the *Berliner Tageblatt* prides itself on its impartiality!

² At the time of the Nancy incident the *Post* went further than merely insulting and threatening France outrageously; it circulated this ridiculous lie:

"At the great review in the spring several cavalry regiments galloped past the President, shouting, 'Down with Germany!' And not one of them was punished, which is an unheard of thing in time of peace!"

This time the *Post* had rather overdone things; the other Pan-German papers did not dare follow it!

Rundschau, which has compared France to a sewer !¹

We must also mention the *Berliner neueste Nachrichten*, edited by Herr Max Schievelkamp, while Herr Otto Diether manages its foreign column in a manner which we can easily imagine. Herr Otto Eichler, the editor of the *Deutsche Zeitung*, tries to keep up with the movement, and the *Deutsche Warte* is not left far behind. As for the *Berliner Lokal Anzeiger*, its attacks against France are the more significant in that it has been called "a semi-official paper" by the official *Norddeutsche Zeitung*. The fact is that within the very walls of the Reichstag the Socialists accused the Crown Prince of backing it. It also brings out a daily supplement called the *Tag*, full of vituperations against France in and out of season.²

The notorious General Keim, one of the directors of

¹ In April, 1913, this newspaper published a poem referring to the incidents of Lunéville and Nancy, which took up no less than two columns of the paper, and of which the last lines were to this effect : "We must put a stop to this. Germans, rouse yourselves. It is essential that the proud device should once again be borne aloft, 'Civis Germanus sum.'"

² It will be as well to recall the expressions used about the French by the Paris correspondent of the *Tag* at the time of the Nancy incident : ". . . If the French really wish to become the clowns of Europe, they should season their jibes with the necessary intelligence and psychology. If they do so, slow and clumsy Germans, although their square heads are quite incapable of seeing a joke, will only laugh at them and will not get angry. I think this Nancy incident may have some useful results, for it will remind the too facetious French of what the comic part requires of the performer. For at least six weeks, perhaps even for three months, they will be careful, and during that time their jests will be such that we on this side of the Vosges will be able to survey them with the utmost calm. But they will soon forget the lesson and that is why, in six months' time, the German bull-dog will again have to call the French pug to order. Thus we shall go on for five, ten, twenty, fifty years, or perhaps longer. Many people think it would be better if the German bull-dog opened its terrible mouth wide, and with one snap killed the pug. But, in the first place that is not so easy, and secondly the loss might perhaps be greater than the gain. The insolent cur often annoys us, but more often he amuses us. We had better not bite him to death, but keep him on a lead that is not too long . . ."

the Pan-German League, writes for the *Lokal Anzeiger*, General Wrochen of the *Wehrverein* for the *Tag*, and General von Puttkamer for the *Post*.

Some provincial Pan-German papers are no less important and influential than the Berlin organs.

For example, in the North there is the *Kölnische Zeitung*, a semi-official organ which indulges in violent gallophobia. South Germany has its *Münchener neueste Nachrichten*, which issues three editions daily, and has a circulation of over 120,000, and receives its instructions direct from the Wilhelmstrasse. Its Berlin correspondent is as official as the *Kölnische Zeitung's* correspondent. Its Paris correspondent, Dr. René Prévot, a renegade Alsatian, insults France shamelessly. He wrote an article, entitled "Politique de Galopins," to ridicule the patriotic enthusiasm displayed by the Paris lycées for the three years' law. It is needless to say that this paper makes a great to-do over any Franco-German incidents which may arise from time to time, and publishes very detailed accounts of all Pan-German manifestations.

We must not omit the *Leipziger neueste Nachrichten*, nor the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, nor the *Weser Zeitung* (of Brema), nor, above all, the *Schwaebischer Merkur*, the official paper of the kingdom of Wurtemberg, which has made a speciality of the Pan-German campaign against the Foreign Legion. It was founded in 1785, and became quite hysterical in 1910, when it discovered that articles against the Foreign Legion had been published in its columns as early as 1830! It was also one of the papers that published Dr. Worth's "Letters from Morocco," which paved the way for the despatch of the *Panther* to Agadir. Its Paris correspondence is particularly treacherous and bitter.

But the most frenzied of all gallophobe journals is the *Rheinisch-Wesphaelische Zeitung*, published at Essen, which enjoys great popularity in the industrial world. The Krupp works have no better nor more reliable organ—and for an obvious reason! Its chief task consists in spying upon and denouncing the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine. Not a day passes but it advocates some aggravation of the reign of terror which weighs upon the annexed provinces.

There are Pan-German papers even in Alsace-Lorraine. The *Strassburger Post*, connected with the *Kölnische Zeitung*, was started on purpose to develop "Deutschum" in these provinces. Among themselves, Alsatians call it the "*Strassburger Peste*," and it does its best to deserve the name. Originally it was only read by German officials, but, unfortunately, it has managed to get Alsatian readers by a series of admirable commercial and financial articles. We may remember the famous phrase about the French aviators who were to be "brought down by rifle-shots." Bruno Wagener, who was responsible for this ignominy, is since dead, but his place has been taken by one Anton Hassmuller, whose name is appropriate, as it signifies "miller of hatred."

The Paris correspondent of the *Strassburger Post* was for too long that notorious Karl-Eugen Schmidt who was obliged to beat a hasty retreat to Germany owing to the energetic action taken by M. Paul Bourson, an Alsatian journalist, and correspondent of the *Matin* at Strassburg.¹

¹ This incident led me to undertake a fairly lively campaign against the correspondents of German newspapers in Paris, who thus abuse French hospitality. I have mentioned particularly the case of Dr. René Prévot, the correspondent of the *Münchener neueste Nachrichten*, and one, Salomon Grumbach, correspondent of the *Freie Presse* at Strassburg: the latter actually had the impudence to speak in

At Colmar, the *Elsasser Tageblatt* is published under the direction of a Prussian Jew called Ehrich. One phrase printed in its columns, which has never been forgotten in Alsace-Lorraine, shows the attitude of its editors and the part they have taken upon themselves on "imperial soil": *Landgraf werde hart*, which means, "Master, have no mercy"!

The *Metzer Zeitung*, published at Metz, heads its columns with the Hohenzollern eagle. It was founded by a Prussian, one Lang, whose daughter married a renegade from Lorraine, Dr. Grégoire, a lawyer, and formerly a deputy in the Reichstag. It is read principally in military circles, and contrives to curry favour by dint of insulting France and advocating the complete Germanization of Lorraine by all possible methods.

Finally, at the risk of lengthening a list which is already too long, though as abbreviated as possible, I must mention the *Pariser Zeitung* and the *Pariser Presse*. They do not feel compelled to observe the smallest reserve, and echo, within the walls of Paris itself, the Pan-German papers from abroad. The *Pariser Presse* was founded by the staff of the *Pariser Zeitung*, because they considered the latter too moderate!

In keen competition with this daily Press are a number of periodicals, reviews, and special journals, such as the *Militaer Wochenblatt*, the army organ.

To be sure, all the papers which I have mentioned do not bear the trade-mark of Pan-Germanism, but imperialist doctrines have made such strides in Germany that now it is practically impossible to distinguish any difference in the tone of a Conservative organ such as

France at public meetings organized to oppose the three years' service law!

the *Post*, or of an Agrarian like the *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, a Liberal-Conservative like the *Berliner neueste Nachrichten*, National-Liberal like the *Münchener neueste Nachrichten*, Democrat like the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, or even Catholic like the *Germania*, which, under the auspices of the deputy Erzberger, proved itself so frankly gallophobe throughout the Moroccan crisis. All these papers of different shades of thought become unanimous when France is attacked.

Sometimes the chorus of vituperation reaches such a pitch that the German Government is afraid of being carried away, and thinks it better to disown responsibility, although it has probably sounded the signal for the attack. Thus, at the time of the Nancy incident, the *Post* wrote that among half-civilized nations there was none so base, so cowardly and so despicable, so devoid of all moral worth as the French, and the *Norddeutsche Zeitung*, in an official note, rebuked this language.¹

It is hardly necessary to say that the lesson, or rather

¹ After this appeal by the *Norddeutsche Zeitung*, at the time of M. Poincaré's visit to England, there was a terrible accident at Cherbourg; some of the ammunition for one of the guns at the Fort du Roule exploded, when the regulation salute was being fired in honour of the President of the Republic. The language used by the *Post* and the *Taegliche Rundschau* on this occasion was such that M. Henri Welschinger, a member of the Institute, and an eminent historian, wrote a letter of protest to the French papers, of which I give the following extract:

"German newspapers, like the *Post* and the *Taegliche Rundschau*, insult the misfortune of these poor fellows and our sorrow. One of them dares to say that the French, like Hindu fanatics, 'thought to honour their great President with human sacrifices'; the other says that 'Mary Ann (the French Republic) has no luck!' etc. These are the lengths to which their gallophobia drives people who are always boasting of their privileged culture! . . . The articles in the *Post* and the *Taegliche Rundschau* show us how little confidence we can have in any attempts at *rapprochement* between France, ever generous, and Germany, ever hostile."

the advice, was not well-received, and in no whit helped to dilute the vitriol in Pan-German inkpots.

The *Deutsche Tageszeitung* let the cat out of the bag one day in a reply to an article in the *Deutsche Revue*, criticising the excesses of provocative ultra-patriotism ; it revealed the theory underlying the abuse and insults of the imperialist German Press : " These exaggerations (of patriotism) need not harm a strong, energetic Government ; *they might even be skilfully exploited*, although occasionally they would require modifying. At all events, it is neither wise nor prudent to say, as does the article in the review, that at the present time the exaggeration of patriotism is more dangerous than its absence in the interest of a profitable foreign policy."

This means nothing more nor less than that the Pan-German Press acts as a scout to the official Press. It explores the lie of the land, points out the way, and engages in advance-guard actions. As it is only an irregular arm it can be abandoned when the expedition seems too dangerous, and followed when a practicable road has been opened up by its daring.

We must not run away with the idea that the Government willingly belittles the services of the Pan-German Press. William II decorated some of its editors on the occasion of his jubilee.¹ The Crown Prince as we have seen, is connected with the *Berliner Lokal*

¹ " William II is a great newspaper reader. First of all he looks at Wedekind's *Princely Correspondence*. In the Imperial ante-chamber there are always to be found the more important German newspapers of all shades of thought, and as he passes, the Emperor takes up one or the other and looks through it. A great quantity of newspaper cuttings are submitted to him, stuck into an album either by the press bureau of the Foreign Office or by the bureau of the Prussian Minister of the Interior. William II often annotates these cuttings by writing a few words in the margin with different coloured pencils, he particularly affects green pencils."—*Deutsche Machthaber*, by Rudolf Martin, Berlin, 1910.

Anzeiger, and another son of the Emperor, Prince Joachim of Prussia, when he was completing his studies at the Kaiser Wilhelm University at Strassburg, was not above giving information to the *Rheinisch-Westphaelische Zeitung* to assist its campaign of Germanization in Alsace-Lorraine.

The creation of a new Imperialist organ, the *Zeitung der Zeitungen* (the *Journal of Journals*), was recently announced. The subscription was to be 300 marks (!), and it was under the patronage of the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank, the Disconto Bank, the Hamburg-America Line, the Norddeutscher Lloyd, the great naval builders such as the Vulcan Company, Blohm and Voss, Krupp, and the small arms factory Løewe and Mauser. This colossal enterprise devoted to the Pan-German cause throughout the world had hardly been set on foot before the Government wrote itself down for an annual subscription, and promised, at the request of Herr Bassermann, a National-Liberal deputy, that all the ministers, consuls, and *chargés d'affaires* in foreign countries should also subscribe.

Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter's successor, von Jagow, has shown what use can and ought to be made of the slightest *ballon d'essai* of the most obscure Pan-German organ; holding in his hand a cutting of the *Lothringer Zeitung*, he commented in the Reichstag, in terms particularly offensive to France, upon the Nancy incident, which had been exaggerated out of all recognition by the spiteful little gallophobe "rag."

Moreover, we should remember how great is the influence of a weekly review like the *Zukunft* (*Future*), belonging to the Jew Maximilian Harden—whose real name is Wittkowsky.¹ We may be quite sure that it was

¹ Harden's views with regard to France can be summed up in this

no particular love of morality that led him to attack and disperse the powerful Eulenburg *camarilla*. Prince Philip of Eulenburg's vices mattered less to him than did his opinions and influence over the Emperor. Now Eulenburg was opposed to a war with France, while Maximilian Harden is an ardent disciple of Bismarckian methods. Intimately connected with his rich and influential co-religionists, Albert Ballin, the Hamburg naval constructor, Emile Rathenau the "electricity king," Carl Fürstenberg the director of the Berlin Commercial Company, with its capital of 100 millions of marks, Harden is also kept informed of what is happening in the financial world by his brother, the director of the *National Bank*. This avowed enemy of France is the most influential German journalist.

We have purposely omitted various other periodicals wherein the Pan-German idea is expressed with more or less vehemence. There are too many of them. But we must refer to the Press Bureaux which are attached to some public offices, notably to the naval and colonial offices. Here articles and leaflets are drawn up, pictures and posters are designed. Incredible as it may seem, the War Office had no Press Bureau. This omission is to be repaired, and a special vote of the Reichstag is to be demanded for the purpose. We can remember what good use Admiral von Tirpitz made of this institution for the propaganda which resulted in the creation of the powerful German fleet.

formula: "France must definitely recognize the Treaty of Frankfort, give up all thought of Alsace-Lorraine, forget the past. As a reward Germany will be her ally as she was Austria's after Sadowa. But if France does not bring herself without delay to subscribe to these conditions, Germany will have to attack her at the most favourable opportunity and crush her. . . ."

Since Bismarck's days German statesmen have learnt better how to handle the prodigious power wielded by the Press. The Iron Chancellor was content to subsidize a reptile press to hiss to order ; his successors do better, they do the hissing themselves.

THE WORK OF THE PAN-GERMANS

WHAT THEY CAN DO

I

PAN-GERMANISM IN MOROCCO

Origins of the visit to Tangier—Herr von Bülow's ineffectual remonstrance—A vigorous campaign—Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter collaborates with the President of the Pan-German League—The Agadir *coup*.

WILLIAM II's visit to Tangier, the "thunderbolt" which opened up the Franco-German dispute on the subject of Morocco, had been prepared long beforehand by the Pan-Germans.

Ever since March, 1904, the President of the Pan-German League had been calling for an aggressive policy on the part of the Empire. "The principal art of diplomacy," he wrote in the *Alldeutsche Blaetter*, "is to know how to profit by the good opportunities which occur from time to time in order to achieve one's aims and aspirations." Now, what fault could be found with the opportunity which offered when Russia was involved in a war in the Far East? True, Germany wanted nothing in the countries where war had broken out, but, said the President of the Pan-German League, "besides Korea and Manchuria there are other countries where the German Empire has important interests, and there are other Powers (besides Russia) which are in urgent need

of peace, and which would offer less opposition to the realization of just demands to-day than they would at other times."

The Power which was in most urgent need of peace was Russia's ally, France. The opportunity must be seized, first of all in Morocco to ensure for Germany all the advantages offered by the situation; secondly, in a general way, to abrogate the clause of the most favoured nation, stipulated in Article XI of the Treaty of Frankfort: "France must be given the alternative of coming in to our Zollverein (!) or of restoring to the German Empire the liberty of concluding commercial treaties with its neighbours without regard for the clause of the most favoured nation."

The Government began by turning a deaf ear, as it always does at the outset of a new campaign by the Pan-Germans. On April 14th, 1904, Herr von Bülow, replying in the Reichstag to a question put by an eminent Pan-German, Count von Reventlow, said that he was resolved not to embark his country on any enterprise concerning Morocco.

The whole year¹1904 was spent by the Pan-Germans in agitating about Morocco. On March 20th, 1904, the Wurtemberg members of the League, meeting at Esslingen, demanded German intervention and the occupation of Agadir. In May the Colonial League, meeting at Stettin, passed a resolution in favour of action in Morocco corresponding with Germany's needs for naval bases for her fleet and territory for the overflow of her surplus population. At the same time the Pan-German Congress at Lübeck censured the Empire's inaction. Not only did the official organ of the League reiterate every week the most energetic representations to the Government, but two pamphlets were disseminated far

and wide by the association in order to interest the masses in the question of Morocco : Herr Class, who has since become the President of the League, uttered this cry of distress : *Have we lost Morocco?* (*Marokko verloren ! von Rechtsanwalt Class*) ; Count Joachim von Pfeil also discussed the question in *Why must we have Morocco?* (*Warum brauchen wir Marokko? von Dr. Joachim Graf von Pfeil*).

This campaign increased in intensity until the moment arrived when the opportunity from being simply good, became excellent. After the defeat of the Russian fleet at Tsushima the German Government consented to believe that France really wanted peace at any price, and that Germany could take steps.

At last the Pan-Germans had got their way : William II's visit to Tangier was settled.

France was simply dumbfounded by this exploit on the Kaiser's part. It was so unexpected. Our rulers had other things to do than to follow the course of a furious campaign which the Pan-Germans were waging in Germany against French pretensions in Morocco ! Then the fallacy that Pan-Germans are ridiculous cranks without prestige or influence had already such firm hold among us, that no one would trouble about them.

Bebel, the Socialist leader, who knew what he was talking about, protested in the Reichstag that German policy in Morocco, as the result of Pan-German pressure, had entirely altered its course in less than a year.

It had, indeed, only required a few months of propaganda by the Pan-German League for the Imperial Government to modify its attitude entirely ; on April 16th, 1904, Herr von Bülow stated in the Reichstag that Germany intended to pursue a cautious policy in

Morocco ; on March 31st, 1905, William II landed at Tangier, and said : " The object of my visit to Tangier is to show that I am determined to do all in my power to safeguard efficiently German interests in Morocco, for I consider the Sultan an absolutely free Sovereign."

* * * * *

From that moment the Franco-German dispute anent Morocco " got under way," and was not settled, except provisionally, till the treaty of November 4th, 1911, by which the French Congo was mutilated for Germany's benefit.

I have no intention of retracing here all the intricacies of the period which extends from the Tangier *coup* to the Agadir *coup* and includes the conference of Algeciras and the treaty of 1909. I will merely recall the fact that we have several times been within an ace of a clash of arms, notably at the time of M. Delcassé's dismissal, which was literally insisted upon by the Pan-German Press, and, again, at the time of the incident of the Casablanca deserters¹; all this was the work, or, more accurately,

¹ " On September 25th, 1908, the French captured some deserters from the French Foreign Legion at Casablanca, who were assisted to escape by the German Consul and his subordinates. Germany demanded an apology for the seizure of the deserters by main force from the hands of the consular officials who were conducting them, and offered on her part to censure her Consul. France refused, but proposed to submit the matter to arbitration, upon which Germany demanded that the apology should be made before the arbitration took place. To this demand she obstinately adhered for more than a month, and it was not until public opinion in all the other countries of Europe had pronounced itself decisively against the German pretension that she yielded, only stipulating in order ' to save her face ' that both countries should first express regret that the incident had occurred."—*Annual Register*, 1908, p. 298.

" The incident was settled in May, 1909, by the Court of Arbitration. The Court decided that the Secretary of the German consul at Casablanca had ' wrongly and through a grave and manifest error tried to embark in a German steamer deserters of the French Foreign Legion who were not of German nationality,' that ' the German

the will of that party which we are taught in France to consider a negligible quantity.

At all events, M. Jules Cambon has learnt, at his expense—and ours—during the laborious negotiations which ended in our sacrifices on the Congo, the importance attached by the German Government to exhibitions of Pan-Germanism. Almost every day (see the *Yellow Book*), Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter makes a stalking horse of public opinion: "Public opinion is nervous," says he, ". . . we must satisfy it . . . I cannot ignore opinion. . . . German opinion insists on having a say in the partition of the world."

This "opinion" is no other than the Pan-German League, and the Pan-German papers which lead it, or, rather, which represent it, for they alone make themselves heard. It is very true, moreover, that when any question of national profit arises—by whatever means it is to be realized—German unanimity is immediate and spontaneous.

Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter had no difficulty in appealing to "opinion." He could do it the more easily that he himself inspired it on the back-stairs, gave it the lead, and, when necessary, was in collusion with the more ardent spirits in the anti-French campaign. We had positive proof of this at the time of the Agadir affair. A short while before the dispatch of the *Panther* to Agadir, Herr Class published a new pamphlet, which did not escape the ridicule of the partisans of a concili-

consulate was not entitled to grant its protection even to deserters of German nationality,' and that the French military authorities 'were wrong in not respecting as far as possible the *de facto* protection exercised over those deserters in the name of the German consulate; the circumstances did not justify either menace by revolver on the part of the French soldiers, or the blows given to the Moroccan soldiers of the consulate.' "—*Annual Register*, 1909, p. 311. [Translator's note.]

atory policy—not a very large body in Germany. It was entitled *Western Morocco must belong to Germany (Westmarokko deutsch !)*. It has since become public property, owing to Herr Class's own confession, that this pamphlet, of which 60,000 copies were printed, was drawn up after consultation between Herr Class and Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter. These two cronies did not fall out until the Secretary of State, not daring to ask for more in face of the resolute attitude maintained by France with England's energetic support, signed the Franco-German Convention of November 4th, 1911, by which Germany renounced to France her rights in Morocco in exchange for a part of the Congo. Herr Class considered that Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter had not made us pay a high enough price for these rights. After all he was obliged to assess them at a high value, since he had manufactured them himself with the help of the Pan-German League. To the demands of the super-patriot was added a very proper pride of authorship!

Observe the tone with which the Pan-Germans greeted the treaty of November 4th, 1911. Daniel Frymann says :

“ To have abandoned Morocco to France is a political crime against the future of our people.

“ Twice during the autumn of 1911 we were on the verge of war ; from the English and French Ministers we have had to submit to words unheard of in international relations ; we have been treated ignominiously by the Press of these countries. During the contemptible discussions over compensation, the official German Press descended to such a low level of self-respect, honour, and decency, that those who inspired it have laid themselves open to the worst construction upon

their moral and political qualities. The debates in the Reichstag, and especially before the Commission, have shown with what criminal levity the Foreign Office embarked upon this enterprise, with what autocratic and offensive action it brushed aside the other public offices, and finally how little reliance can be placed on the statements of the Secretary of State.¹ This grotesque affair ended in political and moral discomfiture. Each time that the Chancellor or the Secretary of State made a move, there was a fresh reverse. The debates in the French and English Chambers revealed all the faults of German diplomacy. After all this we are left with nothing but swamps round the Congo and disgust for an undertaking which had been conceived as the inauguration of a new era of national renaissance! "

That is how Pan-Germans treat Governments who have not the spirit to follow them as far as they wish to go.

Moreover, they never change their opinions, and for them the Moroccan incident² is not yet closed, as Herr Class stated at Erfurt in these terms :

¹ The solution reached by Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter in agreement with the Chancellor and William II aroused general disappointment in Germany. Herr von Lindequist, the Colonial Minister, resigned rather than consent to the treaty of November 4th, 1911, and the Crown Prince, by a memorable exploit, showed his disapproval of his father's government.

² " Many newspapers give out that if a good opportunity offers, Germany ought to make another bid for part of Morocco. If the papers from over the Rhine are to be trusted, Dr. Paasche, a deputy of the Centre, and Vice-president of the Reichstag, adopted a similar tone in Canada. The Pan-German Press depicts the French as incapable of pacifying, civilizing and developing Morocco; ' Germanic culture ' alone could suit the Moroccans. More than once during the summer of 1912 the Quai d'Orsay must have wondered, from the frequency and the tone of German demands about trivial incidents in Morocco, whether the diplomatic world and the Government itself had not espoused the quarrels and passions of Pan-German circles."—*France et Allemagne*, by René Pinon, p. 249.

“ We, as a people, have lost Morocco ; but we are persuaded that this is only temporary. For the moment we must be content to protest against the recent declaration that the Moroccan question had been definitely settled. The events of the last months are evidence that this is a false assertion.”

-We shall see.

Meanwhile we must lay stress upon the start and the finish of this affair : at the outset of the Pan-German campaign, the German Government rejects with scorn the demands of the Pan-German League ; at the conclusion, the Minister for Foreign Affairs collaborates with its President.

II

WILLIAM II "ON THE MOVE"

Before and after the foundation of the League—The Kaiser changes his tone—A wonderful coincidence of facts and dates—The Emperor and the League at variance—The "Black Week"—Armaments against France—William II still "on the move."

THE article in the *Alldeutsche Blaetter* which reviewed the first outlines of this volume accused me of having described William II as "carrying out blindfold the plans of the Pan-Germans." I am in no way guilty of this exaggeration. Quite the contrary, I observed that the Emperor, in spite of the power and audacity of the Pan-Germans, was "occasionally difficult."

It is indeed quite evident that the very moment that William II adopts the programme of the Pan-German League, demands from France Franche-Comté, the rest of Lorraine, Champagne and French Flanders, and as soon as he wants to turn Toulon into a German naval base, the guns will go off of themselves. For this reason I have never used the expression which the *Alldeutsche Blaetter* has attributed to me.

But I maintain that each time that one of the articles of the Pan-German programme reaches that point at which it can be realized immediately, William II, under orders to obey the League's injunctions, ends willy-nilly by yielding.

A very remarkable study by M. Paul-Albert Helmer has been published lately which exactly supports my

view. M. Helmer, who is writing a history of contemporary Germany, has extracted from it at a most appropriate moment an edifying chapter, in which he has noted down, almost day by day, the phases of the struggle which has been in progress for the last twenty years between the Pan-German League and the pacific Emperor.¹

He shows as I have done (see Chapter II) that the Pan-German League is due to a movement of protest against the pacific policy of William II ; he proves by a simple and convincing juxtaposition of facts and dates that this crowned Lohengrin, whose great sword weighs so heavily on Europe, has not yet ceased to move along the paths which have been pointed out to him by triumphant Pan-Germanism.

* * * * *

How are we to explain why William II, who had so far only revealed pacific intentions, who had just given England almost excessive guarantees of his conciliatory spirit, why should he have suddenly modified his attitude as soon as the League started its first campaigns ?

Of course William will continue to hold forth in favour of peace, for he clings to his myth, but there is a wide difference between his words and his actions !

You can judge for yourselves :

The successes of the Pan-German League in the year 1892 were responsible for the passing of the military law of 1893. The Chancellor von Caprivi, hated by the Pan-Germans on account of his moderation, was thanked in 1894. The year 1895 is marked by German intervention

¹ *Revue de Paris*, of April 15th, 1913 : "Guillaume II et les pangermanistes."

in the settlement of the dispute which arose in the Far East owing to Japan's attitude towards China. Russia and France, who meant to intervene by themselves, were obliged to consent to German collaboration. In 1896 William II sent his famous telegram to President Kruger. He did better still ; he celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the German Empire with great pomp and announced on this occasion that Germany would pursue henceforth a world-policy :

“ It is our duty to maintain what our ancestors have fought to win. The German Empire has become a world empire. Everywhere, in the most distant lands, there are thousands of our fellow-countrymen. German merchandise crosses the ocean. Germany entrusts to the seas goods worth thousands of millions. Upon you will fall the duty, laden with responsibilities, of helping me to bind this greater German Empire more closely to our fatherland. The vow which I made this morning in your presence can only be fulfilled if I can count upon your support in all things, and if you give it to me in a spirit of union and patriotism. I desire that you may be united, and that you may help me to do my duty, *not only towards those who are strictly speaking my fellow-countrymen, but also towards so many thousands of our fellow-countrymen in foreign lands ;* that is to say, to help them when necessary, and to remember these words : ‘ What thou hast inherited from thy fathers, see that thou possess it truly.’ . . . I raise my glass in honour of our beloved fatherland and I say : ‘ Long live the German Empire! ’ ”

Already William II has gone a long way, but he has not done yet.

In 1897 we have the taking of Kiau-chau, in 1898

William II's journey to Jerusalem, in 1899 the annexation of the islands of Samoa and the Carolines, in 1900 the China Expedition when Marshal von Waldersee led European contingents against the Boxers.

Behind each of these events we find Pan-German action :

In 1895 the Pan-German League had petitioned for a naval station in China and had marked down Kiauchau.

In 1896 the Pan-German League, in a series of leaflets and manifestos, had pointed out Asia Minor as a field for German activity, and arranged William II's journey to Jerusalem.

In 1895 the Pan-German League coveted the acquisition of some portion of the old Spanish colonies ; its President, Dr. Hasse, published in 1898 in the *All-deutsche Blaetter*, the League's organ, an article which made a great stir and constituted the first direct attack against William II for not having carried out sufficiently rapidly the Pan-German instructions.

Finally, it is quite certain that the China Expedition, rendered necessary by the anti-foreign movement and the assassination of Baron von Ketteler, the German Ambassador, was the result of the agitation aroused by the occupation of Kiauchau.

Meanwhile, the League had in 1897, this time in entire agreement with William II, secured the vote for a considerable increase of the navy, and during the years 1898 and 1899 pursued a vigorous campaign in favour of Germanic interests in Austria.

This last affair, which we shall examine more in detail when we come to study the rôle of the Pan-Germans in Austria, very nearly came to grief, and the relations

between the two allies were severely strained in consequence. It appears that William II, weary of doing everything that he was told to do by these terrible bullies who never left him a moment's peace, thought that he would halt and take breath ; he returned with greater emphasis than before to his pacifist ebullitions, and abolished the regime of dictatorship in Alsace-Lorraine.

The Pan-German League took up the challenge. At the Eisenach Congress in 1902, after a sort of armed vigil spent in reorganization, it issued a final warning to the intractable Kaiser through its President, Dr. Hasse. At Plauen the following year Herr Class, the lawyer from Mainz, who was to succeed Dr. Hasse, presented to the congress a report upon "the changes which have supervened in the world position of the German Empire since 1890." This report was afterwards published as a pamphlet entitled *Die Bilanz des neuen Kurses* (*The Balance of the "New Course"*). Herr Class ignored all the concessions made to the League by William II and maintained that he ought to give up the supreme direction of imperial policy because it was responsible for the loss of prestige which Germany had sustained since Bismarck's day, for neither Caprivi, who had never displayed anything beyond the passive obedience of a soldier, nor Hohenlohe, who had retired into the background so that William II might be his own Chancellor, had really had in his own hands supreme political authority. Therefore the responsibility for what was known as the "new course" could not rest with either of these Chancellors but with him who remains at the head of the empire, even when Chancellors change.

"It is obvious," writes Herr Class, "that such a policy, contrary to the desires and sentiments of the

German nation, could not be without effect on the relations of the German nation with the Emperor and his Government. Was not this discord between sovereign and people too high a price to pay for what we obtained from England? "

The thrust went home. William II felt it sufficiently keenly to give up the struggle. He consented to lend a more favourable ear to the incitements of the Pan-Germans, who were now directing his attention to Morocco. At last, after much hesitation and oratorical precaution, he decided to start off for Tangier, and then to insist that France should dismiss M. Delcassé who had become the bugbear of the Pan-Germans.

William II was not rewarded as he had hoped. In fact he got into trouble because the Algeciras Conference did not produce the desired results. His evasions and weakness, they said, had done all the mischief. One of the principal members of the Pan-German League, Count von Reventlow, published a lurid pamphlet entitled *Wilhelm II und die Byzantiner*. The Kaiser and his entourage of *Byzantine* courtiers were sharply taken to task.

Exasperated at what he considered, perhaps with good reason, as ingratitude, the Emperor on September 8th at Breslau uttered a virulent diatribe against *pessimists* (Schwarzseher) :

"The world belongs to the living, and the living are in the right. I will have nothing to do with pessimists; he who will not support me, let him go and seek elsewhere a better country."

This speech had no other result than to provoke the sarcasm of the entire Pan-German Press. "Pessimists?" replied the *Post*; "why, nowadays, those who contemplate the future with the gravest concern

are to be found among the best and most enlightened patriots. Indeed, the political history of the last few years gives us good cause for indulging in the blackest thoughts."

Another Pan-German took the word "pessimist" as a pseudonym and enlarging upon Count von Reventlow's theme, submitted to the public a work entitled *Deutsche Sorgen von einem Schwarzseher* (*German Apprehension by a Pessimist*).

This *Schwarzseher* reproached the Emperor among other things for relying on the Catholic Centre in the Reichstag, a party which was always ready to ratify his personal policy of capitulation to a foreign Power. This was the signal for a campaign which compelled William II to dissolve the Reichstag. The subsequent elections put an end to the preponderant influence of the Centre in the assembly.

* * * * *

Thus a curious conflict raged between a society of monarchists and their monarch, between a League and an Emperor, both equally devoted to the power and prestige of Germany, and differing only in the bellicose or pacific means by which they wished to ensure the supremacy of their country.

In this conflict the Emperor succumbed.

First of all, his friends were attacked and disgraced by sensational revelations. Every effort was made to isolate him. His authority had been undermined for some time, for early in 1908 he was obliged to consent to the mitigation of penalties in the Penal Code for the crime of *lèse-majesté*. Finally, the latter months of this same year witnessed a complete evaporation of the imperial prestige.

The interview published by the *Daily Telegraph* on October 28th, 1908, opened for the Emperor what was known as "the black week." William II had let himself go and had commented upon foreign politics in a way that was certainly rather serious, since it apprised England of the hostility of the immense majority of the German nation. These views, however, were not of such a kind as to shock Pan-Germans, who are admirers of imprudence and brutality in every sphere—language included. Though they gave the signal for attacks against the Emperor, and, in common with all other parties, denounced the abuses of his personal policy, it was because the occasion for making him pay dearly for his excursions into independence was too good to resist. Abandoned by the Pan-Germans, William II found no voice raised in his defence. Not a single deputy in the Reichstag spoke on his behalf when on November 10th and 11th, 1908, the interview in the *Daily Telegraph* was discussed, and the Chancellor announced that henceforth, both in public and in his private conversations, the Emperor "would adopt that reserve which is indispensable for the continuity of policy and for the authority of the Crown." On November 17th this declaration received the sanction of an official note which ratified the Emperor's adhesion to the undertaking made in his name by the Chancellor.

The Pan-Germans could not complain of the revenge which events had meted out to the *Schwarzseher*! The Emperor, abandoned by all, even by his own Chancellor, deprived himself of the right of replying to his everlasting critics! It may be said that from this moment William will never again attempt openly to defy the injunctions of the Pan-Germans.

In order to please them, Herr von Bülow, immediately

after the "black week," passed a law against Poles and Danes which they had advocated, and also a law for the "protection" of German nationality; besides this an epoch of merciless Germanization, which is still in progress, was inaugurated in Alsace-Lorraine.

Finally, the Pan-Germans started a Press campaign in favour of fresh intervention in Morocco. Herr von Bülow, who declined to pay any attention to it, was succeeded by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, while the Foreign Office was entrusted to a Wurtemberg diplomat, Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, known to be Bismarck's disciple.¹

As a fact, the Agadir *coup* was, as we have seen, prepared by Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter in agreement with the Pan-Germans, and William the Peacemaker once again had to let his Government run the risk of embarking upon a Franco-German war. War having been avoided after all, the Pan-Germans again fell foul of the Emperor, that "valiant coward" as the *Post* dared to call him, and they even managed to make his own son express disapproval of his father in public!

But they were not going to waste their time in barren regrets. In January, 1912, two months after the debates in the Reichstag which marked the close of the Franco-Moroccan incident, they founded the *Deutscher Wehrverein*, a society for national defence, a sort of branch of the Pan-German League, the special object

¹ As a young student he had for several hours been a confidant of Bismarck, who not knowing who he was had by chance engaged in an intimate conversation with him. From that moment his future was assured. Holstein, to please his master, instantly took him under his protection, and he had only just passed his examination as attaché, when he was given his first diplomatic trust. He was sent to Copenhagen to replace the German Minister, Herr von Magnus, who had just been disgraced for having proposed the health of Sarah Bernhardt, who was on tour in Denmark.

of which was to obtain a fresh increase of military forces in Germany. Congresses held at Hanover, Brunswick and Erfurt gave great impetus to this new Pan-German campaign. The Government began as usual by trying to resist, and the *Kölnische Zeitung* of November 7th, 1912, in a semi-official note went so far as to censure those who "are endeavouring to represent our armaments as inadequate." But scarcely two months passed before new military estimates were officially announced. William II was "on the move."

Have we not proved that Pan-German action carries all before it in Germany, and that even the authority of the Emperor nearly always goes down before its onslaught?

III

DEMOCRATIC PROPAGANDA

A fallacy to be exploded—Pan-German ideas among the masses—
Undisguised threats—If needs must, a revolution!—Teuto-
maniac Liberals and Imperialist Socialists—If William II is
dethroned. . . .

I THINK I have given sufficient proof that Pan-Germanism constitutes a force and a danger which is not taken seriously enough in France—even though its triumph in the imperial councils compels us incessantly to make fresh and arduous sacrifices and truly desperate efforts of energy and decision.

But it seems to me that it would also be useful if I could destroy the illusion of those who hope that the Pan-Germans, failing William II's resistance, will meet with a formidable democratic opposition before they can carry out their programme.

To lull oneself to sleep with this Utopia, one must have a very slight acquaintance with the German people, and a complete ignorance of the psychology of Pan-Germanism.

The truth is that the Pan-Germans will not be daunted by anything that stands in their way, for they are determined to achieve at any cost the foundation of "Great Germany" on lines which they have laid down and which I am going to show you. So far from having anything to fear, as is generally supposed in France, from the popular tendency which is manifest

in Germany as elsewhere, they are prepared to rely upon the democratic parties, to use them and make them the instruments of their final victory.

If needs must, they will go to the length of a *coup d'état* or of Revolution.

I exaggerate nothing. A few quotations from Daniel Frymann's book, *If I were the Emperor (Wenn ich der Kaiser wäre)*, will give sufficiently clear proof of this tendency. "There is not one single man in Germany to-day from East to West who is satisfied with the political situation of the Empire, with the exception of those who are indifferent, a few 'climbers,' and business men who think only of themselves. This can only be the result of gross mismanagement on the part of the Government, and is the most crushing indictment against it when one recalls the enthusiasm which greeted the foundation of the new Empire. . . ."

This is only a fragment of a furious diatribe, the tone of which loses nothing by comparison with those of the leaders of the Social-Democracy. I will now give an extract from the concluding passage :

"Our Constitution has a special character, which it owes to the prestige enjoyed by the Prussian crown, and to the great distinction of those who wore it, and finally, to the exceptionally strong personalities of William I and Bismarck. No one would dare to dispute the fact that under the *new course* the authority of the crown and of the Chancellor have diminished . . . at all events the misplaced activity of William II and the inefficiency of his advisers have made the present form of government intolerable. . . . The incredible delinquencies of the most exalted personages exposed by the *black week* of the autumn of 1908, and since then by the collapse of the Moroccan policy of von Bethmann-Hollweg and von

Kiderlen-Waechter, have raised the question whether the adoption of a parliamentary regime is not an urgent necessity."

The Imperial Government has been warned: those who encourage these ideas among the people are quite ready to lead an assault against established institutions—if they do not get what they ask.

The celebrated *Rheinisch-Wesphaelische Zeitung* is particularly clear and explicit on this head. On February 14th, 1913, it wrote: "The Bismarckian spirit and the Bismarckian tendency towards force and boldness are dead. We intoxicate ourselves with sounding phrases, we sing of a Germany stretching from the Adige to the Belt, while at the same time we allow her to relapse into the old weakness common to small States. But one day something of the Bismarckian spirit may revive: the German nation may once again palpitate with a desire for strength and unity, and if, when that day comes, our princes have known no other politics save the right of princes, separate States, the alliances of principalities, and the interests of little courts, then the national movement will become a democratic movement as in 1848, because salvation can only be found by sweeping aside all princes."

There is nothing equivocal about this warning. The federal princes, with the King of Prussia at their head, know what treatment Pan-Germanism will mete out to them if they hesitate to fall in beneath its banner.

The *Rheinisch-Wesphaelische Zeitung* seasons these threats with insolence. This accredited organ of Pan-Germanism makes use of the cruel gibes with which the comic papers perpetually insult the great personages of the little German courts, and greeted in these words the

announcement of the betrothal of the Emperor's daughter to the Duke of Cumberland¹: " This marriage cures none of our ills, but creates a new one by reviving the comedy of the Serenissimus. Possibly some bankrupt nobles may be gratified by the creation of new court appointments, but for the German people the system of small States has no meaning."

To appreciate this diatribe you must understand that in Germany the Serenissimus is the type of the imbecile monarch who is the more particular about marks of respect as he is the less deserving of them.

At the time the military law of 1913 was discussed, the Conservative organs maintained without any beating about the bush that a special tax should be levied on the federal princes. This proposal was passed on a first reading and its final defeat, as the result of the Government's formal opposition, was the subject of bitter and irreverent recriminations. To silence their critics the princes decided of their own initiative to pay at the same rate as other citizens.

You can imagine what a success these bold words have in German democratic circles. Pan-Germanism is not only in favour with the malcontents, whom it knows how to take at the right moment, but is also gradually imbuing the masses with its ideas, while at the same time it becomes a more and more dreaded enemy of the Government.

* * * * *

Already a section of the Radical party, the National-Liberals of Bassermann's way of thinking, have openly avowed their imperialist tendencies, and they have just

¹ The Congress of the Pan-German League, held at Breslau in September, 1913, criticized at great length the conditions under which William II thought fit to marry his daughter!

started two newspapers on purpose to support them, the *Deutscher Kurier* and the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*.

Moreover, did they not vote with enthusiasm for the formidable increase in the German army which the Pan-Germans demanded in June, 1913? Herr Bassermann gave the following explanation of their attitude, which was heartily endorsed by General Keim: "The international situation is such that it necessitates a mighty military effort on our part, an effort which will be unique in the history of the world!"

After the law was passed, the Radical *Berliner Tageblatt* complained bitterly that its party had supported all the Pan-German demands unhesitatingly.

Again, when the Constitution for Alsace-Lorraine was discussed in the Reichstag, the Radicals, who very rightly considered it hatefully oppressive, did not hesitate to vote for it in spite of the protests of their colleagues from the annexed provinces.

"We thought," said the Abbé Wetterlé sadly, the valiant deputy for Ribeauvillé, "that there never would be found a majority in the Imperial Parliament that would bind us with such heavy chains. We were mistaken. The Chancellor sounded the patriotic note, and both the Centre and *the Radicals* forgot the essential articles of their creed in order to ensure the security of our Western frontier."

Finally the few German Radicals who ventured to go to the Berne Conference, organized by the Socialists in favour of a Franco-German *rapprochement*, insisted above everything that the motion censuring armaments should not apply to the military bills then before the Reichstag, and of which they themselves were in favour!¹

¹ This detail was given me by one of the German delegates, and I published it in the Press. It has not been denied.

This is how German neo-Radicalism understands pacificism!

* * * * *

As for the Socialists, there is no need to refer to the famous declarations of Bebel and their other party-leaders—notably in reply to the entreaties of the cosmopolitan Hervé—in order to show what strides imperialist doctrines have made in their midst; it is only necessary to recall the duplicity they evinced during the debates in the Reichstag in order to ensure the passing of the military laws of 1913 without appearing to deny their former principles too cynically.

First of all, in committee, under the pretext that it was merely a question of a provisional vote, they agreed to everything including the increase of the war treasure at Spandau. During the sittings some of their number, even the more influential such as Dr. Heine (June 20th, 1913),¹ were not afraid to formulate professions of faith

¹ Dr. Wolfgang Heine expressed himself as follows: "If the Fatherland were to be threatened, there is no doubt—and the whole world knows it—that we should be the first to rise and protect and defend our country."

This is simply a paraphrase of Bebel's oft-quoted declaration: "All Socialists will fight for the Fatherland to the last gasp."

At the time when the Reichstag was considering the new Army Bill Dr. Sudekum wrote in a Socialist review, *Die Diskussion*, an article the meaning of which he has since tried to distort in view of the reproaches of some of his French "comrades," but of which the plain words remain:

"The Socialist party, through its most accredited leaders, has once more expressed its convictions upon the question of the defence of the German Fatherland; there is not a single man in Germany and not a single Socialist who would expose his country defenceless to foreign attacks. Socialism understands and has always understood that the geographical and political situation of the German Empire necessitates a strong army for its protection. All the more is this the case that so long as the absolutism of the Tsar prevails in Russia we cannot be sure that we shall not be attacked.

"If such a war should break out—and we Socialists sincerely hope it may not, and the German Government has tried to prevent it—that

which were clearly patriotic in tone. Finally, though they voted against the increase of the army because it was certain to be carried without them, they voted for the military estimates for which their adhesion was indispensable. This was the same thing as saying: "We refuse to increase the army, but our refusal is so far from serious that we hasten to allow you to proceed by giving you the necessary funds."

The party who behaved thus in 1913 is the same whose firm opposition to Bismarck's military schemes in 1887 compelled him to dissolve Parliament: "Not a man, not a farthing!" they said then, and yet they were only a contemptible minority in the Reichstag. In 1893 they were only about forty strong, but they fought so vigorously against the early demands of the Pan-Germans that they again made it necessary to dissolve the Reichstag before the League could get fresh military estimates passed. In 1913 there were 110 of them in the Reichstag, and thanks to them the most formidable military law ever passed in time of peace was concluded without let or hindrance!

After this we can understand how a Pan-German deputy, Dr. Werner, the deputy for Giessen, was able to make this pleasing statement: "Our Socialists have become far more patriotic. . . . It is thanks to the collaboration of the Socialists on the question of the financial provision that the military law was passed so rapidly. This is the first time in Germany that the Socialists have taken any interest in the financial side of a military law, and consequently it is the first time that they have worked for our national defence."

war will assume vast dimensions, given modern military technique and organization, and we Germans will be faced with a question of life and death."

The Pan-German deputy, exposing in one word the puerile double game played by the Socialists in the Reichstag, added: "It is obvious that to procure money for the purchase of a commodity is the same thing as procuring the commodity itself."

This is certainly quite obvious in spite of all that Ledebour, Noske, and Scheidemann could say in the Reichstag, speaking to the order of the irreconcilables of the party such as Rosa Luxembourg. They deceived nobody, least of all the Pan-Germans, by their scathing criticisms of militarism, as we see by the following sarcastic comments in the *Taegliche Rundschau*:

"Rosa Luxembourg hurled the thunderbolts of Juno against the party which she accused of betraying the most sacred principles. Then the date of the Socialist congress was approaching. For party reasons, a great blow must be struck. There must be a war dance with savage imprecations, calls to order, and other accessories.

"This task was confided to Herr Scheidemann. He draped about him the great lion skin of the party which is brought out from time to time, and roared in such an alarming manner that the red masses without displayed their delight, and Rosa Luxembourg herself was obliged to nod her head approvingly, while all the time she was thinking, 'That's no good. I know it of old.' Then Scheidemann swore to France and to Rosa Luxembourg that he hated militarism like mortal sin. The object of this little game was to soothe extremists on both sides of the Vosges."

It is very easy to refute Herr Scheidemann's unconvincing statements by a simple arithmetical proof: the financial clauses which were to give the German Government the power of enlisting 200,000 new recruits

were passed by 207 votes to 150, and of the majority 110 were Socialist. Therefore, if the Socialists had abstained the Bill would have been defeated, and the military law would have fallen through.¹

On the evening of the division, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg held a great Parliamentary reception, at which the official world congratulated itself upon the Socialist attitude.

General von Heeringen, the War Minister, confessed that they had deserved well of the Fatherland, and he patted them on the back from the tribune: "In committee the Socialists declared themselves willing to increase the defence of the Fatherland to any extent."

Herr Muller-Meiningen, a Radical deputy, asserted with sly humour that the Socialists of the Reichstag had earned the praise of patriots even more fully than was known: "I deeply regret, gentlemen, that the committee sat behind closed doors. If only we could have known all that was said by your distinguished leaders!" . . .

The Socialist leaders had probably warned their colleagues that they must pay no attention to any of the extravagant statements made in public for the benefit of the gallery, nor to the Franco-German Socialist manifestos against armaments, which were published at the request of French Socialists.²

This "lamentable comedy," as the *Taegliche Rundschau* calls it, can only be explained in one of two ways:

¹ When this attitude was discussed at the Socialist congress at Jena three months later, it was approved by an enormous majority in spite of the efforts of the irreconcilable section, all of whose motions were thrown out.

² Manifesto of March 1st, 1913.

either the Socialist leaders in Germany have been won over to imperialist ideas, or else, knowing to what extent these have taken hold of the populace, they dare not oppose them openly. One or other hypothesis cannot fail to deceive those who count on the *Sozialdemokratie* putting a spoke in the Pan-German wheel!

For all practical purposes the general tendency of German Socialism seems to be towards militarizing the masses rather than democratizing them. This is clearly shown by a fellow-countryman of ours, M. François-André Poncet, who has lived a great deal in Germany. Under the title *What German Youth thinks (Ce que pense la jeunesse allemande)* he says :

“ German Socialists encourage a spirit of discipline among the working-classes ; they enrol them in regiments, and have organized a proletariat army which is essentially national and is likely to remain so. There is nothing absurd in presuming that a Socialistic Germany will not cease for that reason to be a military Germany who will maintain by force her commercial and industrial rights and her economic ambitions.

“ But however this may be, time enough will elapse between now and the advent of the Socialist era in Germany for France, if she does not take warning, to be crushed by her powerful rival.”

M. Charles Andler, a professor at the Sorbonne, has devoted a series of articles from a purely theoretical standpoint to the progress of imperialist ideas in German Socialism. Curious to relate, this aroused protests, not from the quarter from which we might have expected them—namely, Germany—but from France. French Socialists do not like our knowing their German co-religionists in their true colours. M. Andler exposes them fully by analysing the doctrine of Hildebrand,

Atlanticus, Max Schippel, Ludwig Quessel, Sudekum, and Karl Leuthner. He writes thus :

“ These theorists of the new doctrine shelter themselves behind the various formulæ of classical Socialism since Lassalle and Marx (who were always bellicose).

“ Once for all let us get rid of the illusion that the German Socialist party is an anti-militarist party. . . . From henceforth its programme, both explicitly and implicitly, is definitely militarist. . . .

“ I think it probable that the German Socialist party will in future give its sympathy or its countenance, as it has already done in the past, to all attempts at irresistible but pacific pressure which will take the form of robbing other nations who have secured a foothold before them.”¹

M. Andler predicts that the democratic and nationalist tendency which is so marked in Germany will compel neo-Socialism to join forces with the Liberal and Progressive parties :² “ The imperialist and Teuto-maniac Liberals who follow Bassermann will be the prospective leaders of this coalition, and they will demand concessions in military and colonial matters.”

Indeed, they have already obtained them. M. Andler quotes some colonial incidents, and we have since seen how, in the military sphere, the Socialists came to the rescue of the new armament schemes. As to the navy, the *Kölnische Zeitung* pointed out a curious article on the partition of Africa, by Ludwig Quessel, a deputy,

¹ *Le Socialisme imperialiste dans l'Allemagne contemporaine* (1912). See also *La Revue Socialiste* of May 15th, and *La Revue du Mois* of July 10th and August 10th, 1913.

² The official report presented at the Socialist Congress at Jena in September, 1913, revealed a disquieting state of stagnation and depression. The number of members is almost at a standstill, the circulation of newspapers is diminishing, etc. . . .

which appeared in the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* for June 26th, 1913, and shows that this Socialist, at any rate, is convinced that a powerful fleet is essential for Germany.

The Marxist review, *New Times*, remarks sorrowfully: "German Socialists are on the way to become bourgeois, if not philistines."

The *Sozialistische Monatshefte* confesses that "Revolutionary words of command have become incomprehensible to the young generation. . . ."

"This young generation is slipping away from us," said a deputy, Herr Schutz-Erfurt, at the Socialist Congress at Jena (September, 1913), "because it will not hear of anti-militarism."

I repeat once more, Frenchmen are grievously mistaken if they rely upon the rising tide of German democracy to dampen the vast accumulation of "dry powder" which may any day blow up Europe. Only one revolution is possible in Germany, and for that the Pan-Germans themselves will give the signal if they think it advisable to let loose the democratic torrent, and do away at one fell swoop with all the "Serenissimi," who are dead-weights and "impedimenta," and hinder a people determined to march boldly forward.

Madame de Thèbes asserts that if William II comes to Paris after 1913, as he has so longed to do, it will be as ex-Emperor.

This prophecy is by no means improbable.

Perhaps from that moment Germany will start upon an era of great enterprises.

IV

SHARPENING THE SWORD

Pan-German campaign for increased armaments—Ineffectual resistance on the part of the Government—The "Keim Law"—Insolence and provocations from the victors—Permanent mobilization—Fresh naval and military schemes—One million two hundred thousand men!

THE sphere in which the power of Pan-German organization is most freely and efficiently exercised is undoubtedly in the matter of armaments. Its field of operations in this region would seem to be boundless. At all events, a short examination of the results already attained will serve to show not only what Pan-Germans have obtained from the Government and public opinion, but still more what they are capable of securing in days to come.

Germany has certainly never neglected the strengthening of her military forces. As soon as the war of 1870 was over, she set to work to increase her effectives, to renovate and complete her material, and we need only quote the stages, 1874, 1880, 1887, 1888, 1890, 1893, 1899, 1905, to show how military matters engrossed public attention in Germany long before the Pan-German movement took shape.

Each of these dates represents the passing of a fresh military law dealing with increased armaments.

The law of 1874 fixed the number of effectives at 401,000 ; in 1890 this was raised to 487,000 ; in 1899, to

570,000 ; in 1905, to 608,000. The progression is constant.

It is worth noticing that under the septennial or quinquennial regime the military laws take seven or five years to expand automatically to the maximum, and are not supplemented to any great extent during that period.

With the advent of organized Pan-Germanism, all this is being changed ; a new military law annually is not only asked for, it is actually passed. When the regime which had started in 1905 had nearly expired, Pan-Germanism set to work early in 1910 to organize a campaign about the new military statute which would have to be considered in 1911. In April, 1910, General Keim stated at Hamburg : " Next year the Reichstag must have the courage to propose an increase of armaments. The German nation can stand the expense. France must never be able to think that she is stronger than we are."

Upon this signal the whole imperialist Press fired a salvo. In August, the Pan-German party, sitting in solemn conclave at Karlsruhe, expressed the wish that " the strict obligation of personal service in time of peace " might at last be realized. The Government Bill introduced at the close of the year did not go so far as this, and confined itself to increasing the army by 13,000 men. There was instantly a hue and cry.

Notwithstanding, the law was passed, and was to hold good for the period extending from April 1st, 1911, to March 31st, 1916.

But the League had denounced its inadequacy too vigorously to put up with it even for five years. General Keim, who had headed the movement at the Hanover meeting, founded the *Wehrverein*, or Association for National Defence, early in 1912.

From the outset his aim had been to preach the inadequacy of the military law of 1911. Numerous manifestos were issued asserting that Germany could not count upon decisive victory as in 1870, because her army had no longer the numerical superiority which it had then. To make certain of conquering in the next war she ought to imitate France and call every able-bodied man to arms. This measure alone could give the Empire a numerical superiority which France could not rival.

These ideas were disseminated everywhere ; at the meetings of the new *Wehrverein*, and in the local sections of the Pan-German League. At Berlin, Essen, Dortmund, and Düsseldorf, Generals Keim and von Wrochen preached this gospel. At Hamburg, the local section of the League telegraphed to the Chancellor and to the War Minister to demand the definite organization of machine-gun detachments and the employment of the resources provided by the surplus population.

Yielding at last to this tremendous pressure, the Government announced and shortly afterwards introduced new Bills increasing the fleet and the army. Germany would have 700,000 men divided into twenty-five army corps, while France had only 600,000 under arms and twenty army corps.

Still the Pan-Germans were not satisfied. The Committee of the League met at Hanover on April 14th to discuss the Bills. Reports were read by General Keim and Admiral von Breusing, discussion followed, and all the military members of the committee, General von Liebert, formerly Governor of South-East Africa, General von Schmidt, Commandant Baron von Stoessel, etc., all complained bitterly of the inadequacy of the Government proposals. The following resolution was passed unanimously :

“The Committee of the Pan-German League, as a result of expert advice and detailed discussions, considers the Bills dealing with new armaments which have recently been announced, quite inadequate. The Army Bill leaves great gaps in our military organization and does not utilize sufficiently the available forces of the German people in order to ensure on land that absolute and undisputed preponderance of the German Empire, which formerly existed. This inadequacy also jeopardizes our political situation in Europe.”

After dealing with the navy law, the resolution continues in these words :

“The Committee of the Pan-German League therefore considers it its patriotic duty so to work upon public opinion that the nation itself will insist upon the Government enlarging its schemes. Financial or parliamentary considerations should not prevent the Government from putting these demands into execution ; for the German nation, realizing the gravity of the international situation, will be ready to bear the expenditure necessary for the glory and security of the Fatherland.”

In spite of this the new military law was passed as it stood on May 19th, 1912.

No sooner was it passed than the Pan-Germans prepared their revenge. Their orators had never dared to attack the Imperial Government more violently than was done at the Erfurt Congress in September, 1912. Herr Class, President of the League, accused the Government point-blank of betraying German interests at all times and in all places, and more particularly of exhibiting the most shameful weakness with regard to France :

“France’s attitude towards Germany has changed

completely since 1911. The modesty and timidity of former days has been replaced by insolence and arrogance, and there is no doubt that this change is due to the weakness displayed by the German Government in Morocco and Alsace-Lorraine."

As for the military law which had just been passed, it was denounced as "eye-wash," a snare and delusion, its inadequacy was criminal. . . .

In order to put a stop to this campaign, as the Government knew only too well whither it was leading, it was thought advisable to insert this semi-official note in the *Kölnische Zeitung* of November 7th, 1912 :

"Every day we observe that attempts are made to prove the inadequacy of our armaments, and to show our friends and our enemies the supposed weakness and deficiencies of our national defence. This shows an absolute want of judgment as regards moral and intangible values. . . . There must always be weak places in the armour of a people; it cannot be otherwise, but in our case no vital parts of the body are exposed."

So far from being intimidated by this warning, or even paying it the smallest attention, the Committee of the League met at Brunswick on December 1st and, on the motion of General von Liebert, delivered its ultimatum to the Government. In face of recent events in the East, it believed it to be its duty "to insist once again, and most emphatically, upon a complete and adequate reorganization of our forces on land and sea; and it was of opinion that under the influence of the political situation which could not fail to impress the conscience of German citizens, every German, conscious of his duty towards the State and the nation, should be ready to sacrifice his all to prepare the defence of Germany in face of all eventualities."

This was the signal for a fresh campaign of conferences, and Admiral von Breusing distinguished himself as an indefatigable and ubiquitous speaker. In a few weeks he spoke in the most distant parts of Germany; at Dortmund—I quote haphazard—at Muellheim, Moers, Zwickau, Göttingen, Spandau, etc. From each place resolutions were telegraphed to the Chancellor and War Minister from “thousands of men and women” who had just listened to the eloquent words of Admiral von Breusing.

The political situation in the Balkans had furnished an excellent pretext for speeding up the campaign, though at Moers it is true on December 25th, 1912, they also spoke of England's attempts to hem in Germany.

Once again the Imperial Government was constrained to yield to a movement of public opinion raised and fostered by the Pan-German League.

Fresh military Bills were announced early in January, 1913.

Yet barely a few weeks had passed since the haughty *communiqué* in the *Kölnische Zeitung*!

We know what a prodigious effort was sanctioned by these Bills, which were passed in their entirety by the Reichstag on June 30th, 1913: a war contribution of 1,250 millions was ear-marked from the public funds; the effectives of the German army in peace time were raised to 876,000 men, with twenty-five army corps, of which eleven were at war strength. Under the pretext of providing “a containing force” in the event of a French offensive, 250,000 men remain on a war footing on our frontier. Finally, the war treasure rose from 125 millions to 375 millions; it was trebled. Germany does not need to mobilize against us; she is in a

state of permanent mobilization, and keeps us at the mercy of a sudden attack.

Such is, as I write, the military achievement realized by Pan-Germans. Yes; by them and them alone. How insolently they brag about their work!

Hard upon this, while the Reichstag was still occupied with the new Bill, the Pan-German League held its spring congress at Munich and the Military League its general meeting at Leipzig.

Pan-Germanism sounded a flourish of trumpets on the double notes of pride and triumph. Herr Class profited by this fresh satisfaction which the Government had given to Pan-German demands, and laid down the line of conduct it was to follow in the future:

“We trust that the military power of Germany will be employed on the day that our rivals, our ill-disposed neighbours, oppose the needs of our growing population. Our nation in its rapid development must enforce its right to live and secure *fresh territories*.”

General Keim, President of the Military League, claimed that Pan-Germans had fathered the new military law:

“What the Government has just asked of the Reichstag is merely a repetition of the programme laid down a year and a half ago by the Military League and the Pan-German Association. The Chancellor himself has taken his stand with us.”

At Leipzig General Keim's tone towards the Government and the waverers in the Reichstag amounted to provocation:

“We have seen further ahead than official circles, for so long as a year ago we demanded as an absolute necessity what the Government is now asking in its new

army law. *Only in November*, after some hesitation, did Berlin finally understand what was wanted. It is all the more necessary that the military law should be passed promptly. No amount of talk, no expenditure of ink, no loud and indignant protests can alter the fact that the Military League awoke to the interest of our country before those whose duty and profession it was so to rouse themselves. (Frenzied applause.)

“ It is very likely that when the resolutions we are passing to-day are known throughout the country we shall again be abused ; what does that matter to us ? *Storm and swear as they will, our opponents will none the less be compelled to pass everything we demand.* (Laughter and prolonged cheers.)

“ If our demands had been granted in their entirety a year ago, the Balkan war might have been avoided, for Germany and her allies could have thrown greater weight into the balance and would have cut quite another figure in diplomacy.

“ We have been reproached for thinking we know better than the Government and the Reichstag ; as a matter of fact all the speeches made in the Reichstag, even by well-known men, some with the title of professor, betray a complete ignorance of military matters combined with extraordinary animosity.”

In conclusion, General Keim announced new military laws for 1914 and 1915.¹

¹ When the military law of 1890 was discussed, the veteran Windhorst, the distinguished leader of the party of the Centre, declared that henceforth his party would oppose firmly the demands of German imperialism : “ Once for all, those schemes must be given up.”

The military law of 1913 was energetically supported by the leaders of the Centre and every member voted for it.

From this we can estimate the influence which Pan-German ideas have obtained over the ruling German middle class during the last twenty years.

“ They will be passed, never doubt it,” moaned the Radical *Berliner Tageblatt* ; General Keim has only to treat the Government and deputies in his next speech as mentally deficient.”

The bitterness of this remark tells its own tale of the power that Pan-Germanism wields in Germany. The following note, which was inserted in the official *Norddeutsche Zeitung* the day after the passing of the military law, known very properly as the “ Keim law,” also helps us to estimate the strength of this organization :

“ As soon as the Government introduced the military law, the German people accepted it with grim determination ; the Government rejoiced to see its adoption in its entirety, for never has any Bill of such importance for the army received such strong and unanimous public support.”

Congratulations, thanks, encouragement : this is all the Imperial Government could find to reply to the insulting challenges, provocations, accusations, and biting sarcasms of triumphant Pan-Germanism.

Under these conditions the Pan-Germans would have been very foolish to draw in their horns ; to tell you the truth, they do not contemplate any such course. Their accredited organs condescend to inform us of their coming demands. To begin with, *Politisch-Militarische Korrespondenz* demands “ reform,” which means increase, in the artillery ; while the *Kreuz Zeitung* proves the necessity of laying down new cruisers, so as to be able to send flying squadrons far and wide to carry aloft the German flag without reducing the Baltic fleet.

According to its invariable custom, the Government replied that it had no intention of adopting these pro-

posals. The Radical *Berliner Tageblatt* tells us what to think of such a denial, sincere though it may be when it is made ; but its very sincerity only brings out more forcibly the powerlessness of the Government when, as usual, it is finally obliged to submit to Pan-German pressure : “ They deny all knowledge of the matter two or three times, and then, one fine day a Bill appears upon the scene.”

However this may be, Dr. Class and General Keim formally declared, at the nineteenth Congress of the Pan-German League held at Breslau early in September, 1913, that new proposals would be brought before the Reichstag dealing with an increase of effectives and war material. Even supposing it had the will or the power, how could the Imperial Government resist these fresh Pan-German requisitions, accompanied as they are by such peculiarly imperative favourable conditions ?

At the close of 1914 the German Government will have at its disposal one billion 500 million francs (war contribution), plus 750 millions (issue of Treasury bonds), making a total of two billion 250 million francs. The unique expenses of the last military law will be one billion 250 million francs, which leaves a clear billion available for further purposes.

Thus a fresh military effort can be carried out without a fresh tax. The pretext is ready to hand : the restoration of three years' service in France necessitates a vigorous reply from Germany—so says the Pan-German Press daily in every key.

We must realize, in France, that this reply will not be long in coming ; we must realize it ; the patient and indefatigable will of Pan-Germanism will win the day, and they will get what has so far been refused them :

that is, the enrolment of all available recruits without exception, which means that the contingents of the German army on a peace footing (!) will reach the formidable figure of 1,200,000 men.

One million two hundred thousand men under arms at the service of the Pan-German ideal! Who will still be ready to deny that France is in danger?

V

THE GERMANIC " BLOC "

Pan-Germanism in Austria—Its avowed objects, and methods of action—A typical example—Feeling the way—The heir-apparent hesitates—International consequences—A precarious truce—The great race-conflict.

As soon as the military law of 1913 was passed, the Pan-German leaders, whose work it was, congratulated themselves particularly on the fact that the Imperial Chancellor had justified its adoption in the Reichstag by enlarging upon one of the favourite topics of militant Pan-Germanism—namely, upon the threatening antagonism of Germans and Slavs.

This was, indeed, the first time that the accredited mouthpiece of the Germanic world had given his sanction, with all the prestige attaching to his office, to this essential article of the Pan-German programme. The gravity of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's statements was widely emphasized. Doubtless he himself, on thinking it over, was somewhat alarmed at his daring, as the next day he felt constrained to tone down his remarks of the preceding evening.

Perhaps in the interval the Chancellor of the German Empire had been reminded that in case of war all Slavs would not wear Russian uniform, and that Germany's ally, Austria, had also serving under her flag—and especially against Russia—those Slavs who were under Hapsburg rule.

This situation, paradoxical to the verge of being ridiculous and even tragic, does not only embarrass the Governments of the Dual Monarchy, but has also brought the Berlin Government more than once face to face with a cruel dilemma ; on the one hand it is bound to serve the cause of the Germanic race in Austria, and, on the other hand, it is constrained to observe a certain amount of caution towards an allied Empire whose support has been for so long a necessity, and still is so in spite of everything.

Yet we must remember that the Pan-German League, by merely showing a firm hand, has always overruled the objections and hesitations of the Imperial Government. The events of 1897 may be recalled as a typical example of what happens.

When the Austrian Minister, Count Badeni, signed the ordinances granting bilingualism to the Czecks, he had certainly not been sufficiently aware of the influence which the Pan-German League had acquired in Germany. He was not long in learning it, to his cost. The League started a furious campaign against the Austrian Minister and the Emperor Francis Joseph, whom it denounced as a traitor to the German cause.

On May 9th, 1897, a protest meeting, held at Dresden, passed unanimously a resolution "denouncing the ordinances dealing with languages in Bohemia as an insult to the whole German nation, and inviting all Germans to oppose Slavonic encroachments *by every possible means.*" A month later, another meeting was held at Leipzig, and at its close three telegrams were despatched, one of loyalty to the Kaiser, a second thanking the King of Saxony for the hospitality shown in his capital, a third of admiration to

Bismarck. This last performance was somewhat daring for to revive the slightest antagonism between Germany and Austria, whom the former Chancellor had had such difficulty in reconciling after Sadowa, showed a lack of respect for his work and was a reflection on his doctrine ; and this was more than he could stand.

In reply to these expressions of admiration from the Leipzig Congress, Bismarck inserted in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* this scathing note :

" At Leipzig, the *Alldeutscher Verband* has shown itself wanting in the respect due to States. The Austrian speakers who came on to imperial soil have forgotten their duty as Austro-Hungarian subjects."

Pan-Germans disowned by Bismarck! Even that did not check them in their headlong career ; a third meeting was held at Leipzig, on September 2nd, 1897, expressly chosen as the anniversary of Sedan! After that, another meeting was announced in Berlin. This time the Emperor himself was annoyed ; he had just returned from Russia, after exchanging official cordialities with the Tsar. It was an inauspicious moment to embark upon an anti-Slavonic campaign ; the Berlin meeting was forbidden. Thereupon the Pan-Germans retorted by violent polemics in the Press against the Emperor, and by actually provoking Austria from within the Austrian frontier. At Egger, in Bohemia, was held the anti-Slavonic meeting which had been forbidden in Berlin. All the big-wigs of the party were present : Dr. Hasse, Herr Pröll, Herr Wolf, Herr Schnoenerer. Insults were heaped upon Francis Joseph and the Austrian Slavs. Yet the Government at Vienna, which was at last obliged to take the Pan-German movement seriously, did not even dare to protest. Soon the League was able to hold its meetings

again in Germany, at Munich, where the Bavarian regent sent them official congratulations. . . .

Meanwhile the German Government had been obliged willy-nilly to follow the lead. The Badeni ordinances had been denounced by Germany and the two Chancellors, Goluchowsky and Bülow, after an interchange of acrid notes, had met to discuss the question. Finally, Count Badeni had been sacrificed and succeeded by Count Thun, a partisan of Badeni's ideas. More clamours from the Pan-Germans and more protests from Germany. Matters had gone so far that there was talk of putting an end to the Triple Alliance. Once again Austria gave way ; Count Thun's federalist ministry gave place to a bureaucratic ministry, and the Badeni ordinances were rescinded.

After this memorable victory the Pan-German League—sometimes profiting by the toleration of the powers that be, sometimes at open war with them—pursued incessantly the patient realization of its schemes, that is to say, the union of all Germans throughout Central Europe, the aggregation of a formidable Germanic *bloc* of a hundred million men!

We can get a good idea of what Pan-Germans are capable of doing in a foreign country which they have marked for their own if we examine the present state of their organization in Austria-Hungary. It is as many-sided and Protean there as in Germany, though it has to be more circumspect. Thus, for instance, while a German society with its headquarters at Chemnitz, the *Bund der Deutsch-Oesterreicher in Deutschen Reiche* (League of German-speaking Austrians living in the German Empire), divides Austrian subjects residing in Germany into groups, the Pan-German League thinks

it advisable not to have its Austrian disciples in sections. Its organization in Austria, therefore, differs in this respect from that in Germany, for it is carried on by delegates whose names are not published. They thus escape the worries incidental to a policy which many people in Austria would call "a policy of high treason."

By the side of the members of the Pan-German League, the different countries in Austria have grouped the partisans of the creed of "Greater Germany" into territorial associations. Thus the *Bund der Deutschen in Boehmen* (League of Germans in Bohemia), founded at Prague in 1894, has 106,400 members, divided into 1,124 local sections. Its annual revenue exceeds half a million crowns. It is directed against the Czecks, as is also the League of Germans in Low Austria, which was founded at Vienna in 1903 and has 4,000 members. In Northern Moravia a similar association has 50,000 members, and an annual revenue of 216,000 crowns. In Southern Moravia, the Association has 10,000 members; in Galicia, a similar League has 4,100; and in Bukovina 9,500 members.

All these Leagues of Germans in the different Austrian countries pursue the same exclusively political aim, while they allow their members to indulge their preferences, religious or otherwise. Thus, at Vienna, we find the *Bund der Germanen* (League of Germans), the *Alldeutscher Verein für die Ostmark* (Pan-German Society for the Eastern Frontier), *Deutsch-Nationaler Verein für Oesterreich* (German National Society for Austria), and finally the *Deutscher Weltbund* (German World Association), which corresponds with the German Society for Germanism in Foreign Parts.

The oldest and most important society is the *Deutscher Schulverein*, which deals solely with the foundation and upkeep of schools in bilingual countries. It was founded in 1880, has 200,000 members divided into 2,500 local sections, an annual income of 1,177,000 crowns and a reserve of 4,000,000 crowns.

Germans in Austria are organized in two different ways, which are peculiar to them. In the first place there is the *Deutscher Volksrat* (German Popular Council) of the different countries (Bohemia, Moravia, Carinthia, etc.). These are representative chambers composed of militant Germans outside the Constitutional Parliaments.

Besides these, national rivalry, carried on by boycotting and other economic methods, has brought about the creation of *Deutsche Schutzvereine* for the Northern and Southern frontiers, Hungary, Bosnia, etc. These societies support German tradesmen and help them to compete with their adversaries.

Then there are German friendly societies which abound in all parts of the Empire. In Bohemia there are more than ten German societies: the Union of the Bohemian Forest, the Germans of Northern Moravia, of the Southern frontier, of Western Bohemia, of the Northern frontier, of Eastern Bohemia, of North-Western Bohemia, of the Egger district, and finally there is their Federation, the General Union of Germans in Bohemia, which numbers about 100,000 adherents.¹ All these societies, I repeat, pursue the same

¹ It is a fact that race-antagonism is particularly acute in Bohemia. Germans in Bohemia are more irreconcilable than any others from the national point of view. They are more closely connected with Saxons and Prussians than with their fellow-Austrians. Nowhere have theories of "Greater Germany" more partisans than at Prague. Nor have ethnical conflicts assumed elsewhere such alarming proportions.

Pan-German ideal: on the one hand, the struggle against the Slavs; on the other hand, union with the German Empire under a federal form to be decided at some future date.

It would be very interesting to write a history of Pan-Germanism in Austria from the Badeni ordinances to recent events in the Balkans, but it would exceed the scope of this work. It will be sufficient to point out that after passing through violent and distracted periods, Pan-Germans were able for some years to indulge the highest hopes. This was the epoch of perfect agreement. The two Empires proclaimed to the world, on all occasions and quite openly, their close bond of union. William II won unanimous approval in Germany in 1908 by throwing his sword into the balance in favour of his ally, when Austria was in danger of Russian reprisals for her treacherous annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

But, as years drew on, and Francis Joseph began to bow beneath their weight, the question of the succession became the chief object of public concern. For some

Bohemia's industry is in German hands. For a long time Germans held all administrative posts. A long, bitter, merciless struggle was required before Czeck nationality could be revived, could reconquer public posts for its sons, or the right to use its national language in the schools, in the law-courts, or in official correspondence.

All these conquests are again challenged. Although the Germans only command one-third of the seats in the Diet, they have succeeded in paralyzing Parliamentary action so completely that in July, 1913, the Emperor Francis Joseph was obliged to suppress constitutional guarantees. The Diet was dissolved and its place taken by an administrative Commission, composed of officials, five of whom are Czecks, and three are German. Since Parliament no longer exists, this Commission might set up German schools again, decree that German should once more be the only official language, and fill the offices with German officials. By such means as these twelve million Germans in Austria can impose their will on twenty-four million Slavs—not to mention ten million Hungarians!

time people had been wondering what were the personal predilections of the heir-apparent, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, a somewhat enigmatic figure. Some who claimed to know him well, asserted that his sympathies were decidedly Slavonic! Was it not rumoured that one day he meant to break with the policy inaugurated in 1879 by Count Andrassy, which made Austria the humble satellite of Germany? Was he not credited with the dream of leading the Hapsburg Empire to new destinies by putting it at the head of a sort of Confederation of Southern Slavs? . . .

The leaders of the Pan-German League determined to have an explicit statement at any price. Their scouts were sent on ahead to reconnoitre the ground.

In the book which I have already mentioned, *If I were the Emperor*, Herr Daniel Frymann examines all the reasons which should inevitably bind the future Emperor of Austria to the German cause. But as no doubt these do not seem sufficiently convincing, he sketches out a whole programme of action, and warns him that he will not be allowed to deviate from it.

According to Daniel Frymann, who agrees with many but not with all the specialists on these matters, the death of Francis Joseph will be the signal for furious warfare among the conflicting nationalities. The new Emperor will therefore be obliged to abandon legal and constitutional paths; dissolution of Parliaments, recourse to arms, military dictatorships, merciless repression—these will be his weapons. At this point the Germans of Austria will intervene.¹

“They must go to the heir to the throne and offer

¹ On September 16th, 1913, Herr Weisskirchner, the burgo-master of Vienna, dared to say in public: “We Germans of the Danube are one with the Germans of Germany. Our heart is German, and our heart-beats are German.”

him the following alliance: They will approve the abrogation of constitutions, and the dismissal of Parliaments, and will support the future Emperor's dictatorship by putting themselves at his disposal as 'staatsvolk' (the people who are the mainstay of the State). The dictatorship should restore a centralized State with an Imperial Diet in which the number of seats should be apportioned according to the amount of taxes paid by each nationality to the State. . . . The Emperor should give the Germans a guarantee that their language should be the language of the Empire, and that wherever they were in the minority their will should nevertheless prevail, because the 'staatsvolk' could not be overruled by a majority. We assume that Germans, thanks to the amount of taxes they pay, would have an absolute majority in the Diet; if this were not the case, the Constitution should arrange that every vote of the majority should be of no effect if it were contrary to the German vote."

If the heir to the throne should not fall in with these ideas, nor fulfil his engagements towards the German population, considered as *Staatsvolk*, then the German Empire should intervene, if necessary by force of arms: for it is a prime necessity for Germany to ensure in Austria the definite preponderance of Germanism.

"After which," coolly observes Daniel Frymann, "our surplus population in the Empire can be directed towards the south-east, where it will bring new blood to the German population."

This brutal and threatening language, which was taken up, approved and amplified by all Pan-German papers,¹ raised a general hue and cry throughout

¹ Anyone who requires further information as to the tone employed by Pan-German writers when they speak of Austria, should look at

Austria—except of course in those circles which were openly and violently German. The Archduke let it be understood that he was not the man to become the obliging cat's-paw of such a programme.

The Pan-Germans had found out what they wanted to know. Their reply was not long in coming.

On December 1st, 1912, in the middle of the Austro-Serbian crisis, the committee of the Pan-German League met at Brunswick to consider whether it would suit Germany to support Austrian claims. After some hesitation, the committee decided in the affirmative, but they made it quite clear that they decided thus not from respect for treaties, but because Austria, whether she wished it or not, was destined to become the advanced fortress of Germanism, and it would be dangerous to leave her to face single-handed the triumphant Slav.

"Our methods," said the President, Herr Class, "are not actuated by the interests of the House of Hapsburg or of the Danubian Monarchy, but by the fact that the German Empire and Austrian Germanism have identical interests, and by the necessity of maintaining unim-

a pamphlet by Dr. von Winterstetten, published in July, 1913, by Lehmann, of Munich. He writes :

"The German people have *lent* ten million of their countrymen to Austria. That is the investment which they have made in the Austrian joint stock company, so that Germans, as representing a higher culture, may become the basis and cement of the South Austrian amalgam with Central Europe."

The Germans have "lent" ten million of their countrymen to Austria, as representatives of a higher culture : is not this delightful! And of course everyone has the right to take back what they have lent. So Dr. Winterstetten proves that the German provinces of Austria really belong to Germany, who can take them back again when it seems good to her. In September, 1913, the *Alldeutsche Tageblatt*, a review with both democratic and imperialist sympathies, asked point-blank for the annexation of the German provinces of Austria to Germany, and announced that the Gustavus-Adolphus Society had devoted 90,000 marks to the propaganda of this idea.

paired Austria's character as a Power dominated by the German element."

The resolution passed at Brunswick was particularly explicit on this point ; it specified without any circumlocution that Germany would support Austria on the sole condition that she should play the part allotted to her, that of the well-disciplined soldier of Pan-Germanism :

"The political events of the last few weeks have exposed the threatened situation of Germanism in Central Europe, and shown that the struggle for existence cannot be avoided. Starting from this consideration the committee of the Pan-German League is of opinion that Germany cannot tolerate the weakening or annihilation of Austria-Hungary ; it sees in the Serbian attacks against the Danubian Monarchy the first move in a universal Slavonic assault upon Germanism, and regards from this standpoint the demand for an Adriatic port."

The following day, December 2, 1912, the Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg thought himself authorized by the enunciation of the principle of intervention at Brunswick to make this famous statement in the Reichstag :

"If, contrary to expectation, one of our allies were attacked by a third party while it was defending its interests, and if its existence were threatened in consequence, we should take up our stand firmly at its side, faithful to our treaty engagements. . . ."

But he had omitted the main thing by not mentioning the one condition on which German assistance would depend. They soon let him hear of it. All the Pan-German papers fell upon him simultaneously. Promises, alliances, fidelity to treaties, that famous *Nibelungen-treue* of which William II spoke in 1909, were not con-

siderations which were capable of affecting Pan-Germans. Some of them, however, purely as a matter of form, concocted a special interpretation of the treaty binding Germany to Austria. The Triple Alliance, said they, obliges Germany to go to Austria's assistance if she is attacked by Russia. But if the attack comes from another Power, Germany is only obliged to observe a benevolent neutrality unless Russia intervenes actively on behalf of the third assailant. The Chancellor had, therefore, been too categorical in promising German aid unconditionally. The *casus fœderis* in the hypothetical case mentioned by the Chancellor would be by no means established, declared the *Rheinisch-Wesphaelische Zeitung* on December 4th.

This cavalier and cynical fashion of repudiating fidelity to alliances in favour of the selfish interests of Pan-Germanism, exasperated beyond all bounds those Austrians who had retained their independence. The *Armee Zeitung*, a journal which was connected with the Archduke's entourage, replied that the Austrian Germans must have observed—to their sorrow—that without the Czecks and the Poles, parliaments could not work, so that any regime that oppressed Serbs and Croats was impossible.

“Austria-Hungary is a composite State wherein all races must collaborate for a common understanding. Austria has no quarrel with Slavs. Austria struggles for her existence, which is endangered by Russia and her tools. We have no quarrel with Serbs, for most Serbs and the most civilized among them have belonged to us for centuries. We are fighting a little people which lets Russia use it as an advance-guard. . . . We are not fighting Slavs ; we fight side by side with Slavs ; we have brothers among Slavs.”

Upon this there was a fine to-do in Germany.

Some Pan-German papers, like the Radical review *Maerz*, went so far as to reproach the League committee for having declared in favour of intervention in the Austro-Serbian conflict, and the Hapsburg dynasty was freely abused.¹ The *Rheinisch-Wesphaelische Zeitung* issued a striking article entitled, *Das deutsche Volk zieht nur für deutsche Belange in den Krieg* (*The German nation will only make war for German interests*).

"If the German nation is obliged to help Francis Ferdinand," says the article, "it must make sure that it is fighting only in German interests. It must therefore make its own conditions. It must insist upon the restoration of German supremacy in Austria. If Germans in the Empire get no advantage from war and victory, then at least the Germans in Austria must reap some benefit. If Francis Ferdinand will not make this concession, then let our sword remain in its scabbard."

A few days later the *Rheinisch-Wesphaelische Zeitung* returned to the charge :

"The decisive struggle between German and Slav is not yet the burning question. For our immediate future the settlement of our relations with England is of vital importance. It was not Russia, nor Serbia, which prevented our taking Morocco, but England. The Dreadnoughts in the North Sea are not Russian nor Montenegrin, but English. Germany's most urgent work is to concentrate and prepare all her forces for the decisive

¹ We must not forget that many German Protestants are opposed to the incorporation of Austrian Germans into the Empire because they would bring a considerable reinforcement to the Catholic element. The famous movement, called *Los von Rom*, under the pretext of undermining the influence of the Vatican in the Germanic world, was mainly directed against Austrian Catholics.

struggle by which England will try to defend her world position, which we shall be bound to attack by force of circumstances. Consequently the German nation has no vital interest in the conquest of Albania, Montenegro and Serbia."

This was too much of a good thing. The *Rheinisch-Wesphaelische Zeitung* was confiscated in Austria, and vigorous action was taken against Pan-Germans. *Das alldeutsche Verein für die Ostmark*, of Vienna, issued a manifesto on March 6th, 1913, which the Austrian authorities condemned as high treason, and as an offence against the members of the Imperial house.

During the uncertainty and confusion of this crisis aroused in Austria by Pan-German agitations, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand in his turn thought it would be as well to clear up German official intentions. He resolved to see William II and put these questions to him plainly: "Did he adopt Pan-German theories?" "To what extent exactly could Austria count on the help of her ally?"

These questions, as you will agree, were of great importance at a time when Austria was feverishly mobilizing her army corps, calling up her reservists, when the searchlights of her gunboats on the Danube awoke King Peter of Serbia at night in his Palace chamber. . . . Every moment the news was expected that the Austrians had crossed the frontier, that the guns were firing, and the battle begun. . . .

What could the calm and placid William II reply to this feverish interrogation? He did not approve of Pan-German excesses—certainly not. More than anyone he deplored their threatening brutality, the insolence of their speeches and commands. He had more than

once displayed openly his disapproval of their proceedings—a step which, by the way, had not turned out very well for him. But what could he do? The opinion of the immense majority was won over to the ideas they propagated, and the public prayed for the realization of the programme which they advocated.

The bourgeois Lohengrin then read in his guest's face some surprise and much contempt, and he must have regretted that he had so gratuitously despoiled himself of his glittering armour, and revealed himself as the poor creature that he really is, for he thought to close the interview with these epic words :

“ After all, I think Austria is making a good deal of flourish with my big sword ! ”

From that moment, deprived of German support, Austria demobilized, her policy in the Balkans wavered, and finally capitulated all along the line. As for the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, he drags his perplexities from one castle to another. He is said to be ill. He is literally ill of indecision. Shall he be German or Slav ?¹ Shall he accept the comparative safety of the yoke, or take his chance of independence ? While waiting for him to decide and acquaint Berlin with his decision, Germany pretended that she could no longer count upon this doubtful ally, and made her isolation the pretext for exacting fresh sacrifices from the taxpayer, and for

¹ In August, 1913, a Vienna newspaper, which announced the approaching visit of the German Emperor to the Imperial court of Austria, called forth a curt denial : William II, who had been invited a long time before to a shooting-party early in the winter by the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, would fulfil this engagement but would pay no other visit in Austria. . . . We should compare this attitude with that of the Tsar, who threatened to stay away from the marriage of the Duke of Cumberland if the Archduke was to be present. “ He or I,” he said straight out. This is the position of Francis Ferdinand between the German potentate and the Slavonic potentate, which reminds one, with all due respect, of Buridan's ass!

increasing prodigiously the strength of her army. France, with good reason for being uneasy, had to swim with the tide, restore three years' service, and revive her military spirit. . . .

Thus it is not only worth while following up and studying Pan-German activity in Germany itself, but wherever it is to be found, for it leads to the most serious international consequences. Pan-Germans have shown what they can do in Austria, where they literally held in suspense the issue of peace and war. There, by a truly surprising anomaly—but we should do well not to calculate either on its duration or repetition—they determined the maintenance of peace. That was only because their work was not yet completed.

Whilst waiting for the events which will follow the death of Francis Joseph, a sort of uneasy armistice has been arranged. The two sides are watching each other. While this game has been going on, France has scored, for the delay has given her time to concentrate all her efforts upon the reorganization of her military forces. But in case she may be tempted to believe that this effort will suffice to guarantee her security in the future, let her look at Austria, where Pan-Germanism, with a determination that nothing can tire, pursues its slow and inexorable way towards the accomplishment of its vast and terrible designs.

The great clash of races is imminent: German and Slav are infallibly destined to collide upon the eternal route of human migrations. Does France want to be in a position to play the part of final arbiter, or will she be content to act as the hostage which the Pan-German conqueror will drag at his chariot wheels? Now or never she must make her choice.

THE WORK OF THE PAN-GERMANS

WHAT THEY WANT TO DO

I

ARGUMENTS FOR "INTELLECTUALS"

Two methods—Privileges of the German tongue—A successful book—Big and little nations—Aristotle and Nietzsche—Concentration of "culture"—What the professors say—A new formula, a new right.

EARLY in 1913, Maximilian Harden, the famous editor of *Zukunft*, speaking at a popular meeting at Munich, said: "Since we are obviously unable to damage England on the sea, let us strike at her friends."

On the same day, at Göttingen, before 2,000 students from various German universities, Arning, the deputy, enlarged upon some of the ideas which the Pan-German League means to propagate.

We may be certain that Arning the Pan-German, though he came to the same conclusions as Harden the Democrat, did not use the same brutal and cynical vocabulary. Pan-Germans know how to speak to each man in the language he understands best, and offer him a choice of arguments agreeable to his taste. This explains the prodigious success in university circles of such imperialist manuals as Herr Paul Rohrbach's *Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt* (*German Thought in the World*). The author carefully adopts a dogmatic tone

and adorns his theories with tawdry scientific tags. Let us follow his reasoning. The aggrandisement of the German Empire is not only essential on account of its increasing population and its need for economic outlets, it is an historical necessity imposed by the march of civilization ; it is a question of " culture."

" No one can admit," writes Herr Paul Rohrbach, " that mankind has the same interest in the welfare of small nationalities of no value, as in the prosperity of world-wide nations that represent civilization. In the future, small nations will be obliged to join on to that centre of *culture* which most attracts them, or to which they are impelled by their geographical position."

This method gives Pan-Germans the advantage of asserting their rights over every country inhabited by German-speaking peoples.

This is the practical application of the dream of Arndt the poet : " Where the German tongue is spoken, the German Empire should rule," and also of the axiom of Fichte the sociologist : " He who speaks thy tongue is of thine own flesh and blood."

Yet it would be difficult to assert that German was commonly spoken prior to the conquest throughout Alsace-Lorraine, Danish Schleswig, or Poland !

But what is the use of arguing ?

Let us be content to follow the development of Herr Paul Rohrbach's thesis, of which, as we are told by one of our fellow-countrymen who was educated at a German university, " more than 10,000 copies were sold in a single year, and were much appreciated in intellectual circles."¹

Herr Rohrbach cannot endure the idea that twenty million Germans are living outside the Empire, and are

¹ *Ce que pense la jeunesse allemande*, by André-François Poncet.

in danger of losing "the sentiment of national community." Dutch, Flemish, Swiss, and German-Austrians are all invited to remember that sooner or later—but preferably sooner—they must return to the "*culture*" centre of German civilization.

Arguments steeped in German pedantry abound in Herr Rohrbach's work :

"In comparison with former days," he writes, "the realm of science is now so stupendous that only a great nation is capable of coping with it. German students outside our frontiers, the Dutch, and our more distant kinsmen the Scandinavians, are all obliged to form a kind of fraternity with German science, both in order to rear scholars and to facilitate their researches ; they are too few in number to be able to produce first-rate scientific work or institutions in all branches. . . . This also applies to other spheres. Just in the same way that small States cannot build a fleet of modern Dreadnoughts, because they would be ruined by the cost of one, so they are incapable of producing a complete civilization from base to apex because it requires too broad a foundation."

Is this true? I doubt it. It would be easy to enumerate little States which had fulfilled a civilizing mission quite as usefully as greater Powers. Herr Rohrbach's theory is contrary to Aristotle's advice—which is grievous for a pedant : "So arrange that the number of citizens does not exceed ten thousand, or they will be unable to assemble in the forum."

Verily it is a long time since Nietzsche extolled antiquity and the virtues of small free States and the rights of individual conscience . . . In his early years he was infected by the war fever of the early German victories and volunteered for hospital work so that he could smell

the powder on the battlefields of Wissemburg and Woerth ; but he gradually recovered and expressed his horror at the growth of the monstrous *bloc* of Prussianized Germany.

But Nietzsche is no longer the fashion in German universities, any more than any other philosopher, for the only idealism taught now is State idealism.¹

When Ernest Renan protested against the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, he contrasted the brutal triumph of military strength with the more glorious conquest of the world by German philosophy, and his words then awoke a faint echo across the Rhine. To-day, the chief Nationalist organ, the *Rheinisch-Wesphaelische Zeitung*, asserts that the change in the German intellectual attitude is complete : " Perhaps we used to be a nation of poets and thinkers, we certainly are so no longer."

Let us turn back to Herr Rohrbach's " Imperialist breviary," which sets before German youth an ideal both practicable and, according to him, now realizable, of consummating the work of the founders of Germany. This work is still incomplete, because the German nation is so unequally distributed, if we compare the total number of its members with that portion of them which is responsible for the maintenance of the national idea.

In contrast, Herr Rohrbach points jealously at France : " The French, except for a small group in Lorraine (we must give a good mark to a Pan-German who makes this exception), are all united in one single political whole."

After submitting that the position of the Swiss and Flemish with regard to France is not the same as that of

¹ This is the conclusion of M. A.-F. Poncet's inquiry in German universities.

the Flemish with regard to Germany, he concludes: "Even if the whole French-speaking population and Belgium and Switzerland were considered as French, one could hardly find three million Frenchmen living beyond the borders of the Republic.

" . . . Germany has been more weakened by the separation of many of her members than any other nationality in the world."

The *Manual of the Pan-German League (Handbuch des Alldeutschen Verbandes)* gives statistics of which a few will be sufficient to explain Herr Rohrbach's deductions.

According to Pan-Germans there are 89 million Germans in Europe (73 million High Germans, 11 million Low Germans), 55,700,000 Russians, 41,300,000 French, 40,300,000 Anglo-Saxons, etc. Now the percentage of Anglo-Saxons living in Great Britain is 99.7, of Hungarians living in Hungary 99.15, of Italians in Italy 96.21, of Russians in Russia 95.95, of Scandinavians in Scandinavia 93.9, of French in France 82.76, but of Germans in the German Empire only 67.25.

There are, therefore, many German brothers to be reconquered and brought back to the "culture" centre.

German theorists have succeeded in drawing the most astounding conclusions from these premises.

For example, they prove that such a mighty "culture centre," and so highly-privileged a race must carry civilization to the confines of the world, diffusing on its way the light of German genius for the greater benefit of inferior races. This is worked out by T. L. Reimer most learnedly, in a very serious work, *Ein pan-germanisches Deutschland*. Upon the German Empire must fall the task of "civilizing" France. But will it stop there? Certainly not. The Iberian peninsula is also longing for

the German conqueror. Is Spain not peopled by an inferior race, the *homo mediterraneus*, crossed with races that are lower still? And since South America is Spanish, Germany must go on there from Spain and carry the benefits of her culture—not to mention her trade. . . .

Are these wild schemes isolated instances of the intellectual attitude? One of the best known German university men, Professor Ludwig Bernhard, of Berlin University, is a fervent disciple of Bismarck, and consequently a convinced Pan-German.

Then listen to the distinguished Professor Adolf Wagner, who is also a member of the Prussian Upper House :

" I am a Nationalist."

" But you do not go so far as the *Deutsche Rundschau* ? "

" That is my newspaper."

" It is Pan-German."

" I am a Pan-German. I desire the growth and diffusion of the German idea, which is one of the forces of the modern world. I wish to see the unity of the German spirit strengthened in Austria, in Switzerland, and wherever it is to be found." ¹

Professor von Schmoller is equally emphatic. These are not Conservatives but " Liberals," they are very advanced Radicals.

The most recent Pan-German society, the *Arndt-Bund*, founded especially in order to encourage the patriotic spirit which fired that fierce poet from 1806 to 1813, is presided over by Herr Zorn, Professor of Law at Bonn University.

¹ *L'Enigme allemande*, by G. Bourdon, p. 103.

The immense majority of university and educated men in Germany is Pan-German, that is a certain, patent, and undeniable fact. The schoolmaster and the “Herr Professor” are of one mind in this, and drill the young who are already accustomed to Nationalist discipline.

The patient, tireless propaganda of the Pan-German League has achieved this result by creating a special literature of which we have seen some specimens; its variety and wealth are beyond belief. Its whole effort—and we can but admire its ingenuity—has been directed to changing a formula which shocks cultivated minds. “Might surpasses right” does not sound so well as “might creates right,” which has quite a scientific flavour. It is a recognized maxim of all chairs of higher education in Germany that if a people or race attains a certain degree of power, then *ipso facto* the positions of other peoples in the world are called in question. This theory was expounded, for instance, by way of practical experiment at the time of the first Balkan War, and it was there brought forward against the interests of the Turk, who was Germany’s client, if not her vassal. The Bulgarian race had the right to demand a fresh partition of the Balkans because its portion was not equivalent to its racial power and warlike strength. It was in virtue of this theory that Germany intervened in Africa and Asia. She does not deny anterior rights, but she brings into the scales the weight of a new right, that which her strength gives her. Then either the intervention of this German Colossus has to be disputed, and bought off, or else his appetite has to be satisfied.

Looked at from one point of view this is a seductive theory, and it is easy to guess what a good thing can be

made of it by fluent professors in the enjoyment of that prestige which belongs in Germany to the function of educator, and to the character of savant. It discloses a horizon of boundless possibilities founded upon work, activity, a spirit of discipline and all the virile virtues. Without a blush the intellectual repeats that hideous cry, "Woe to the vanquished!" for the vanquished are the cowards who have surrendered in the battle of life and have forfeited fortune and success. It is logical, it is salutary, it is just that a redistribution of benefits should be made in proportion to deserts. Who can deny this? Is not he who pleads the cause of the weak a traitor to civilization, science, and progress?

You see the developments which this theory entails. Read over again some of the speeches of William II the Peacemaker, especially those which coincide with the great outbursts of Pan-Germanism. You will have no difficulty in finding in them the substance of this great idea that Germany wants peace, that she needs it to accelerate the fulfilment of her economic and martial power, but that none should ignore the new rights which have now accrued to the Empire, and which will become more and more forcible in the future as the position of the Empire becomes more and more definitely preponderant.

"There is growing in Germany," writes M. René Pinon, in the work to which we have already referred,¹ "a theory of rights founded on force in the area of economic and colonial expansion, which, if the Government were to adopt it as a rule, would endanger the peace of all nations. From the fact that Germany has a plethora of manufactured articles for sale, vast factories to keep supplied with raw materials, and an overflow of

¹ *France et Allemagne.*

emigrants to dispose of, some German publicists, vulgarizing the ideas of philosophers and economists, have claimed for their country the genesis of a right to occupy new territories and to open new outlets ; it is a theory of the right of expropriation of incompetent races. There are 'super-nations' as there are 'super-men.'”

* * * * *

The theory that force alone confers superiority is exploited under every form, and adapted to every phase of human activity by the instructors of German youth.

In order to prove that in the various spheres where she has been called to rule, Germany has only been able to do so and will only be able to do so by force, a group of eminent scholars has edited and published in common an astonishing work, in which can be found the expression and synthesis of modern German mentality.¹

Writers and distinguished savants have contributed to this book, professors—Zorn for public law, Eheberg for finance—politicians, engineers, well-known publicists, all have brought their enthusiastic contribution to this prodigious apology for German hegemony.

From beginning to end, energy, activity, force, even violence, are extolled as the only virtues which can build up and support a modern nation. The cult of force for these choice spirits means not only the practice

¹ *Deutschland als Weltmacht*, Vierzig Jahre Deutsches Reich. Unter Mitarbeit einer grossen Anzahl berufener deutscher Gelehrter, Offiziere und Fachmänner, herausgegeben von Kaiser-Wilhelm-Dank, Verein der Soldatenfreunde, Berlin, 1911.

It should be noted that this work, which has no fewer than 850 pages and 5,000 illustrations, and is handsomely bound, is sold at the ridiculously cheap price of four marks, obviously with a view to circulation and propaganda.

of the military power, it is also a way of thinking and behaving which combines "depth of thought" and "vehemence superior to every obstacle": *Deutscher Tiefsinn in Verbindung mit dem alles überwindenden Kraft bewusstsein*. Science is a force which must be utilized; art also, so long as it encourages German taste. Music, too, is a power in the world: *die Machtstellung der deutschen Musik!*

Thus the idea of Germany's universal power, of *Weltmacht*, is strengthened in the minds of the young German generation.

Thus while we are taken in by appearances, and imagine that after all time is on the side of peace, the militarizing of Germany and preparation for war is being planned by thousands and millions of brains.

It will not be long before we find these terrible theories being practically applied in many more varieties of ways. Those who are students to-day will in a few years' time be officers, deputies, leading men; they will insist upon the application of the maxim which excited their studious youth, and they will urge the realization of the immense hope which haunts their minds now and evermore. . . .

II

WHAT A GERMAN VICTORY WOULD COST US

Remember the map with the green border!—One of Herr Class's phrases suppressed by Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter—The programme of conquest and annexation—The account to be settled—To get at England—Are Frenchmen warned?

THE Pan-German League, met in solemn congress at Breslau on September 7th, 1913, declared that Germany "hungered for territory."

Under these conditions I think it would be as well to consider what France would have to give up if the next war put her at the mercy of the German Empire.

No doubt many of the speeches or writings on this subject which we shall quote will provoke a smile.

So smiled, three years before the war of 1870, those Frenchmen who held in their hands a map edited by Kiepert, illustrating the researches of Richard Beckh, a German philologist.

To-day we can see that Kiepert's map corresponds, with a very few alterations, to the "map with the green border," attached to the treaty of Frankfort. . . .

M. Paul Albert Helmer, from whose masterly study, *Guillaume II et les pangermanistes*, I have already quoted, refers in the following terms in *Les Marches de l'Est* to the significance of Richard Beckh's researches, published by Kiepert soon after Sadowa as the result of an inquiry instituted in France:

“When, after Frœchswiller, distinguished German scholars, Treitschke, Wolfgang Menzel, Maurenbrecher, and Herr Adolf Wagner, etc. . . . published pamphlets demanding cessions of territory from France, we realized what had been the object of the discreet inquiries of preceding years, and saw that Beckh’s and Kiepert’s publications had only been slightly premature. They prepared German public opinion for the great mass of pamphlets advocating annexation with which the country was flooded after the first Prussian successes.

“Those who had neglected these early indications, which had been visible for years, were dumbfounded by claims which they had not foreseen, and to which in the end they had to yield. Ideas which in the past would have been considered as chimeras of German Chauvinists suddenly became realities. . . . But not all of them! There were still some desires ungratified. Some of the requirements made by the pamphleteers were not satisfied by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. Some of them demanded more than one territory by right of the language spoken by the people—a claim never put forward officially by Bismarck. One author, Franz Maurer, claimed the strategical Franco-German frontier: Germany was to keep Sainte-Ménéhould, Ligny, Neufchâteau, Monts Faucilles, and Montbéliard. The new frontier was to go due north from Sainte-Ménéhould, and would give Germany Sedan. Another writer, Franz von Loeber, not content with these territories, wished Germany to realize what he called her natural limits. He wanted to take the basins of all the rivers flowing into the North Sea as far as Cape Griz-Nez (*Granenese!*), and the whole of Lorraine and Franche-Comté.”

Here, in a nutshell, is the method of the Pan-Germans: they make the most extravagant demands in a dogmatic, domineering tone. Thus they accustom public opinion to the idea that something is due to them, and when the auspicious moment comes, they claim, if not all they could wish, at least all that it is possible to get.

In order to get some idea of the wild schemes in which the Pan-German League indulges in the interests of this propaganda, we should analyse some of the innumerable pamphlets which it disseminates throughout the Empire. At all events, let us quote this one, written in 1903, and referred to by M. Helmer:

“A pamphlet entitled *Little Germany: a Topsy-turvy Picture* contains a map marked with two broad red lines following the courses of the Elbe and the Rhine. These are the limits within which Germany is to be restricted by the enemies who surround her on all sides, French, Danes, Poles, Czecks, who are all hoping, it seems, to reduce the Empire of William II. Then there is an almost imperceptible dotted line which denotes the present frontiers, while another strongly marked line denotes the extent of the Empire under Charles the Fifth. By this means the man in the street learns that German unity is not yet an accomplished fact, and that large parts of the nation are still outside the political organism which is called upon to realize this unity. No other nation in Europe, with the exception of Poland, is in a more unfortunate position.”

I have already referred to the pamphlet issued by Herr Heinrich Class, the President of the Pan-German League, at the time of the Agadir *coup*, and of which sixty thousand copies were sold, *Westmarokko deutsch!* (*West Morocco must belong to Germany*). As a symptom it is unquestionably serious, for it bears all the weight

102 WHAT A GERMAN VICTORY WOULD COST
of its author's personality and of Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter's collaboration. The latter confessed to it and tried to explain it before the commission on the budget in the Reichstag in November, 1912.

In this pamphlet there occurred a passage which Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter wished suppressed, and which Herr Class, not without some hesitation, consented to strike out—provisionally. Herr Class had written that to revenge herself on England, who had backed France in the Moroccan affair, Germany would no longer be content at the end of the inevitable war with a huge war indemnity, "bleeding us white," as Bismarck advised, but she would insist upon annexing the whole of Northern France from Nancy to the mouth of the Somme, so that she could face proud Albion with the German ports of Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk. In the south she would annex all the territory beyond a line from Nancy to Toulon, for the German eagle would have to take its flight over the Mediterranean.¹

One can readily understand that Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, considering the French state of mind at the time, thought such threats impolitic and likely to impede his negotiations.

After the signing of the treaty of November 4th, 1911,

¹ It will be as well to note here the growth of Pan-German claims, since France, according to the theory propounded in 1907 by one of the Emperor's advisers, Dr. Rudolf Martin, is to be the "hostage" of the inevitable Anglo-German conflict. In 1907 Professor Rudolf Martin confined himself to the outlines of this programme. "At the end of the war, besides a big indemnity, Germany will take possession for good of the Northern provinces of France, so getting an outlet to the sea at Calais and Boulogne, while Belgium and Luxemburg will be annexed to the German Empire. Germany's possession of the coast from Boulogne to Antwerp will be the beginning of the end of English supremacy."

Five years later Daniel Frymann, while naturally abandoning nothing of this programme, adds to it access to the Mediterranean. The Pan-German appetite grows with advancing years. . . .

which satisfied him so ill, Herr Cláss hurriedly restored his text to the original, and indicated the source of the prudent suggestions which he had at first thought it his duty to obey.

Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter merely replied that Herr Class had only himself to thank for his discomfiture, because he had always warned him that over this affair in Morocco Germany had no desire for territorial acquisitions. "But I own," he added, "that Herr Class did not seem to believe me."

Probably Herr Class had not found his informant either very decided or very categorical.¹ Moreover, immediately after the settlement of the Morocco question one of Herr Class's collaborators, Herr Kurd von Strantz, a member of the Pan-German League, published a pamphlet (three editions!) which bore this significant title: *Do you want Alsace and Lorraine? We shall take the whole of Lorraine from you and more besides. A reply to the French cries for revenge. (Ihr wollt Elsass und Lothringen? Wir nehmen ganz Lothringen und mehr! Antwort auf das französische Rache-geschrei von Kurd von Strantz.)*

The substance of this author's contention is that the

¹ It is now well known that Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter was intimidated in the end by the intervention of England.

"France has behaved like a little girl who has been slapped, who goes and fetches her big brother," said Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter to M. Cambon.

"You are barely polite," replied our ambassador drily.

"Well then, let us say if you like, her little friend."

Agadir was the slap, France was the little girl, England was the big brother. Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter toned down the impertinence by reducing the status of the actors who surrounded France, but he did not withdraw the slap.

This incident was public property, for the very day after it took place the *Kreuz Zeitung* and the *Deutsche Tages Zeitung* spoke of France as the little girl who was slapped and went and fetched her big brother.

Franco-German War proved that the German Government and people did not realize the historical and national rights that they had over France. The Prussian diplomatists did not know national history nor the limits of German nationality. Therefore, with inexcusable moderation—they call the Treaty of Frankfurt which took two provinces from France “inexcusable moderation”!—Germany left France both in 1815 and 1871 French Flanders, Lorraine, Sundgaw (the territory round Belfort) and Franche-Comté. “This mistake must not be repeated.”

Should the French nation ignore threats like these?

When the inevitable day arrives, says Herr Kurd von Strantz, when French ambition will give Germany a fresh opportunity for restoring the historical and national limits of the German people, they must not neglect the “*western marches, which are in a state of servitude and sigh over their separation from their German mother country*” (*unsere Westmarken, die noch in ohnmaechtiger Trennung vom deutschen Mutterlande schmachten*).

The French reader will have to look at this sentence again before he can fathom its true meaning. The western marches of Germany are the East of France; these subject populations, which sigh to be German, why these are the very men of Arracourt who not so long ago, when they were mobilized by mistake, rose as one man, without a moment's hesitation, without a murmur, without a single defection, and thus gave the most admirable proof of their French patriotism! From this example we can judge how the Pan-Germans mould German public opinion. They even make the Germans believe that our Eastern departments are pining to be delivered from the French “yoke”!

Since the outstanding account between France and Germany will have to be settled one day, says Herr von Strantz, not only on French soil but at the cost of French territory, the future conquerors of France must be prepared for what is to come by receiving instruction in the "knowledge of ancient German nationality in countries which are now French."

This is what Herr von Strantz teaches: Germany has inalienable rights over a great number of French departments by reason of the race of their inhabitants and their former submission to the Empire, lands which France has snatched from Germany, strip by strip, in the days of Germany's weakness and the dynastic egoism of her emperors. Germany must set before herself, as the price of the next war, the restoration of the ancient limits of the Empire such as they were fixed by law, history, and racial descent. This is an equitable claim, and he submits that it is consistent with the epoch that has proclaimed the principle of nationalities.

To be quite precise, Herr Kurd von Strantz claims from France "*the German part of Lotharingia, Flanders, Lorraine and Franche-Comté.*"

Herr Kurd von Strantz does not stand alone. He is a regular contributor to the *Alldeutsche Blaetter*, and he was invited by the Pan-German League to develop some of his ideas at its Hanover Congress on April 14th, 1912.

These ideas are sown systematically throughout Germany. From the top of the scale to the bottom, Pan-German newspapers are urging public opinion in this direction. A popular newspaper published at Frankfurt, *Für Wahrheit und Recht*, wrote on November 23rd, 1912: "After an unsuccessful war France will

106 WHAT A GERMAN VICTORY WOULD COST
cease to be a Great Power, for she will be so divided up that nothing much will be left of France as she now is."

There are similar conclusions at the end of Herr Paul Rohrbach's work, *German Thought in the World*.

On the occasion of the inauguration of the Palace of Peace at The Hague, an important German Review, *North and South*, edited by Professor Stein, published an article by Herr Georg Erdmann called *Deutschlands naechste Aufgaben* (*Germany's next task*) which is a specimen of undiluted Pan-Germanism. By way of celebrating the festival of peace the author could find nothing better to do than to offer Holland the Flemish provinces belonging to Belgium. As Belgium would then have the right to some compensation, the northern provinces of France would be handed over to her!

Let us quote in conclusion—for we must restrain ourselves—Daniel Frymann's warning that since May 10th, 1871, the account mounting up between France and Germany has reached enormous proportions, and that its settlement will be stern and uncompromising. "The victorious German nation will be able to insist that an end shall be put once and for all to threats from France. Therefore France must be crushed. We shall also insist upon the cession of so much French territory as will ensure our security for evermore. Such territory will have to be evacuated by its inhabitants. Then we shall take whichever of the French colonies will best suit Germany's requirements."

Do these ebullitions seem almost too Pan-German to be taken seriously? Listen to Herr Alfred Kerr, "man of letters, critic, lecturer, editor of the review, *Pan*," who flatters himself that he is not imperialist but

merely Prussian. M. Georges Bourdon, who has collected his statements, vouches that we may believe his word.

“ The prospect of another campaign alarms nobody. We talk of it without emotion, and calculate the profit : the annihilation of France and *a war indemnity of twenty-five billions*, for last time you were really let off too easily. You are rich, we desire your goods. The peace of the world ? For Germany that means the possession of colonies. Yours are valuable. . . .”

We are warned, concludes M. Georges Bourdon, whose breath is almost taken away by such brutal and cynical greed. Yes, Frenchmen are warned ; if only they will not persistently refuse to see that which Pan-Germans are by no means trying to conceal.

III

MONSTROUS THEORIES

After the conquest—How the “reconquered brothers” will be treated—Compulsory expropriation and wholesale expulsion—Precedents of Alsace-Lorraine and Poland—The Barbarian invasion.

GERMANY hopes to justify her schemes of aggression and conquest by means of this axiom of so-called science: “the recapture of territory historically inhabited by other Germans.”

I am afraid we poor Frenchmen must have very feeble intellects; we are quite incapable of grasping the subtlety of an argument founded on the data of anthropology, ethnology, historical philosophy, and many other sciences in which the Teuton genius shines so radiantly. Who of us can grapple with the following line of reasoning: Germans love so dearly their “brothers” who are parted from them that they are willing to risk a European war, to shed rivers of blood to “deliver” them. . . . But their first anxiety, when they have annexed the coveted territory, will be to expel those “reconquered brothers,” to *make room* so that Germans coming from Germany may find the place empty and take possession at their ease.

Again I say, I am exaggerating nothing. My part is merely to produce documents, to set forth and give their full value to facts and theories which are too little known in France.

Now it is only too true that Pan-German propaganda, the influence of which over the trend of German policy I have shown to be so powerful and decisive, maintains this monstrous paradox with the calmest impudence: recapture of territory inhabited by "other Germans" . . . and wholesale expulsion of inhabitants as soon as the conquest is complete. . . .

Of course these two contradictory statements are not produced simultaneously, but they are defended alternately according to whether the propaganda is aimed at idealists or men absorbed solely in practical results.

In a preceding chapter we have seen how Pan-Germans have discovered "parted brothers" groaning under a foreign yoke in the populations of our Eastern departments, which are so devoted to France.

Those who talk thus are those who are making ready for the coming war.

This is how they are calculating upon the results:

"When we have won, and obtained territorial concessions," writes Herr Daniel Frymann, "we shall receive lands inhabited by French or Russians, consequently by enemies. One wonders if such an increase of country will be a remedy for our increasing population. In our national egoism and hardness of heart we have not got so far as to demand from a vanquished enemy the cession of uninhabited territory. . . ."

All Germans have not got so far, it is true. But some of them think this is a matter for regret, and spend their time familiarizing their countrymen with the idea that it is necessary to demand the evacuation of annexed territory. Daniel Frymann advocates a similar step, and its utility has been enlarged upon by another author (see *Grossdeutschland von Tannenberg*).

“To speak openly on the question of ‘evacuation’ has its utility,” says Frymann, “so that our enemies should know that this extreme measure has its supporters in Germany.”

He continues: “Those who have learnt to think according to the historical school will be horrified when we demand the ‘evacuation’ of land inhabited by Europeans; for that signifies the violent interruption of an historical development centuries old. Besides, the idea hurts the feelings of civilized man and is contrary to the modern law of nations which protects individual property. But when we consider seriously the peculiar position of the German people, squeezed into the middle of Europe and running the risk of being suffocated for want of air, we must agree that we might be compelled to demand from a vanquished enemy, either in the East or in the West, that he should hand over unpopulated territory.”

Daniel Frymann makes one concession to what he calls the feelings of civilized man:

“We must not contemplate an offensive war undertaken with the object of getting territory evacuated; but we ought to get used to the idea that such a step would be admissible as a reply to an enemy’s attack.”

Here, I foresee some one will raise an objection. The idea that I have just summarized is so revolting that many will see in it nothing more than one of the notorious exaggerations which makes us treat Pan-Germans as enthusiasts or madmen.

Have those who make this objection forgotten October 1st, 1871, when, in consequence of the interpretation given to the option clause by German authorities, one-quarter of the population of Alsace-Lorraine left

the country of its own accord? Is this not "evacuation" obtained by indirect means?

From that time has not one persecution followed another with the avowed object of inducing the native element to leave the country to make room for the ever-increasing flow of immigrants?

Those who raise this objection have also forgotten the Law of Expropriation directed against the Prussian Poles, one of the chief successes of Pan-German internal policy. Neither the "feelings of civilized man," nor even the rights of the Constitution, prevented Prussian citizens from finding themselves robbed of their goods for the simple reason that they spoke Polish.¹

Why should Pan-Germans not treat a defeated enemy in the same way that they have treated in time of peace their fellow-citizens, subjects of the King of Prussia?

* * * * *

Consideration has been given to another alternative: that of allowing the conquered population to remain on the territory that has been annexed.

K. F. Wolff, a scholar well known for his studies on human races, has given particular attention to this hypothesis.

In September, 1913, this ethnographer and philosopher combined, published an article in the *Alldeutsche Blaetter*, which is, as you know, the official organ of the Pan-German League. We will first of all summarize his assertions:

¹ Herr von Schor, the Prussian Minister of Agriculture, announced recently in the Prussian Chamber, when an estimate of 125 million marks was being voted for the Germanization of the "Eastern frontier," that already there were 41,239 Germans, as against 47,587 Poles out of a total of 88,926 peasants in Posen. The Minister announced that a Bill dealing with the division of large properties would soon be introduced.

1. Scientific biology teaches us that there are two kinds of races : *dominant* and *inferior*.

2. Dominant races, in virtue of the law of progress, must conquer and subdue inferior races.

These essential principles having been once laid down and admitted, nothing remains to be done but to decide the fate of the vanquished.

In earliest times they were massacred : then, as manners and customs became more refined, they were reduced to slavery ; nowadays a new course must be adopted, which K. F. Wolff endeavours to define scientifically.

To begin with he opposes the granting of political rights to the vanquished :

“ Where is it laid down that a conquering dominant race is obliged after a certain number of years to grant political rights to the vanquished ? From a biological point of view does not the exercise of political rights constitute an advantage which belongs solely to the dominant race ? To claim in the name of humanity that every citizen living in a State has the right to exercise political rights, because it is not possible to make a second class of citizens, is to rebel against logic, because it means a deplorable confusion between political rights and the rights of man. Now, these rights have nothing in common.”

The rights of man are : individual liberty, liberty of expression, and the right to work. These are the only liberties which the vanquished can claim. As for public rights, “ they are acquired by war. The rights of dominant races, the rights of war, the rights of conquerors, these are rights that must be seized by force. Nothing but the sophisms of a transitional period could so blind the conquerors as to make them believe that

they were obliged to give up part of their rights of sovereignty to their subjects."

See how the application of these theories simplifies matters :

" There will be no more difficulties in the different Parliaments, no more obstruction in the Imperial Parliament, no more opposition from any of the communes ; for those who have not a sufficient number of burghers exercising political rights will be administered by an official. There will cease to be any educational question ; for the fully-enfranchised citizens will provide as many schools as they need, while the remainder, who do not wish their children to attend these schools, can provide others at their own expense, or, if they prefer it, allow their children to grow up in ignorance. *It is not to the interest of the conquerors that the conquered should learn anything. The essential matter for the conquerors is that they must always be masters.*"

K. F. Wolff then continues in the calmest, most scientific manner possible :

" Conquerors are acting according to the laws of biology and logic when they endeavour to do away with foreign language and to annihilate foreign nationality. Hence there must be no compromise, but merely insistence upon the right of sovereignty, the widest possible extension of power and the sternest refusal of political rights.

" The Constitution is made for the conqueror, never for the conquered. Let the conquered enjoy the rights of man, but under no pretext the rights of sovereignty. We are born men, we win the position of lords and masters on the field of battle."

At this point it becomes impossible to abbreviate without being suspected of misrepresenting or exagger-

ating the author's meaning. We must therefore quote in full :

“ The conquering nation must be rich in men, so that it may be able to flood the conquered country with its own people. Hence only nations with large populations have a moral right to conquest ; for it is unjust that such a nation should be overcrowded within its frontiers, while a neighbouring people with fewer citizens should live luxuriously on richer territory. It is still more unjust, it is really criminal, that a nation with a decreasing birth-rate should take possession of foreign countries with the sole and unworthy object of recruiting soldiers whom it needs for the realization of its selfish schemes.

“ The only method by which the conquered can attempt to obtain political rights is by rebellion. This must be put down with the utmost violence. Then immediately afterwards the greatest toleration should be shown. There should be no wholesale indictments, no individual prosecutions. This is a far surer way of winning people over than if they were treated leniently ; it is better to have the courage to shoot down the rebels than to fill the prisons with them. Honest principles of war should be applied under all circumstances ; those who assemble on the public highway are enemies and must be dispersed by gun-fire. Those who run away are not worth running after.”

For fear, no doubt, that he will not be thoroughly understood, K. F. Wolff hammers away on the same subject in a heavy Teutonic fashion :

“ The conqueror must have an absolute will to dominate, and must strive for the political and ethnical annihilation of the vanquished. He must entirely ignore the fallacy that the vanquished have the right to maintain their language and nationality. A victorious

people, invading a country, must insist upon its privileges in the most ruthless manner ; it will commit no injustice in doing so, it will merely derive the natural consequences of its position ; it will be chivalrous, it will compel no one to associate with it, nor will it force the vanquished to defend the country, knowing that that right is reserved for the sovereign power. To make war, to make conquests, is noble ; to mock at the vanquished and ill-treat them is ignoble, and ill becomes a dominant race with high principles, which feels called to be mistress of the world (*eine hochgesinnte Führer-rasse, die sich berufen fühlt, die Weltherrschaft zu erringen*)."

In order to lead up to a forcible, and yet at the same time graceful metaphor, the Pan-German leader recalls the "beautiful words" of Alexander of Peez : "*Upon the ancient Indo-Germans rests some of the fresh dew of paradise.*" He then adds in conclusion :

"Such men as this can conquer, they are allowed to conquer, it is their duty to conquer. They must be suzerain, both for their own advantage and that of others. For invasion by a noble high-minded race does not mean annihilation but amelioration, it is in the service of the Lord of armies, and His work is a work of deliverance!"

* * * * *

Sometimes in France we hear revolutionaries, cosmopolitans—men of no country like Gustav Hervé—emitting this blasphemy : "After all, what difference does it make to us whether we are French or German?"

Frenchmen must realize that another victory of Germanism will leave no choice to the vanquished

throughout the whole extent of conquered country between pitiless subjection, and total dispossession, forced exodus, and the frightful mourning and misery of an exile whence there can be no return.

A fresh Barbarian invasion is being planned beyond the Rhine and is threatening us. . . .

IV

“HEMMING US IN”

An allegorical picture—Pan-Germanism in Belgium—In Holland—
In the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg—In Switzerland—Latin
solidarity—The consummation of a great work.

A CELEBRATED picture designed by William II and executed by Professor Knackfulss has been most skilfully and prophetically transposed by Zislin, an Alsatian designer, and at a most opportune moment. William II depicted the European nations all standing on a rock, looking at the Yellow Peril coming upon them from afar. “European peoples, defend your most sacred possessions!” Such was the inscription William II devised for this allegory with his own hand. Zislin has drawn representatives of both worlds on this same rock. In the front row are standing France, England, and Russia, and on the horizon in the lurid light of dawn Pan-Germanism moves towards them in serried masses.

It is indeed true that Pan-Germanism is working, struggling, fighting in every corner of the world. We can trace it in Asia, where it has already marked for its own part of the Turkish spoils; in Africa, where, since the partition of the French Congo, a vast and magnificent colonial scheme is taking shape; in America, where its flood of emigrants is creating scattered rights, Germanic oases, which will no doubt one day be combined

in one mighty union. . . . But we must stay our hand, for already we have more than sufficient evidence of the covetousness which Pan-Germanism has either displayed or gratified in the countries immediately within its reach, the annexation of which will one day give substance to the territorial dream of "Great Germany."¹

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This dream has not always been expressed with the same brutality of which the commander of a German warship was guilty in 1898. When he was entertained by his fellow-countrymen living in Antwerp, he drank to "the annexation of Belgium to the German Empire." Berlin hurriedly disowned this braggart. But, as a compensation, a fresh impetus was given to the work of German penetration in Belgium. To-day a tithe of the population of Antwerp is German, the trade of the great Belgian port is in German hands. Eight sections of the Antwerp Chamber of Commerce have a German president. The dream is coming true, and to fulfil its deeds are better than words.

The official word, moreover, is pleasantly reassuring. In April, 1913, while the commission of the budget in the Reichstag was discussing the new military law, a Socialist deputy asked whether in the event of a war with France, Germany would respect Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied: "Belgian neutrality is guaranteed by international conventions, and Germany is resolved to abide by those conventions."

Unfortunately, this little piece of by-play coincided

¹ See in the number for August, 1913, of the *Marches de l'Est*, "Les projets de l'Allemagne dans l'Afrique centrale," by M. P. A. Helmer, and "Le Pangermanisme en Afrique," by J. Goulven.

with the bringing in of a Bill in the Belgian Chamber for reorganizing the army and putting the country in a better position in case of a German invasion. The Belgian Socialists had to be provided with an argument for throwing out the Bill.

But in spite of the solemn declarations of the German Minister, the Belgian Government, which probably knows what to believe, carried the Bill, which became law on June 18th. From that date Belgium has an army of 60,000 men on a peace footing, and can have a field army of 250,000 men.

Three months after the passing of this law, the Grand Belgian manoeuvres of the summer of 1913, which were extremely brilliant and reflected great credit on the "neutral" army, were developed upon this line: a Belgian army had to repel a German army which was trying to make its way across Belgium.

It is no secret that in the event of a European conflagration the Belgian army would be reinforced by an English army corps of about fifty thousand men, who would be landed at Antwerp, to see that Belgian neutrality was respected, by threatening the flank and rear of the German right wing.

Field-Marshal Lord Roberts admitted, in an article in the *English Review*, that in the autumn of 1911, when a German attack seemed imminent, an expeditionary force was ready to embark for Flanders at a moment's notice.

To speak quite frankly, the fiction of Belgian neutrality can no longer be maintained. The treaties of 1839 are worn out, if not in theory at least in fact. They were drawn up at a time when the European situation was very different from what it is at present. From the mere fact that the Powers guaranteeing

Belgian neutrality are divided into two hostile camps, the guarantee of that neutrality is at an end. In the event of a Franco-German war, Belgium would become *nolens volens* a belligerent. Daniel Frymann is quite explicit on this point :

"It is impossible to abandon the mouth of the Rhine to Anglo-French domination or influence, for it is contrary to nature that Germany should not possess the outlet to the sea of her most important way of communication. It is impossible to leave the coast of the North Sea in the hands of these States (France and England). It is impossible to tolerate little States on our north-west frontiers, which give no guarantee against violations of neutrality on the part of England and France, and which, on the contrary, would gladly afford supporting points to our enemies. Hence we must insist that as soon as opposition between Germany and France or England leads to warlike complications, Belgium and Holland must be called upon to choose between those States and the German Empire."

This is the attitude always adopted by Pan-Germans, who are more frank or more cynical than Herr von Jagow, when they mention Belgium. And we may be sure that, in spite of official denials, they have had their way with the German Staff, since everything is ready on the frontier line from Luxemburg and Belgium to Aix-la-Chapelle for a rapid offensive in tremendous force. A vast system of strategic railways has been carried out, which can easily carry four army corps to the Belgian frontier, one to Aix-la-Chapelle, another to Mountjoye and the fortified camp of Elsenborn, a third to Malmedy, and a fourth to Monteneau and Saint-Vith, while four other corps could concentrate in the Duchy of Luxemburg.

All of a sudden, eight German corps, having avoided the batteries of the forts of Liége and Namur,¹ which have been carefully brought up to date, could swarm along the French frontier between Givet and Verdun by roads south of the Meuse.

There is the danger. Our Staff must have foreseen it, at least we can only hope so. Yet there are no indications on the German side that our precautionary measures appear at all decisive, and their confidence cannot but give us cause for anxiety.²

Parallel with these military preparations a slow and silent work of assimilation is being carried on in Belgium. Not only are Flemish areas, which are naturally Germanophil, being canvassed in the name of racial brotherhood, but the Germans themselves are claiming rights of citizenship, as the *Taegliche Rundschau* affirms :

“In Belgium, by the side of the French-speaking Walloon population, and the Low German Flemish, there are a hundred thousand German Belgians to whom German is the natural tongue. But the Francophil Belgian Government absolutely declines to allow German Belgians to pass the examination for the military college in their mother tongue, although this is permitted to Walloons and Flemish.

“German public opinion should and must watch more

¹ In July, 1913, the *Express*, a Liége newspaper, published the fact that two high German officials, who had come to welcome the Belgian sovereigns on the occasion of their entry into the town, had asked for and obtained permission to visit the forts. The two visitors were no others than Herr Freiherr von Reinnbaben, the President of the Rhenish province, and the Lieutenant-General commanding the 3rd Prussian army corps, that is to say, the two chief men who were interested in finding out how resistance to a German invasion was organized round Liége.

² Senator Henry Bérenger, in August, 1913, informed the Press of this danger, and announced that he would interpellate the Government on the point.

carefully over the maintenance and culture of the German language in foreign parts. We are convinced that a strong protest by German public opinion, on behalf of our Belgian brothers, would not be without effect."

Perhaps the time is not far off when Germany, according to her invariable custom, will adopt as her own these Pan-German demands which have so far been made unofficially.

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Logically, however, intervention of this kind, the consequences of which would be incalculable, should be attempted in Holland before trying the experiment in Belgium. We have already seen how Daniel Frymann defines the principle of German policy in the Netherlands. Many others have done the same before him, for the Low German question has interested Pan-Germans since the first foundation of their League.

To start with they hoped to win Holland by kindness. They declared their kind intentions towards their Low German cousins. They suggested a Customs union. They even expressed regret when the German navy was created that Dutch or Low German had not been introduced as words of command.¹

These tendencies, which inspired the Pan-German League in its attitude towards the Boers and President Krüger, were followed for more than fifteen years without a break. A well-known Pan-German, the proprietor of the *Rheinisch-Wesphaelische Zeitung*, dealt with the question in the name of the League.

In the end this appeal to the relationship between Low

¹ See *Die Deutschen Reichshäfen und das Zollbündnis mit dem Niederlanden*, by Dr. Reismann-Grone; see also *Niederlande und die alldeutsche Bewegung*, by Fritz Bley.

Germans and High Germans went rather too far. It got on the nerves of the Dutch. The Queen of the Netherlands decided to put a stop to it. On her visit to Paris on June 1st, 1912, she said, very simply: "I am very proud of the French blood which flows in my veins"—and the shaft went home.

We only saw in these words a civil compliment, meant to flatter our vanity. The fury they aroused in the Pan-German world ought to have made us realize their political significance. While Germany was always insisting upon racial affinity with the Dutch, Wilhelmina had of her own accord made a great point of her connection with France.

The Pan-Germans then changed their tone. If their "good offices" were unsuccessful in peace time, in preparing the dilemma which was to be offered to Holland at the beginning of a war, then they must resort to other methods.

Would it not be possible to attack the commercial interest? Dutch trade benefits to a great extent from the transport of German goods brought down the Rhine. Supposing Holland were threatened by the removal of this carrying trade, would she not be obliged to accept German conditions?

The Pan-Germans then conceived a *kolossal* scheme—but nothing is too much for Germany now; this was to alter the course of the Rhine, or rather to construct a canal going from Wesel or Cologne along the Dutch frontier to Emden. By this means merchandise from the hinterland of Amsterdam and Rotterdam could be loaded in a German port.¹

¹ See *Der Rhein-Nordsee-Kanal, eine Studie von den königlichen Bauvätern, Herzberg and Faaks, and Holland deutscher Bundesstaat? Eine mögliche technische Eroberung von königl. Regierungsbaumeister Groh.*

Engineers set to work to study and work out this scheme of *economic conquest*, as one of them calls it.

Herr Fürbringer, a deputy, referred to it in 1912 in the Prussian Chamber, and the Minister of Public Works, Herr von Breitenbach, without promising anything definite at the moment, stated that the scheme was deserving of the greatest attention, and encouraged "the most daring hopes." He also added that the scheme had to his knowledge the support of "economic powers of the first order."

On February 11th, 1913, the Minister was called upon to express more than a platonic interest. Herr von Breitenbach made no demur. He said that the Rousemeyer scheme, starting from Cologne and less costly than the Herzberg-Faaks plan, had just been submitted to the Government.

The sword of Damocles is suspended over Holland. If she does not fall in with Pan-German views she knows what she may expect, and she knows at what a sacrifice she can save her trade.

The *Berliner Post* wrote, on January 3rd: "It is unnecessary to create a *German* mouth to the Rhine artificially, for the existing one is already *German*; only from the point of view of constitutional law, it does not belong to the German Empire. It is, therefore, not a problem for engineers, but an object for the efforts of German diplomatists."

Meanwhile, just as in Belgium but more vigorously and speedily, the work of silent absorption proceeds. The number of German residents in Holland increases incessantly and in amazing proportions. German newspapers and German schools are multiplying. Half the population of Amsterdam and Rotterdam is already German. Holland finds herself in Germany's strong

grip and struggles in vain. Nothing can be more significant than the interminable discussions which rage periodically in the Dutch Chamber round the schemes for coast defence. These schemes, of German origin, are naturally directed against England, and include an extension of the fortifications at Flushing, where the German fleet will find a shelter in the Lower Scheldt, whence she can threaten the English fleet, according to the Pan-German notion. A Government scheme marked urgent, in July, 1910, raising a loan of 40 million florins for the organization of Dutch coast defence, was still under discussion before the Chamber three years later, and Herr Troelstra, the Socialist leader, exclaimed (April 24th, 1913): "If this scheme is adopted, Holland will be at the mercy of one Power."

That Power is Germany.

The Bill was passed in June, 1913.

* * * * *

We may be sure that the little Duchy of Luxemburg, so peaceful within its narrow frontiers, has not been neglected by Pan-German agitators.

It is an accepted axiom in Germany that Luxemburg has been from all time, and must therefore remain a German country. Hence when the young Grand Duchess Mary Adelaide came to the throne and made her first speech in French, this was denounced as nothing less than treason in Germany, and Pan-Germans rudely reminded the "German dynasty" that rules in Luxemburg by the permission and toleration of the German Emperor, that it has certain duties and obligations towards the great Germanic cause.

Statements such as these are persistently repeated, commented upon, amplified, especially in the *Kölnische*

Zeitung, which has been appointed particularly to watch over and hasten the Germanizing of Luxemburg.¹

As it is characteristic of the Germans to add brutal injury to threatening insult, the Staff has actually made a training camp at Wasserliech, eleven kilometres from Trèves, quite close to the Grand Ducal frontier, on the line Coblentz-Metz.

Luxemburg retorted according to her means, by introducing a Bill increasing her army to 3,000 men in normal times and to 20,000 at full strength.

The effort is touching, but unfortunately it is ludicrous. When the great struggle begins the German army will enter Luxemburg as it pleases, and to guide its invading columns towards France its intelligence department will find Germans established at all the strategic points of the Grand Duchy, for the express purpose—as it seems—of fulfilling this eventual duty.

* * * * *

Switzerland is particularly prone to arouse Pan-German desires, standing as she does at the crossways of the great European trade routes and, with her numerous waterfalls, eminently suited for great industrial enterprises.

It is not surprising to learn that for years Germany has been trying to secure economic and political supremacy throughout Swiss territory.

Bismarck himself started the era of peaceful penetration in Switzerland by giving his support to the railroad

¹ On the other hand there is a current of feeling in Luxemburg which is favourable to French influence. Its accredited organ, *L'Independance Luxembourgeoise*, a French paper printed in French, does its best to counteract the German papers.

scheme which was to unite North Germany to Italy by the St. Gothard tunnel.

The story of this affair is worth a brief study.

The St. Gothard line, laid down in 1882, was only completed, thanks to subsidies amounting to 30 millions from Germany, and 55 millions from Italy, while Switzerland only spent 28 millions.

Germany and Italy demanded an important share in the profits as a reward for their contributions, and thus obtained a controlling right which was very annoying to the Federation.

Switzerland, therefore, declared her intention, in 1904, of buying in the shares of the other two nations. They, however, did not see why they should abandon, merely for a refund of money, all the material and moral advantages which they had acquired in the country.

The negotiations for the repurchase, which were very long and complicated, ended in that notorious Convention of Berne, so injurious to federal interests that it very nearly provoked riots at Geneva and some other towns.

It will be as well to recall some of the clauses of the Convention to show how well Pan-Germans of to-day have learned to follow Bismarck's footsteps.

1. It confers upon Germany and Italy most favoured nation treatment no longer merely over the St. Gothard system but over all Swiss railways. This treatment, which till then had only applied to 276 kilometres of line laid down in common, now extended to 2,700 kilometres of rail.

2. Germany and Italy obtained the right to control all the arrangements that the Swiss Government might make in the future with foreign railways. This, as Swiss patriots pointed out with vehemence, and even

with violence, constituted a limitation of the sovereignty of the Swiss Federation for the benefit of Germany and Italy.

To all intents and purposes Switzerland was prohibited from ever having a free policy in railway matters ; she could never, for instance, make an agreement with France to connect the systems, or by a reduction of rates attempt to attract goods or passenger traffic going to Italy.

3. The Swiss Government, to allow Germany and Italy to recover their capital, consented to reduce by 35 per cent. up to 1912 and by 50 per cent. after that date the surcharge on tariffs which the great expense of running a mountain line renders imperative.

This reduction of tariffs means that the St. Gothard line will undercut all other lines across the Alps.

After 1920 the distance between London and Milan via the St. Gothard will be (from the point of view of tariffs) no more than 1,100 kilometres, while it is 1,216 kilometres by the Paris-Mont Cenis route, and 1,113 via the Simplon.

The St. Gothard line is therefore bound to get hold of all the traffic between North-west Europe and the Mediterranean.

While Germany was getting possession of Swiss railway traffic for herself and her ally, she was at the same time skilfully manœuvring so that her army should also eventually have access to the same railroads.

Basle station, partly in Baden and partly in Switzerland, is really a German possession. The Germans have a Customs office there, and German troops can make use of the railway built on Swiss territory when they wish to proceed from one point to another on the frontier of the Grand Duchy.

The station was rebuilt between 1903 and 1913 at Germany's expense ; she expended 70 millions to join it up with her strategic lines, and constructed seven kilometres of detraining platforms.

At the same time there is a scheme under consideration for making a canal of the Rhine from Basle to Constance, so as to join an important waterway to the railways.¹

This is what the Empire has done up to now to facilitate the penetration of German influence in Switzerland.

But what has been done over and above this by private industrial and commercial enterprises? Their efforts to get possession of markets have also been nothing short of colossal.

German commercial travellers in Switzerland number 5,000 as against 1,400 French. German banks, business houses, industrial enterprises, are becoming more and more numerous.

Switzerland is becoming an industrial country. She is the hostelry of Europe, and if her agricultural labourers come from Austria, her masons from Italy, the majority of her engineers and industrial working men come from Germany.

In 1900 these numbered 168,000 against 58,000 French. There are to-day 300,000 Germans out of a total population of three and a half millions!

Even the most short-sighted Swiss patriots are alarmed at the rapidity of German penetration.²

¹ See *Une autre question de défense nationale*, by Georges Trouillot, Senator. *Grande Revue* of June 25th, 1913.

² In August, 1913, they were quite exasperated by the mania of the federal topographical bureau for translating into German the Romance names of places, or even of altering the names completely and Germanizing them. It was then discovered that the said

M. Schmidt, a professor at Zürich University, wrote recently: "If steps are not taken in time, the absorption of Switzerland by Germany will come about automatically; when the Germans have got possession of all paths which lead to power, they will claim the political rights which are now denied them; they will claim them, and they will get them."

At present it is not easy for foreigners living in Switzerland to become naturalized. The Federation is unwilling to make citizens of them for fear of increasing its poor rate, which is already a heavy burden. But in ten years' time, if the German invasion continues, one quarter of the population will be German. Then what will happen?

Will not the authorities, under irresistible pressure from these peaceful but all-powerful invaders, find themselves compelled to accept imperial protection, just as Wurtemberg and Bavaria have had to accept it?

The combined efforts of the German State and German traders are infallibly aiming at making Switzerland a German province. Pan-German pressure is flagrant, enthralling. . . .

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Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Italy—even to the Mediterranean where a German fleet now

federal bureau employed about half a dozen Germans and even Prussian officers; one of them who had to look after plans of the fortifications was the father of an officer of the General Staff at Berlin! We should also remember the Huninguen affair. In 1815 France was obliged to destroy all fortifications within ten miles of Basle. In 1871 Germany took over these French obligations when she annexed Alsace. But, on the contrary, she finished the construction of a bridge-head at Huninguen which was prepared for infantry and artillery and threatens Basle. In spite of protests from the inhabitants of Basle and Thurgau the Federal Government submitted in silence to this violation of a formal treaty against its interests.

cruises—the Germanic Empire is all about us, hemming us in. Spain, even, has been invited to betray Latin solidarity for the benefit of Germanism. There are Pan-Germans in Madrid. If they ever succeed in getting a hearing, France will be completely hemmed in.¹

¹ See *Entre l'influence française et allemande en Espagne*, by Gomez Carillo. *La Revue*, November 15th, 1911.

V

WAR "INEVITABLE"

Logical deductions—Bellicose Germany—From Luther to von Bernhardt—What the settlement of accounts will be like—No compromise!—Two serious grounds of quarrel : Alsace-Lorraine and the Foreign Legion—Incidents and pretexts.

Do Pan-Germans want war? Let them answer this question for themselves.

On June 29th, immediately after the passing of the military law of 1913, the *Berliner neueste Nachrichten* wrote : " *By increasing our armaments, we are accumulating excellent means for pursuing an energetic world policy, but what good are they, if we never use them?* "

That is Logic, pure and simple.

Here is the proof, no less firmly demonstrated by the *Lokal Anzeiger* at the same time : " All the art of diplomacy will fail to prevent the outbreak of a world war, which will be war to the knife, for the glory of Germany. "

Finally, let us borrow this conclusion from Daniel Frymann, for it is a fitting comment on the two preceding statements : " The popular attitude in the Empire has changed since the Morocco affair ; it has passed from a philosophic defensive to an aggressive policy. War is inevitable. . . . "

Quotations of this kind might be multiplied to infinity, for the Pan-German Press and Pan-German publications have rung innumerable changes in this triple theme ever since the passing of the " Keim law. "

This is the process : first of all they demand an enormous increase of armaments, purely as a defensive measure to secure peace. Once this increase has been effected, they exclaim : " What good are they, if we cannot rob our neighbour ? " Then they add : " Since war is inevitable, why not let us have it at once, while we can make the most of a momentary advantage ? "

From which we may conclude, no doubt, that if France had not replied to the German military law of 1913 by restoring three years' service, she would most certainly have been attacked on the first pretext.

And we know since the Ems telegram how easy it is to forge pretexts for battle—without counting those which already exist between the two countries, and of which we will try to give a short summary.

When the three years' law came before the Senate for its sanction, a conscript father, who thought it advisable not to give his name to the reporters in the high assembly, interrupted General Pau, the Government Commissioner, and delivered himself of this absurd remark : " Germany does not want war any more than we do ! "

If by " Germany " our senator means the Kaiser and the majority of the German people, we can easily grant him that they may be ranged among the peaceable if that will simplify the discussion. But still he is guilty of great folly if he is not aware of this truth—more obvious in Germany than anywhere—that wars are always the work of minorities. That has been proclaimed across the Rhine by two men who had the courage to know it and say it : Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg and Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter.

My readers have no doubt perceived in the course of this work that the bellicose minority in Germany is

sufficiently active and powerful to bring about the fatal explosion whenever it chooses. It must also be evident to them that this minority is steadily growing in numbers and influence, and that there is no reason to doubt that it will very shortly become the majority.

Anyone who follows the movement of public opinion in Germany is bound to recognize the amazing rapidity of a wholesale conversion to ideas which, a short time ago, were by no means general.

It is nothing new for Germans to hear of the utility and necessity of war. Luther said to them: "It is easy to show by preachings and writings what a scourge is war, but on the other hand it should be remembered that it saves us from still greater evils. We must not only look at the massacres, burnings and violence which are the result of war; that is behaving like foolish, short-sighted children who dare not look on when a surgeon cuts off a hand or a leg, and who do not see nor understand that his object is to save the whole body. Similarly we must study manfully the part played by sword and warfare, and seek the final cause of all these horrors and violence. When we consider its end we shall see that war is of God, and its aim is as necessary to man as eating and drinking and the natural functions."

It seems that Germans had rather lost sight of this teaching through the ages, but it also seems as though there had never been a greater sympathy for its doctrine than there is now.

On this point we can refer to General von Bernhardt, one of whose most famous works, *Germany and the Next War*, was inspired by this state of affairs.¹

¹ *Deutschland und der nächste Krieg*, by Friederich von Bernhardt, General der Kavallerie z D. Sechste Auflage. Stuttgart and Berlin:

General von Bernhardi, in 1913, speaks almost exactly as Luther did in the sixteenth century :

“ There is no standing still in the world’s history. All is growth and development. It is obviously impossible to keep things in the *status quo*, as diplomacy has so often attempted. No true statesman will ever count on such a possibility ; he will only make the outward and temporary maintenance of existing conditions a duty when he wishes to gain time and deceive an opponent, or when he cannot see what is the trend of events. He will use such diplomatic means only as inferior tools ; in reality he will only reckon with actual forces and with the powers of a continuous development.

“ We must make it quite clear that there can be no standing still, no being satisfied for us, but only *progress* or *retrogression*, and that it is tantamount to *retrogression* when we are contented with our present place among the nations of Europe, while all our rivals are straining with desperate energy, even at the cost of our rights, to extend their power.”

Hence it is diplomacy’s duty to declare herself pacific until she is ready to wield “ the sword, the favourite weapon of Germans,” as William the Peacemaker is always saying.

General von Bernhardi deplotes that the German sword has not been employed on various occasions which were particularly favourable for settling accounts with France. But delay from pusillanimity will mean greater efforts in the future. The inevitable cannot be avoided. France’s obstinacy in not admitting that she must be content with a place in the second rank, her

wish "to try and remain on an equal footing with the great military powers" is bound to end in a decisive conflict. France, says Herr von Bernhardi, has inherited such vast political ambitions from her glorious history that she cannot make up her mind to abandon them without a struggle, whereas they are no longer justified either by the numbers of her population, nor by her international prestige.

"In one way or another we must square our account with France if we wish for a free hand in our international policy. This is the first and foremost condition of a sound German policy, and since the hostility of France once for all cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be settled by force of arms. France must be so completely crushed that she can never again come across our path."

Bernhardi tells us without mincing matters what this war will be like :

"It would be a war to the knife with France, one which would, if victorious, annihilate once for all the French position as a Great Power. If France, with her falling birth-rate, determines on such a war, it is at the risk of losing her place in the first rank of European nations and sinking into permanent political subservience. Those are the stakes."

"War to the knife!" We have already had "war of annihilation,"¹ and "war to the last gasp,"² and, finally, the threat to "bleed us white."³ Even supposing this attitude is that of a minority, one wonders that Frenchmen decline to see in it any cause for anxiety.

But, I repeat once more, these ideas are gaining

¹ *Kriegführung*, by von der Goltz.

² *Strategie*, by von Blume.

³ *Deutschlands nächster Krieg*, by von Osten-Sacken-Rhein.

ground so rapidly in Germany that the principal danger with which France has to contend is this very conviction now so prevalent in Germany that war has become an absolute necessity.

Thus Pan-German propaganda has achieved the fearful result of preparing public opinion to decline any compromise with France. At the first incident of any importance which brings the two countries face to face, Germany will say: "As we cannot avoid it, let us get it over as quickly as possible. Let us get to work!"

This is one risk of war. There are others, and each one deserves special attention.

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First of all there is the question of Alsace-Lorraine.

France still suffers both in her physical and moral well-being from the cruel, clumsy amputation inflicted on her in 1871. Succeeding generations have felt this suffering more or less acutely, but none, thank God, has been insensible to it, and time cannot heal a wound in the living flesh. The Germans hoped that it would heal, and they have waited, not too impatiently, for forty years. Even without this delay they would have found it difficult to retain their illusions. They are now completely cured of them. There is not a German to-day who admits that France will willingly give up all hope of recovering Alsace-Lorraine.

Equally there is not a German who admits the hypothesis that these provinces can ever be given back to France under any form.

This was said to me by an Alsatian who is in the best position for knowing the German attitude to his country; that is Dr. Ricklin, the President of the

Landtag (Chamber of Deputies) in Alsace-Lorraine and deputy in the Reichstag.

It was the day after the Berne Conference (May, 1912), when one hundred and eighty French representatives, shepherded by M. d'Estournelles de Constant and M. Jaurès, repaired to Berne to find some grounds for a Franco-German agreement. They found to meet them only a handful of German Socialists, and rather ashamed of being so taken in they hurriedly passed a formal resolution and returned home.

The day after this ridiculous and deplorable affair, Dr. Ricklin said the following words to me at Strassburg, and he has given me permission to reproduce them :

" I saw at once, at Berne, that there had been a misunderstanding. The French who came to meet the Germans had been given to understand that the question of Alsace-Lorraine could be settled by some sort of arbitration. Well, that is not the case. This must be realized. Every German without exception, from the highest to the lowest, considers that the question of Alsace-Lorraine can only be reopened on the battlefield, by force of arms. The French should have no illusion on this head. . . ."

It is a particularly dangerous illusion when it leads to active measures, and proposals that can have no other result than to irritate and exasperate the proud and susceptible conqueror.

In reply to an article in the *Daily Mail*, dealing with the possibility of restoring Alsace-Lorraine to France by an amicable arrangement in the interests of peace, Professor Delbrück answered this suggestion for Germany in these words :

" The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine to the Empire

is absolutely irrevocable. We might as well be asked to give up Prussia as to abandon territory bought and paid for at Gravelotte, Mars-la-Tour, Saint-Privat, and Sedan. The restitution of Alsace-Lorraine can never be considered under any form whatever. Nor can there be any question of an exchange of territory anywhere on the surface of the globe, and nothing would induce the German Government to contemplate the possibility of such a transaction."

The Abbé Wetterlé, commenting upon this reply in his paper, *La Nouvelliste de l'Alsace-Lorraine*, wrote :

"Germany will not restore Alsace-Lorraine to France. She has no intention of doing so. She will never contemplate it, even if France—which is moreover a very doubtful assumption—were to offer her in exchange her finest colonial jewel. Germany took Alsace-Lorraine by force of arms ; she will only lose it when the fortunes of war are against her. Once for all we must be done with useless discussions which lead to nothing except foolish illusions in the brains of those who wander in the clouds of Utopia or exaggerated pacificism. It may even become dangerous."

Indeed, every time any suggestion is made of an agreement about Alsace-Lorraine, the German Colossus instinctively feels for the hilt of his sword. Do we dare think him incapable of keeping what he has conquered ? Just to show us that Alsace-Lorraine belongs to him, and that he will listen to no talk on the subject, he tightens the cords that bind her.

In reply to the Berne Conference the entire German Press paraphrased Professor Schiemann's brutal words : "A Franco-German agreement? . . . First of all, ratify the Treaty of Frankfort !"

The Government brought before the Federal Council

of the Empire Bills of Exclusion against Alsace-Lorraine!¹

On this occasion, Herr Mandel, Secretary of State for the Interior, answered an interpellation in the Landtag with these words: "Alsace-Lorraine must submit to the victorious and dominant race!"

I was present at this sitting. I shall never forget the tone in which these simple words were spoken.

Thus between France and Germany there exists a permanent possibility of war, since the difference from which it arises is only aggravated by any attempt at a remedy.

Now, it is humanly impossible for two peoples, living side by side, to be perpetually on the alert on account of a standing quarrel.

The conclusion is obvious.

* * * * *

As I am examining the possibilities of war which Pan-Germanism might utilize in its own time, and at its own convenience, I am purposely associating the question of the Foreign Legion with the question of Alsace-Lorraine.

For, in my opinion, these two questions are by far the most important in the present state of Franco-German relations.

I might almost go so far as to say that the question of the Foreign Legion is the more dangerous of the two. As far as Alsace-Lorraine is concerned we have only to

¹ As these Bills were published beforehand by an Alsatian patriot, M. Paul Bourson, the Strassburg correspondent of the *Matin*, there was an interpellation in the Reichstag. The Centre, anxious to obtain the abrogation of the Laws of Exclusion against the Jesuits, was forced to disapprove of the Exclusion Bill against Alsace-Lorraine, so that there was a majority in the Reichstag against the Government measure. But the Bills are still before the Federal Council and will come up again before the Reichstag.

keep quiet, however cruelly we suffer by our silence. I do not think that they would go the lengths of demanding a definite ratification of accomplished facts, holding a sword to our throats.

But, on the other hand, it may very well happen that before long imperative representations on the subject of the Foreign Legion may be made to France.

What should we reply if Germany were to order us to disband our foreign regiments, or at least to refrain from enlisting German subjects?

It seems probable that Pan-Germans hope to force the Government to take this step, or, rather, to send this ultimatum.

The incident of the Casablanca deserters goes back to September 25th, 1908. Since then the Pan-German campaign against the Foreign Legion has not flagged for a single day. In Pan-German circles you constantly hear: "We shall have war when we want it, over the question of the Foreign Legion." General Keim, President of the Military League, speaking at its general assembly on May 18th, 1913, at Leipzig, made it quite clear that the inevitable struggle with France would break out over this question. The same statement was made at the Congress of the Pan-German League at Breslau, in September.

Meanwhile, a special League has been started to conduct this campaign, the *Deutscher Schutzverband gegen die Fremdenlegion* (German League of Protection against the Foreign Legion). Its centre is at Munich. This League offered Herr Bebel, the Socialist leader, a seat on its committee, and though he had to refuse it on personal grounds he promised to send a circular to the entire Socialist and Syndicalist Press to induce them to take up the campaign with fresh energy.

Periodically the League contributes correspondence to the newspapers with the object of exciting public opinion, and the papers publish it at once, without distinction of party. Meetings are organized at which former legionaries appear and give an account of their sufferings. We may remember how offers were made to Haberthur, a legionary who had both eyes shot out at the beginning of the Morocco campaign. He was in Switzerland, waiting for the settlement of his pension, when a delegate of the German League for Protection against the Foreign Legion offered him fifty thousand francs if he would consent to appear at meetings in Germany organized by the League. With groping hands the blind man pushed him gently to the door.

Others, less scrupulous, accept.

Besides, it is not difficult to find sham legionaries who are quite ready to tell the most extravagant tales with the greatest impudence.

Countless pamphlets appear every year and are disseminated broadcast. I have the last one before me now, *Fünf Jahre Fremdenlegionaer von Franz Kull* (*Five Years in the Foreign Legion*). It has reached the two hundred and fiftieth thousand. This figure shows the intensity of a campaign which has been too long ignored in France.

The propaganda is also carried on by means of special stamps on which are depicted horrible scenes illustrating the life of a soldier in the Legion. Cinemas are also used. The legionary is shown in a series of films devoted to the convict's life in various countries, in Siberia, in New Caledonia, in Chinese prisons, etc.

This campaign has more than once received official sanction. On December 2nd, 1910, the *Norddeutsche Zeitung*, a Government organ, at the close of a long

diatribe against the Foreign Legion, announced that "at the suggestion of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Prussian Minister for Worship and Public Education had decided to introduce into the new editions of reading books in use in the schools of the Western provinces of the monarchy, which are principally interested in the questions of the Foreign Legion, extracts from a work published by Robert Lutz at Stuttgart, exposing the true nature of the Legion, so as to give the youth in our schools the necessary warning."

School inspectors and provincial presidents were advised to do their utmost in this direction.

When reprinting this note, the *Kölnische Zeitung* emphasized its true character by heading it, "An official warning against the Foreign Legion."

Shortly afterwards General von Heeringen, the War Minister, abused the Foreign Legion from the tribune in the Reichstag.

The note in the *Norddeutsche Zeitung* and the Minister's speech were greeted with indescribable enthusiasm by the entire German Press. The *Münchener neueste Nachrichten*, the *Vossische Zeitung*, the *Post*, the *Reichsbote*, the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, the *Rheinisch-Wesphaelische Zeitung*, the *Taegliche Rundschau*, the *Kreuz-Zeitung*, etc., vied with one another in praising the Government, which, departing from its usual moderation, had at last officially taken part in the struggle against the Foreign Legion.

But this did not suffice. The campaign still requires definite sanction. The Government is asked to denounce the institution of the Foreign Legion as contrary to the law of nations. This theory, which has been outlined by Dr. Leuter in a review, *Die Zeit im Bilde*, is always being taken up by the Pan-German Press.

The *Kreuz Zeitung* tries to prove that the enlistment of Germans in the Legion is null and void according to German civil law, and therefore the French Government is exercising an illegal and intolerable constraint over a German subject when it tries to keep him against his will, and the Imperial Government, as the accredited protector of all its subjects, ought to step in and ask for an explanation.

The *Hamburger Nachrichten* proposes to raise the question at the tribunal of The Hague.

This proposal, by the way, is all the more absurd in that no convention for arbitration—except on questions concerning Morocco—exists between France and Germany.

Supposing Germany summons us to The Hague to discuss our right to enlist foreign volunteers—shall we answer the summons?

Alas! possibilities of war abound; such as the political crisis, resulting from the antagonism between a military and administrative organization essentially aristocratic and feudal, and the rising of a popular tide which surges up against it; financial difficulties, the result of the uninterrupted expenditure on armaments; the irresistible need for economic expansion consequent upon an industrial and commercial over-production which can find no sufficient outlets in the present state of international transactions. Over and above all these there are all the possibilities which we have encountered when we discussed German megalomania, the huge appetite of the conqueror, the exasperated pride of the dominating race which brooks no failure.

* * * * *

There can be no doubt that even a trivial incident may lead to a bloody conflict when two countries, armed to

the teeth, perpetually at bay, are watching, spying on one another, and are determined not to forgive the smallest injury or submit to the most trifling humiliation.

Will the incident be fortuitous? It is hardly probable. Hitherto fortuitous incidents have always been settled between France and Germany, and the fiercest Pan-Germans, even though they use the pretext to insult our country, have never yet proclaimed the *casus belli*.

For it has always been understood across the Rhine that the fatal incident shall develop according to the best Bismarckian methods—that is to say, it will be carefully prepared, and will proceed along lines that have been previously laid down and planned. Do not imagine that the Ems telegram *coup* cannot be repeated.

One of the most important German business men and financiers, Herr von Walther Rathenau, said to M. Georges Bourdon: “Not only will our pacific people not refuse to answer the call to arms, but the Ems telegram *coup* has only to be repeated and it will rise without a word.”

This *coup* will be repeated, both to give Germany the moral advantage of a nation which is defending itself against provocation and attack, and to furnish France's allies—not to mention her internal enemies, anti-patriot revolutionaries—with an excuse for their defection.

After Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter's death, one of his intimate friends asserted that he had been told in confidence that the gunboat *Panther* had been sent to Agadir in the hope that some act of hostility would be committed against the ship or her crew. By this means Germany would be attacked and her allies would have to come to her defence, while France's allies would have the right to stand aloof from the struggle.

Can this be really true? At all events there is no

denying that General von Bernhardt has enlarged upon precisely the same idea with the utmost calm :

"Let it then be the task of our diplomacy so to shuffle the cards that we may be attacked by France, for then there would be reasonable prospect that Russia for a time would remain neutral. This view undoubtedly deserves attention, but we must not hope to bring about this attack by waiting passively. Neither France nor Russia nor England need attack in order to further their interests. So long as we shrink from attack, they can force us to submit to their will by diplomacy, as the upshot of the Morocco negotiations shows, and as the result of the Balkan crisis will probably show likewise.

"If we wish to bring about an attack by our opponents, we must initiate an active policy which, without attacking France, will so prejudice her interests or those of England, that both these States would feel themselves compelled to attack us. Opportunities for such procedure are offered both in Africa and in Europe. . . ."

This explains why all Franco-German incidents since the Schnaebelé affair have been amicably settled, because they did not fulfil all the required conditions ; but the first incident which, as though by chance, does fulfil all these conditions *will not be settled*.¹

¹ "In April, 1887, the commissary-special, an agent of the Ministry of the Interior at Pagny-sur-Moselle, the last French station on the frontier of the annexed territory of Lorraine, having stepped across the boundary to regulate some official matter with the corresponding functionary on the German side, was arrested. It was said that Schnaebelé was arrested actually on French soil, and on whichever side of the line he was standing he had gone to meet the German official at the request of the latter. Bismarck justified the outrage in a speech in the Prussian Landtag, which suggested that it was impossible to live at peace with a nation so bellicose as the French. In France the incident was regarded as a trap laid by the Chancellor to excite French opinion under the aggressive guidance of Boulanger and to produce events which would precipitate a war."—"France," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, eleventh edition. [Translator's note.]

VI

WAR " NECESSARY "

To test and strengthen the military virtues of the German army—
To secure the peace of the world—To save Germany from an
economic and financial crisis—France in danger!

THE theory is beginning to gain credence in high German military circles that an army which has attained the maximum of preparation, which has profited by the best and most perfect conditions of training and meticulous organization, which in a word has become the ideal weapon of warfare, that army must be used, or it will deteriorate.

The generals of the Military League, without troubling to explain the contradiction, alternately cry down the German army when it is a question of raising loans to increase its strength, or maintain that it has reached a degree of perfection beyond which there can be nothing but staleness and discouragement from the inevitable disappointment which follows sterile effort and forced inaction.

When they are pursuing this second tack, one of their arguments is drawn from a skilful comparison between the German army, which has not taken the field for forty-two years and has few officers and fewer men who have ever received their baptism of fire, and the French army, which is constantly adding the names of victories to its colours. They point out what an invaluable school

of warfare its colonial campaigns have been to the French army, giving opportunities as they do for practical experiments in material and tactics, and for natural selection of immense value among its leaders.

No doubt a Franco-German war would differ in many respects from a campaign against the Annamites, Soudanese, or Moroccans, but there is nothing on the German side to counterbalance the prestige of that group of officers who have won such brilliant reputations—Galliéni, Dodds, d'Amade, Marchand, Gouraud, Mangin, Largeau, etc.

Then there are our black troops who are getting training and experience, and whose military value is progressing steadily.

In short, as France is determined to reply by corresponding measures to every increase of German contingents and every improvement in its engines of destruction, it is in Germany's interest not to postpone the inevitable conflict.

Since its professors of tactics and its instructors received a severe check, and its artillery was proved to be inadequate, the German army, badly hit by the collapse of Germanized Turkey, wants to recover confidence in itself by experimenting personally and testing its own strength.¹

¹ The recruiting of the German army is threatened, at all events, in the numerical advantage which, owing to our low birthrate, it has possessed up till now over the French army. The German birthrate is now beginning to decline and to a very considerable extent. In 1912 there were 500,000 fewer births than in 1901, and during the last few years the annual decrease has been from 60,000 to 70,000. If this decline continues, in fifteen years' time the excess of births over deaths, which is still, we must not forget, more than 800,000, will be replaced by a deficit. From this fact Pan-Germans naturally conclude that, as a settlement of accounts with France is inevitable, it would be better to get to work before Germany has to some extent lost the numerical advantage over her opponent.

This experiment and this test seem all the more urgently required that morbid germs are infecting the noblest parts of that tremendous warlike organism of which Germany is so proud. The Krupp trial was particularly enlightening in this respect. It is said that during the hearing the Emperor was kept informed every hour of the depositions of the witnesses and the explanations of the accused. He could not ignore the profound and widespread bearing of this scandal, and he must have felt still more apprehension for the future than humiliation for the present.

Is it too daring to imagine that at that moment William the Peacemaker at last recognized the irresistible pressure of those obscure needs and forces which must one day soon drive him to the solutions of the stern iron law?

* * * * *

One of the most disquieting elements revealed by a study of Franco-German relations, and one which leads to dangerous political instability in the mutual dealings of the two countries, arises, strange to say, from the Emperor's unsettled, pacific leanings.

It is because he sincerely wishes for the peace of the world and because, from year to year, he sees how increasingly impossible that is, unless it can be founded upon an *entente* if not alliance with France, that William II will find himself compelled to make war.

At first sight the statement seems paradoxical, but it only expresses a simple truth.

To seek in vain for a valuable or useful friendship ends by being very exhausting and irritating. The man who refuses obstinately to shake the hand

that is courteously offered him, exposes himself to a request for an explanation, generally followed by a blow.

William II said it in so many words to one of our fellow-countrymen: "I am tired of holding out a hand that you decline to see." This accounts for the fluctuations and suddenness in his attitude towards us, his unexpected advances, so pressing and indiscreet, followed by violent, provocative words.

He is as incapable as every other German of contemplating the only solution of the problem—the restitution, or rather the exchange, of Alsace-Lorraine—and therefore considers our reserve as a personal injury and cannot grasp its motive.

If on the other hand he does grasp it only too clearly, it is the most dangerous incentive to him to adopt the argument repeatedly advertised by Pan-Germans, namely, that a lasting peace between France and Germany can only be realized at the price of a decisive war. The war may therefore break out immediately after an exhibition of imperial cordiality, not from any particular duplicity, but because William II will have reasoned thus: "There is nothing to be done with these people. They will never forget and they will never give up hope as long as they are strong enough to have the right to hope. Let us be done with them, the sooner the better. Then when I have annihilated France I shall secure the peace of the world and deserve the name of William the Peacemaker."

To conclude that William II will never consent to war because he has kept the peace for twenty-five years is to ignore the irresistible logic of events, is to build upon the most fleeting and dangerous of dreams, and is to court light-heartedly the most tragic disillusionment.

William II the Pacific will want war as soon as he is convinced that it is *necessary*.

* * * * *

Germany offers to the casual observer the imposing spectacle of an immense factory or business house at its busiest time. M. François Deloncle, a French deputy, on returning from a rapid visit through industrial and commercial Germany, rejoiced to think that a country so absorbed in important interests must of necessity be so wedded to peace, and he expressed a hope that no one would disturb the Colossus at work. . . .

In the first place the economic condition of Germany is very far from being what one would gather, judging by appearances.

Secondly, it is not our fault that there are many Germans who consider that war is as essential on the grounds of material interests, trade, production and exchange as it is on political grounds.

Certainly Germany's industrial and commercial prosperity has developed in marvellous and unexpected proportions. At the time of William II's twenty-fifth anniversary the *Taegliche Rundschau* proudly quoted figures to show what progress had been made by the Empire in that quarter of a century.

The return of German agriculture had increased from 50 to 80 per cent. In 1912, cereals produced 2 billion 800 million marks, cattle 4 billions, milk 2 billion 750 million, making a total for these products alone of nearly 10 billion marks or 12 billion 500 million francs. The figures for commercial industries in 1912 reached 25 billion francs, of which nearly 12 billion were exports. The production of iron has trebled, coal is seven times

as great. German railways, in this quarter of a century, have grown from 40,000 to 70,000 kilometres of lines. Savings-bank deposits have increased by nearly 13 billion francs. The increase in national wealth may be calculated at from 5 to 7 billion francs a year. . . .

These figures correspond to the reality : Germany's production and trade is increasing steadily, she is getting richer. But by a singularly disturbing coincidence, it cannot be denied that the general increase of wealth is leading to an economic and financial crisis.

The reason for this is that all the money that has been made has been invested in new and often risky undertakings. We must admire the enterprising German spirit which never leaves its capital idle and is never content with the profit realized, but is always venturing on vaster operations to increase its funds. But in the end a very precarious state of affairs is reached, when all this wealth is represented only by speculative values.¹

A forced liquidation, brought about by some great event, would be terrible for high commerce and high finance. Securities cannot be realized, money is dear because it is scarce, credit is shaky, even State credit : the last loans raised by the kingdom of Prussia or the German Empire were not entirely covered in spite of the combined effort—by order—of the insurance societies, savings-banks, and credit societies.

In fact the financial condition of the State is bad. The imperial budget is continually swelling. Taxes are getting heavier, and in order to cover the expenditure necessitated by the passing of the last military law, recourse was made to a dangerous expedient which introduces State Socialism into the finances of feudal Germany.

¹ See *Les Embarras de l'Allemagne*, by M. Georges Blondel.

An agrarian crisis, closely connected with the political crisis, is now in process, and is turning in favour of Socialism. In spite of the progress in agriculture of the last few years, it is not sufficient to feed the population of Germany. For meat and cereals more particularly she is dependent upon foreign countries. In their anxiety not to be penalized by these imports, the peasants insist upon protective tariffs which are highly prejudicial to the inhabitants of the towns, who find the most necessary commodities reach exorbitant prices. Between peasants and townfolk the struggle rages from economic grounds to political grounds, and in Prussia especially the situation is getting acute.

As a vivid example of what is taking place in the industrial world we will consider the metal trade.

At first sight this industry seems to have reached the most astounding prosperity: Germany produced 13 million tons of cast iron in 1907 and 20 million in 1913.

Unfortunately, the immediate result of this abnormal output was a general fall in prices. Bars of steel which were worth 124 marks at the end of 1912 have now fallen to 100 marks. There is the same proportion in the fall of steel and sheet iron.

The *Vorwärts*, a Socialist journal, stated in August, 1913, that this state of affairs could not go on beyond a certain point.

“There will be violent struggles to open new markets for Germany, and, consequently, there will be fresh international complications. Germany exports half her iron and steel manufactures to foreign countries; as other countries have colonies to secure their markets, Germany will be obliged to look for some.”

The threat is unmistakable and it is forced on us by necessity.

What is more, Germany's vast iron works will be short of raw material ; her iron ore will only last for a very short time.

" In 1940 the iron ore of Luxemburg will be exhausted, and before another ten years have passed its output will have reached the maximum. In 1950 German iron ore will be exhausted, and in twenty years' time its output will reach the maximum. Therefore, before forty years have passed, Germany will be on the eve of a most colossal catastrophe—that is, the shutting down of the works which are scattered throughout the Rhine Province, Westphalia, Silesia, and the Sarre valley. That will mean that twenty million people will immediately be reduced to seeking their bread ; credit societies will fail, and a crisis will ensue far more appalling and on a much larger scale than any which Germany has as yet produced—as she does at regular intervals to our astonished gaze. . . . When a nation has reached such a pitch that it is obliged to collect the smallest particles of ferruginous dust contained in the gases which escape from its blast furnaces ; to mix them with cellulose to make briquettes to put them back into the furnace ; when this is done, not with the perfectly legitimate commercial object of economizing, but by its own confession, in order to postpone for four or five years the terrible disaster which the disappearance of its ore will entail, one may safely say, without exaggeration, that it is on the edge of the abyss as far as iron is concerned."¹

Germany, as she feels disaster overtaking her, has sought everywhere for iron : in Spain, in England, in Sweden, even in Morocco.

¹ *Ou va l'Allemagne ?* by M. Gaston Henry. See also *L'Allemagne aux abois*, by the same author.

Why go so far afield when she has within her reach the richest country in the world in iron ore—France?

The slow immigration has already begun. There are German works in Meurthe-et-Moselle, in the Briey region, of which a third is in German hands, the important Thyssen works in Normandy which have several factories and furnaces, and the port of Diélette.

All this is only one step on the line of invasion along which Germany will one day have to advance with all her standards unfurled, for the conquest of our mineral wealth must infallibly become for her industry a question of life or death.

Thus we have proved the twofold statement that the economic condition of Germany can never let her be content with an indefinite period of peace, and that it does not rest with us to avoid the certain clash of material interests which are absolutely antagonistic.

When we reflect that Germany tries to prohibit us from insisting that her manufacturers shall declare that all the cheap goods they dump upon us are "made in Germany";¹ when we see this country, which is short of wheat, offering 55 marks a ton of flour to its subjects in order that they may export it and ruin our peasants;² when we realize that the day is coming when we shall be obliged to take measures to protect ourselves against

¹ Furious protests were aroused in Germany and threats of reprisals from the German Government, because the French Customs decided to apply the letter of the Customs Law of 1892, article 15, which stipulates that German goods shall bear the mark "Made in Germany!"

² The *Berliner Tageblatt* (July 29th, 1913,) gives the following explanation: "Premiums on exports from Germany are not confined to cereals. All iron and coal industries have introduced them so as to ruin methodically the industry in neighbouring countries. Their agents report bankruptcies and catastrophes as they occur, and when they consider that the country to be invaded is no longer in a position to resist, the price is raised again."

the invasion of German hands,¹ against the disturbing swarms of German agents in every branch of our industry and commerce, is there the faintest ground for hoping that the fatal crash can be avoided? ²

Just as in the purely political order of ideas, France cannot escape from the dilemma of recognizing German supremacy and submitting to it once for all or of conquering her independence as a great nation, with arms in her hands; so in the economic sphere we must either accept submissive vassalage or secure by force the right to be masters in our own land.

On June 8th, 1913, the *General Anzeiger*, an Independent Frankfort newspaper, wrote:

"Germany's great development demands new outlets. It is only by a war that we shall be able to overcome the opposition of other nations. Our successes in peaceful competition in most spheres of human activity are what will inevitably precipitate war.

"It is a profound error to believe, as we often hear, that nations can live side by side indefinitely in peaceful rivalry. All competition is a necessary struggle in the life of nations."

Let us grant pacifists all they ask: that William II loathes the idea of war, that the German people do not hate us, and that the German democracy—which votes huge military credits and increased effectives—will

¹ French working-men's trade unions, though they do not pay much attention to international principles, are getting alarmed themselves at the invasion of foreign hands. Besides the metal-workers' federation, the builders' union has taken up the matter.

² Extract from an article in the *Deutsche Export Revue*:

"If we wish to conquer a country economically and permanently, we must begin by exporting men. . . . Some countries ask to be conquered; there are others which it is indispensable to conquer; the time comes at last when that conquest must necessarily be undertaken. With regard to German trade relations with France, these three conditions are now fulfilled."

leave no stone unturned to maintain peace. Granted all these points—and needless to say France will never be the provoking party—the eventuality of an armed conflict is none the less certain for the reason which the *General Anzeiger* points out, and which is economic competition.

Germans need our financial market in order to get money, they need our commercial market to dispose of their over-production, they need our land for their surplus population, our iron ore to supply their gigantic iron works. We cannot concede them one atom of all this, for that would mean the end of France, our total subjection. The German Government may hesitate to take it by force, while it is counting the cost, and while it waits for particularly favourable circumstances. But can we doubt that when the German people are hungry, when the out-of-work are clamouring at the doors of the overflowing bureaus, when furnaces are shut down for want of raw material, can we doubt that an explosion of anger and jealousy will hurl them in immense hordes towards our land, just as in old days for similar reasons came hordes of Goths, Vandals, Alans, and Suevi?

For Germany, war is not only inevitable, it must be very soon necessary.

Yes, as I lay down my pen, I repeat with renewed conviction the cry of alarm that I wrote at the head of these pages: *France is in danger!*

Not only is she in danger, as she was after the fatal war of 1870, by the inexorable chain of circumstances; nor because it has been proved, after long and hopeless waiting, and many fruitless attempts, that no solution of peace is possible.

Henceforth France is in danger because of the deliberate will and concerted plan of a powerful society of bellicose doctrinaires, who have made her final annihilation at no very distant date the first condition of the gigantic work towards which imperialist Germany aspires.

France is in danger because of all the old reasons which still exist and are aggravated every day, but also for new reasons of which no one had warned her, and which she had to be told.

INDEX

- Africa, East, Anglo-German agreement, 13.
- Agadir incident, ix, 35, 47, 145.
- Algenciras, conference of, 34; result, 44.
- Alldeutsche Blaetter*, extracts from, xvii, 39, 42, III; issue of, 14.
- Alldeutsche Verein für die Ostmark*, manifesto, 85.
- Alldeutscher Verband*, 12, see Pan-German.
- Allgemeiner Deutscher Sprachverein*, Society, 16.
- Alsace-Lorraine, epoch of Germanisation inaugurated, 47; oppressive policy, 53; question of the restoration, 137-40; Bills of Exclusion against, 140.
- Alsatian Mechanical Construction Company, xiii.
- Andler, Charles, *Le Socialisme impérialiste dans l'Allemagne contemporaine*, extract from, 58, 59.
- Anglo-German agreement relating to East Africa, 13.
- Annual Register, extracts from, xi note, 34 note, 35 note.
- Antwerp, number of Germans in, 118.
- Armee Zeitung*, extract from, 83.
- Arndt-Bund*, 94.
- Arning, Herr, at Göttingen, 89.
- Arracourt, incident at, x note; patriotism of, 104.
- Arren, Jules, "Guillaume II: ce qu'il dit, et ce qu'il pense," 3 note.
- Atlas, the Pan-German, 8.
- Austria-Hungary, Pan-German League in, 75; number of Leagues and Societies, 76, 77; relations with Germany, 78.
- Austria-Hungary, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, character of his policy, 79; his indecision, 86.
- Badeni, Count, result of the grant of bilingualism to the Czecks, 73-5; rescinded, 75.
- Ballin, Albert, 29.
- Basle station, 128.
- Bassermann, Herr, leader of the National Liberals, xvii; his imperialist policy, 53.
- Bebel, Herr, on the policy of Germany in Morocco, 33.
- Beckh, Richard, 99.
- Belgium, number of Germans in, 118, 121; question of the neutrality, 118-20; reorganization of the army, 119.
- Bérenger, Senator Henry, 121 n.
- Berlin, Pan-German League meeting, forbidden, 74.
- Berliner Post*, 21; extract from, 124.
- Berliner Lokal Anzeiger*, 21, 22.
- Berliner Morgen Post*, 20.
- Berliner neueste Nachrichten*, 22, 26; extract from, 132.
- Berliner Tageblatt*, 20, 53; extracts from, 69, 155 note.
- Berne Conference, 53, 127, 138.
- Bernhard, Prof. Ludwig, 94.

- Bernhardi, Gen. F. von, *Deutschland und der nächste Krieg*, 134-6; on the policy of forcing attack, 146.
- Bernhardt, Sarah, 47 *note*.
- Bethmann-Hollweg, Herr von, 47; on the antagonism of Germans and Slavs, 72; his statement on the support of Austria, 82.
- Bismarck, Prince, gift of a sword, 5 *note*; his treatment of the Pan-German League, 74; support of the St. Gothard railway scheme, 126.
- Bley, Fritz, *Niederlande und die alldeutsche Bewegung*, 122 *n*.
- Blondel, Georges, *Les Embarras de l'Allemagne*, 152 *note*.
- Blume, von, *Strategie*, 136 *note*.
- Bohemia, League of Germans in, 76; number of societies, 77; race antagonism, 77 *note*.
- Bourdon, Georges, 107, 145; *L'Enigme allemande*, 20 *note*; extract from, 94.
- Bourson, Paul, 24, 140 *note*.
- Breitenbach, Herr von, Minister of Public Works, on the scheme to alter the course of the Rhine, 124.
- Breusing, Admiral von, at the Pan-German League meeting at Hanover, 63; his series of speeches, 66.
- Breslau, Congress of the Pan-German League at, 52 *note*, 70, 99, 141.
- Brunswick, Pan-German League meeting at, 48, 65, 81.
- Brunswick, Duke of, his betrothal, 52.
- Bukovina, League of Germans in, 76.
- Bülow, Herr von, on the Moroccan question, 32, 33; his law against Poles and Danes, 46.
- Bund der Deutsch-Oesterreicher in Deutschen Reiche*, 75.
- Bund der Deutschen in Boehmen*, 76.
- Calmbach, Heinrich, his *Alldeutscher Katechismus*, 8 *note*.
- Cambon, Jules, xi *note*, 35; his interview with Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, 103 *note*.
- Caprivi, Chancellor von, 40.
- Carillo, Gomez, *Entre l'influence française et allemande en Espagne*, 131.
- Carolines, island of, annexation, 42.
- Casablanca deserters, incident, 34, 141.
- Catechism, the Pan-German, 6, 8.
- Cherbourg, accident at, 26 *note*.
- Class, Herr, President of the Pan-German League, xvii, 15; his pamphlet *Have we lost Morocco? (Marokko verloren)*, xvii, 33; manifesto, 7; *Western Morocco must belong to Germany (Westmarokko deutsch!)*, 36, 101; at Erfurt, 37; *Die Bilanz des neuen Kurses (The Balance of the "New Course")*, 43; on the relations between Germany and France, 64; at Munich, 67; his views on the support of Austrian claims, 81; his suppression of a phrase in his pamphlet, 102.
- Colonial Union*, 13.
- Comert, Pierre, his study of "German Chauvinism," 18.
- Constant, M. d'Estournelles de, at Berne, 138.
- Cumberland, Duke of, *see* Brunswick.
- Czecks, grant of bilingualism, result, 73-5; rescinded, 75.
- Daily Telegraph*, interview with Emperor William II, 46.
- Delbrück, Prof., on the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine, 138.
- Delcassé, M., his dismissal, 34, 44.
- Deloncle, François, result of his visit to Germany, 151.
- Delsor, Abbé, xiv *note*.
- Denais, Joseph, xiv *note*.

- Deutschbund* (German Society), 15.
- Deutsche Export Revue*, extract from, 156 note.
- Deutsche Jugendwehr*, 17.
- Deutsche Kanzlei, Hilfsstelle für vaterländische Arbeit*, 16.
- Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft*, 16.
- Deutsche Sorgen von einer Schwarzseher*, 45.
- Deutsche Tageszeitung*, 21, 26; extracts from, 4, 27.
- Deutsche Warte*, 22.
- Deutsche Zeitung*, 22.
- Deutscher Flottenverein*, 16.
- Deutscher Kriegerbund*, 16.
- Deutscher Kurier*, 53.
- Deutscher Ostmarken-Verein*, 17.
- Deutscher Schulverein*, 77.
- Deutscher Schutzverband gegen die Fremdenlegion*, 141.
- Deutscher Stipendien-Verein der Provinz Posen*, 17.
- Deutscher Verein für das nördliche Schleswig*, 17.
- Deutscher Wehrverein* (Society for German Defence), 16; founded, 47.
- Deutschland als Weltmacht*, 97 n.
- Deutsch-nationaler Handlungs-Gehilfen Verband*, 17.
- Diether, Herr Otto, 22.
- Dortmund, 66.
- Dresden, meeting at, 73.
- Egger, Pan-German League, meeting at, 74.
- Eichler, Herr Otto, editor of the *Deutsche Zeitung*, 22.
- Eisenach Congress, 43.
- Elsasser Tageblatt*, 25.
- Encyclopædia Britannica*, extract from, 146 note.
- Erdmann, Herr Georg, *Deutschlands nächste Aufgaben*, 106.
- Erfurt, 37; congress at, 48, 64.
- Esslingen, meeting at, 32.
- Eulenburg, Prince Philip of, 29.
- Foreign Legion, Pan-German campaign against, 140-4.
- France, restoration of three years' service, 70, 87, 133; reorganization of military forces, 87; German demands of cessions of territory, 100-6; result of defeat, 105-7, 115; expulsion of inhabitants, 108; question of Alsace-Lorraine, 137-40; the Foreign Legion, 141-4; character of the army, 148; relations with Emperor William II, 150; the iron ore works, 155; in danger of war, 157.
- Franco-German Convention of 1911, 36.
- Frankfort, Treaty of, 32, 104.
- Frymann, Daniel, *Wenn ich der Kaiser wäre* (*If I were the Emperor*), extracts from, 8 note, 10, 50, 79, 80; his views on the abandonment of Morocco to France, 36; on the result of defeat to France, 106, 109, 110; on the position of Belgium in a Franco-German war, 120; on an aggressive policy, 132.
- Für Wahrheit und Recht*, extract from, 105.
- Fürbringer, Herr, 124.
- Fürstenberg, Carl, 29.
- Galicia, League of Germans in, 76.
- Gautier, Théophile, his definition of patriotism, xvi.
- Geibel, Emmanuel, his poem, 4.
- General Anzeiger*, extract from, 156.
- German Apprehension by a Pessimist*, 45.
- Germany, increase of the army, xii note, 63; military laws passed, 40, 55, 56, 61, 132; intervention in the settlement of the dispute between Japan and China, 41; Reichstag dissolved, 45; policy of the Radical party, 52, 53; the Socialists, 54; amount of war

- contribution, 66, 70 ; relations with Austria-Hungary, 78 ; demands cessions of territory from France, 100-6 ; result of victory, 108 ; system of strategic railways, 120 ; the right of control over Swiss railways, 127 ; number of Germans in Switzerland, 129 ; question of Alsace-Lorraine, 137-40 ; character of the army, 147 ; decline of the birth-rate, 148 *note* ; industrial and commercial prosperity, 151 ; financial condition, 152 ; the metal trade, 153.
- Germany, Crown Prince of, his hymn of the sword, 4 ; Pan-Germanism, 5 ; his disapproval of the treaty of 1911, 37 *note*.
- Germany in Arms*, 4.
- Goltz, Baron von der, *Kriegführung*, 136 *note*.
- St. Gothard railway, 127, 128.
- Göttingen, 66 ; meeting at, 89.
- Goulven, J., "Le Pangermanisme en Afrique," 118 *note*.
- Grafenstaden incident, xiii.
- Grégoire, Dr., 25.
- Grosjean, Georges, 9.
- Grumbach, Salomon, 24 *note*.
- Haberthur, the legionary, case of, 142.
- Hakatist Society, 17.
- Hamburg, 63.
- Hamburger Nachrichten*, 23, 143, 144.
- Hammerbund*, 15.
- Hanover, congress at, 48, 63, 105.
- Harden, Maximilian, editor of *Zukunft*, 28 ; his views on France, 23 *note* ; attack on Prince P. of Eulenburg, 29 ; at Munich, 89.
- Hasse, Dr., President of the Pan-German League, 13, 14, 43 ; his attack on Emperor William II, 42 ; at Egger, 74.
- Hassmuller, Anton, 24.
- Hauptmann, Gerhart, suspension of his play, "1813," 5.
- Heeringen, General von, Minister for War, on the policy of the Socialists, 57 ; his abuse of the Foreign Legion, 143.
- Heine, Dr. Wolfgang, his patriotic profession of faith, 54.
- Heligoland, cession of, 13.
- Helmer, Paul Albert, 39 ; *Guil-laume II et les pangermanistes*, 40 ; *Les Marches de l'Est*, 99 ; extract from, 100. "Les projets de l'Allemagne dans l'Afrique centrale," 118 *note*.
- Henry, Gaston, *Ou va l'Allemagne?* extract from, 154 ; *L'Allemagne aux abois*, 154 n.
- Hervé, Gustav, 115.
- Heyler, M., head of the works at Grafenstaden, xiii ; his dismissal, xiv.
- Holland, the work of the Pan-German League in, 122 ; number of Germans in, 124 ; schemes for coast defence, 124.
- Huninguen, construction of a bridge-head at, 130 *note*.
- Ilkirch-Grafenstadener Anzeiger*, xiii.
- Iron ore of France, 155 ; of Germany, 153 ; of Luxemburg, 154.
- Italy, the right of control over Swiss railways, 127.
- Itzenplitz, Herr, 15.
- Jagow, Herr von, Under-Secretary of State, x *note* ; on the Nancy incident, 28 ; on the question of Belgian neutrality, 118.
- Jaurès, M., at Berne, 138.
- Jena, Socialist congress at, 57 *note*, 59 *note*. 60.
- Jung-Deutschland Bund*, 17.
- Karlsruhe, meeting at, 62.

- Keim, General von, director of the Pan-German League, 15, 22; his views on increase of armaments, 62; founds the *Wehrverein*, or Association for National Defence, 62; at Hanover, 63; President of the Military League, 67; extract from his speech at Leipzig, 67; on the new military laws for 1914 and 1915, 68; on the Foreign Legion, 141.
- Kempf, Heinrich, xiii.
- Kerr, Herr Alfred, editor of the review *Pan*, 106; on the annihilation of France, 107.
- Ketteler, Baron von, his assassination, 42.
- Kiau-chau, taking of, 41, 42.
- Kiderlen-Waechter, Herr von, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, xi, 47; policy, 35; his career, 47 *note*; his wish to suppress a phrase in Herr Class's pamphlet, 102; interview with M. Jules Cambon, 103 *note*; death, 145.
- Kiepert, his map, 99.
- Klingemann, Herr, 15.
- Knackfuls, Prof., 117.
- Kölnische Zeitung*, 23; extracts from, 6, 48, 65.
- Kreuz Zeitung*, 21, 143, 144; demands new cruisers, 69.
- Krupp trial, result, 149.
- Kull, Franz, *Fünf Jahre Fremdenlegionær*, 142.
- Langhaus, Paul, his maps and atlases, 8 *note*, 15.
- Lehmann, I. F., 15.
- Leipzig, meetings at, 67, 73, 74, 141.
- Leipziger neueste Nachrichten*, 23.
- Lèse-majesté*, crime of, mitigation of penalties in the Penal Code, 45.
- Leuter, Dr., 143.
- Liebert, General von, 15; at Hanover, 63; at Brunswick, 65.
- Liebknecht, Herr, his denunciation of the Crown Prince, 6.
- Liège, forts of, 121.
- Lindequist, Herr von, Colonial Minister, his resignation, 37 *n.*
- Little Germany: a Topsy-turvy picture*, 101.
- Litzmann, General, editor of the *Taegliche Rundschau*, 21.
- Loeher, Franz von, 100.
- Lokal Anzeiger*, extract from, 132.
- Lübeck, Pan-German Congress at, 32.
- Lunéville, German airship lands at, x *note*.
- Luther, Martin, on the teaching of war, 134.
- Lutz, Robert, on the true nature of the Foreign Legion, 143.
- Luxembourg, Rosa, 56.
- Luxemburg, Duchy of, the work of Pan-Germans in, 125; strength of the army, 126; iron ore, 154.
- Luxemburg, Grand Duchess Mary Adelaide, 125.
- Madrid, Pan-Germans in, 131.
- Magdeburg Gazette*, 2.
- Magnus, Herr von, Minister at Copenhagen, 47 *note*.
- Mandel, Herr, 140.
- Martin, Prof. Rudolf, on the result of an Anglo-German war, 102 *note*.
- Mediterranean, German fleet in, 130.
- Metzer Zeitung*, 25.
- "Might creates right," theory of, 95-7.
- Militaer Wochenblatt*, 25.
- Millerand, M., War Minister, xiv *note*.
- Moers, 66.
- Moraht, Commandant, 21 *note*.
- Moravia, Northern and Southern League of Germans in, 76.
- Moroccan treaty concluded, xiii.
- Morocco, question of, 32; Pan-German campaign in, 32.
- Muellheim, 66.

- Muller-Meiningen, Herr, on the policy of the Socialists, 57.
Münchener neueste Nachrichten, 23, 26, 143.
 Munich, congress at, 67, 89.
- Namur, forts of, 121.
 Nancy, incident at, x note, 21 note, 22 note.
- Netherlands, The, German policy in, 122, see Holland.
 Netherlands, Wilhelmina, Queen of, in Paris, 123.
New Times, extract from, 60.
 Nietzsche, F., his views on the virtues of small free nations, 91.
Norddeutsche Zeitung, 26, 69; extract from, 142.
North and South, article in, 106.
- Odin Society*, 15.
 Osten - Sacken - Rhein, von, *Deutschlands nächster Krieg*, 136 note.
 Ostwald, Herr Wilhelm, his article in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, 21 note.
- Paasche, Dr., 37 note.
 Pagny-sur-Moselle, incident at, 146 note.
 Pan-German atlas, 8; catechism, 6, 8.
 Pan-German League (*Alldeutscher Verband*), 12; its foundation, 12; constitution, 13; change of title, 14; principles, 14; members of the committee, 15; societies, 15-18; extent of the organization, 18, 117; campaign in Morocco, 32; relations with Emperor William II, 39, 43, 47; character of the policy, 42, 49-52; influence on increase of armaments, 62; meeting at Hanover, 63; resolutions passed, 64; demands for military laws, 67; strength of the organization, 69; meetings at Leipzig, 73, 74; despatch of three telegrams, 73; anti-Slavonic campaign, 73; meeting at Berlin forbidden, 74; meeting at Egger, 74; organization in Austria-Hungary, 75; number of societies, 76, 77; Manual of the, statistics, 93; theory of "might creates right," 95-7; schemes of conquest and annexation, 100-2; organization in Belgium, 118; in Holland, 122; scheme to alter the course of the Rhine, 123; organization in Luxembourg, 125; in Switzerland, 126; in Madrid, 131; campaign against the Foreign Legion, 140-4.
- Pan-German Press, 20.
 Pan-Germanism, influence of, xv; spirit, 2.
Panther gunboat, despatched to Agadir, xi, 35, 145.
Pariser Presse, 25.
Pariser Zeitung, 25.
 Pau, General, 133.
 Peace Palace, inauguration at The Hague, 106.
 Peez, Alexander of, 115.
 Pfeil, Dr. Joachim, Graf von, *Why must we have Morocco? (Warum brauchen wir Marokko?)* 33.
 Pinon, René, 96; *France et Allemagne*, extracts from, 6, 37 n.
 Plauen, congress at, 43.
 Poincaré, M., his visit to England, 26 note.
 Poles, Prussian, Law of Expropriation against, 111.
Politisch-Militärische Korrespondenz, demands reform of the artillery, 69.
 Poncet, François André, *Ce que pense la jeunesse allemande*, extract from, 58, 90.
 Posen, number of Germans in, 111 note.
Post, The, 143; extracts from, 4, 21 note, 26 note, 44.

- Powles, Allen H., his translation of *Deutschland und der nächste Krieg*, 135 note.
- Preussische Zeitung*, 21.
- Prévot, Dr. René, 24 note, his article "Politique de Galopins," 23.
- Pröll, Herr, at Egger, 74.
- Prussia, Prince Joachim of, 28.
- Puttkamer, General von, 23.
- Quessel, Ludwig, his article on the partition of Africa, 59.
- Rathenau, Emile, 29.
- Rathenau, Walther von, 145.
- Reichsbote*, 21, 143.
- Reimer, T. L., *Ein pan-germanisches Deutschland*, 93.
- Reinbaben, Herr Freiherr von, his inspection of the forts of Liége, 121 note.
- Reismann-Grone, Dr., 15; *Die Deutschen Reichshäfen und das Zollbündnis mit dem Niederlanden*, 122 note.
- Renan, Ernest, his protest against the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, 92.
- Reventlow, Count von, *Wilhelm II und die Byzantiner*, xviii, 44; editor of the *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, 21.
- Rheinisch - Westphälische Zeitung*, 15, 24, 143; extracts from, 51, 91; article on "The German nation will only make war for German interests," extract from, 84.
- Rhine, the boundary line, 1; scheme to alter the course of the, 123.
- Ricklin, Dr., on the question of Alsace-Lorraine, 138.
- Roberts, Field-Marshal Lord, 119.
- Rohrbach, Herr Paul, *German Thought in the World (der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt)*, 7, 89, 106; extracts from, 90-2; number of copies sold, 90.
- Rolck, Lieut. von, 5 note.
- Rommel, Dr., *In the Country of Revenge*, extract from, 7.
- Russia, defeat of the fleet at Tsushima, 33.
- Samoa, island of, annexation, 42.
- Scheidemann, Herr, his views on militarism, 56.
- Schiemann, Prof., 139.
- Schievelkamp, Herr Max, editor of the *Berliner neueste Nachrichten*, 22.
- Schmidt, General von, at Hanover, 63.
- Schmidt, Karl Eugen, 24.
- Schmidt, Prof., on the absorption of Switzerland by Germany, 130.
- Schmoller, Prof. von, 94.
- Schnaebéle, his arrest, 146 note.
- Schnoener, Herr, at Egger, 74.
- School and Fatherland*, *The*, 9.
- Schor, Herr von, Prussian Minister of Agriculture, on the number of Germans in Posen, 111 note.
- Schwäbischer Merkur*, 23.
- Seignobos, M., his views on the increase in the German army, xii note.
- Slavs, relations with Germans, 72.
- Sozialistische Monatshefte*, extract from, 60.
- Spain, Pan-Germans in, 131.
- Spandau, 66.
- Steig, M., Minister of the Interior, xiv note.
- Stein, Prof., editor of *North and South*, 106.
- Stettin, meeting of the Colonial League at, 32.
- Stoessel, Commandant Baron von, 15; at Hanover, 63.
- Strantz, Herr Kurd von, *Ihr wollt Elsass und Lothringen*, 103-5.
- Strassburger Post*, 24.

- Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 53.
 Sudekum, Dr., on the defence of the German Empire, 54 *note*.
 Switzerland, the work of Pan-Germans in, 125; the St. Gothard railway, 126; number of Germans in, 129; of French, 129.
- Taegliche Rundschau*, 20, 21, 22, 26 *note*, 56; extracts from, 121, 143.
Tag, the, 22; extract from, 22 n.
 Tangier, 31, 34.
 Tannenberg, *Grossdeutschland*, 109.
 Thèbes, Madame de, her prophecy, 60.
 Thun, Count, his federalist ministry, 75.
 Tirpitz, Admiral von, 29.
 Troelstra, Herr, 125.
 Trouillot, Georges, *Une autre question de défense nationale*, 129 *note*.
 Tsushima, defeat of the Russian fleet at, 33.
- Universal German Empire, A*, pamphlet, 12; extract from 13.
- Vaterlaendischer Schriften-Verband*, 16.
Verein Deutscher Studenten, 18.
Verein für das Deutschtum in Ausland, 17.
 Vergnet, Paul, criticisms on "France in Danger," xvii.
 Veterans' Societies (*Kriegerverein*), 16.
 Vienna, League of, Germans, 76.
Vossische Zeitung, 143; extract from, 5.
- Wagener, Bruno, 24.
 Wagner, Prof. Adolf, his views on Pan-Germanism, 94.
- Waldensee, Marshal von, his expedition against the Boxers, 42.
 War, the teaching of, 134.
 Wasserliech, training camp at, 126.
Wehrverein, or Association for National Defence, founded, 62; meetings, 63.
 Weisskirchner, Herr, 79 *note*.
 Welschinger, Henri, 26 *note*.
 Werner, Dr., on the patriotism of the Socialists, 55.
Weser Zeitung, 23.
 Wetterlé, Abbé, on the oppressive policy of the Germans in Alsace-Lorraine, 53; on its restitution, 139.
 William II, Emperor of Germany, extracts from his speeches, 3; his method of annotating press cuttings, 27 *note*; his visit to Tangier, 31, 34; relations with the Pan-German League, 39, 43, 47; telegram to President Kruger, 41; statement of his world-policy, 41; his journey to Jerusalem, 42; diatribe against pessimists, 44; result of his interview with the *Daily Telegraph*, 46; betrothal of his daughter, 52; return from Russia, 74; interview with Archduke Francis Ferdinand, 85; his disapproval of Pan-German excesses, 85; design for a picture, 117; relations with France, 149.
 Windhorst, Herr, his opposition to the demands of German imperialism, 68 *note*.
 Winterstetten, Dr. von, on the number of Germans lent to Austria, 80.
 Wittkowsky, 28, *see* Harden.
 Wolf, Herr, at Egger, 74.
 Wolff, K. F., his views on the dominant and conquered races, 111-15.

- Wolff, Herr Théodore, editor of
the *Berliner Tageblatt*, 20.
- Worth, Dr., "Letters from
Morocco," 23.
- Wrochen, General von, 15, 23.
- Zeit im Bilde, Die*, 143.
- Zeitung der Zeitungen*, 28.
- Zislin, Herr, 117.
- Zorn, Herr, Professor of Law, at
Bonn University, 94. 97.
- Zukunft* (Future) weekly review,
28.
- Zwickau, 66.

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